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ABSTRACT 
 
This study provides an historical analysis of the Chicago Public School 
Desegregation Consent Decree, while illustrating its relationship with the Brown v. Board 
of 1954. It provides an analysis of the mission and objectives of all three versions of the 
Consent Decree which include: The Original Consent Decree 1980, The Modified 
Consent Decree 2004, and The Second Amended Decree 2006. The study also provides 
an account of the Brown v. Board case of 1954, defining the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as the conduits between the 
landmark case and the Chicago Public School Desegregation Consent Decree. 
The dissertation answers five questions; the discriminatory practices responsible 
for the Consent Decrees origin, the goals established within the Consent Decree, the 
strategies used to implement the Consent Decree’s goals, the supports and obstacles that 
affected the implementation of the Consent Decree, and the effect of the Consent 
Decree’s implementation on current and future leaders.  
The Chicago Public Schools Policy Manual, official reports of the proceedings of 
the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, and transcripts from the signing of the 
Original, Modified, and Second Amended versions of the Consent Decree served as 
valuable primary resources to support this study. Court transcripts from the Brown v. 
Board court case assisted in establishing the relationship between the landmark case and 
the Chicago Public School Desegregation Consent Decree. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
 
Dating back to the signing of The United States Constitution in 1776, the United 
States endorsed practices that alienated individuals based on their differences. Even 
before the actions of our forefathers, America’s mistreatment of individuals perceived to 
be different from the majority is well documented. The practice of slavery best illustrates 
America’s commitment to its segregative mentality.  
Although slavery played an important role in the building of the United States, it 
did so with a price.1 From the early 1600’s when America imported its first slaves from 
Africa, to the beginning of the Civil War in 1861, the practice of slavery oppressed 
generations of Black people while creating wealth for American slave owners.2 The Civil 
War ended in 1865, and although slavery was abolished through the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, there were those who still resisted the notion of not owning 
slaves.3 
                                                 
1James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, Slavery and the Making of America (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7. 
 
2Ibid. 
 
3Harvey Fireside, Separate and Unequal (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005), 10. 
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The ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments worked to eliminate 
the last remnants of slavery by giving Blacks citizenship and the right to vote.4 Despite 
these efforts there were still barriers that hindered the ability for Blacks to be treated 
equally. In the late 1800’s, Blacks found themselves still being alienated although slavery 
was no longer in existence. In 1890, the state of Louisiana passed the Separate Car Law, 
making it illegal for Blacks and Whites to ride in the same rail car.5 This would soon 
serve as the catalyst of a larger movement, wherein Blacks began to question if their 
rights were being violated.6 These feelings would later manifest themselves in the Plessy 
v. Ferguson case of 1896.  
The Plessy v. Ferguson case attempted to challenge the premise set forth in the 
Separate Car Act, which established the separation of individuals because of their race.7 
The outcome of the Plessy v. Ferguson case was not in the plaintiffs’ favor, with the 
courts rendering a decision that established the doctrine “separate but equal” and 
legalizing discriminatory practices in America until 1954.8 
America’s ideology as it stood with racial integration was no different when it 
came to how students were educated. Public schooling in the United States mirrored what 
was going on in society by continuously alienating the minority population.  A group of 
individuals spoke out against the racial injustices being imposed on minorities, creating 
                                                 
4Ibid, 21. 
 
5Ibid, 3. 
 
6Ibid, 20. 
 
7Ibid, 3. 
 
8Ibid. 
  
3
in 1909 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).9 In 
1930, Nathan Margold developed a plan for the NAACP to eliminate school 
segregation.10 The original plan was to sue for equal schools at the elementary and high-
school levels.11 Margold’s plan was later modified by NAACP lawyer Charles Houston, 
who became the NAACP’s special counsel in 1935.12 Houston believed that focusing 
efforts on higher education would be more feasible because the idea of integration would 
be met with far less resistance.13 After achieving success in their early discrimination 
cases, the NAACP and its group of lawyers decided to take on the idea of segregation 
completely.14 The emphasis in all education cases was to create integrated school 
settings, rather than attempt to create separate but equal accommodations for students of 
different races.15 
Ultimately, the most monumental case that came out of this new strategy was the 
Brown v. Board of Education case of 1954. The Brown v. Board case actually represented 
a total of five cases, all in separate states (D.C., Delaware, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
                                                 
9National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, About the NAACP, 
http://www.naacp.org/about/index.htm, accessed February 2009. 
 
10Richard C. Hunter, “The Administration of Court-Ordered School Desegregation in Urban 
School District: The Law Experience,” The Journal of Negro Education 73, no. 3 (2004, Special Issue: 
Brown v. Board of Education at 50): 218-229. 
 
11Ibid. 
 
12Ibid. 
 
13Ibid. 
 
14James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and its Troubled 
Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 21. 
 
15Ibid. 
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Kansas).16 These cases were: Belton (Bulah) v. Gebhart (Delaware), Briggs v. Elliot 
(South Carolina), Davis v. County Board of Prince Edward County (Virginia), Bolling v. 
Melvin Sharpe (D.C.) and Brown v. Board of Education (Kansas). All of the lawsuits 
worked to destroy the practices of racism that had taken over the country’s public school 
system.17 
The legal arguments in Brown were presented as follows: 
1. The initial presentation of the case, which did not allow the justices 
sufficient time to consider all of the presented evidence. 
 
The justices were under constant pressure due to the magnitude of the case. It became 
difficult to make an informed decision due to pressure from those whom still prescribed 
to segregative practices. 
2. A second phase, which argued the intentions of the 14th Amendment’s 
framers.18 
 
The NAACP lawyers continued to argue the fact that segregative practices violated the 
equal protection included in the 14th Amendment. The intended meaning of 14th 
Amendment was the subject of great debate throughout the Brown v. Board case. 
3. After the court struck down Plessy v. Ferguson (Brown I), a call for a 
remedy to segregation was initiated. (Brown II). 19 
 
The original Brown verdict that came down in 1954 finally refuted the “separate but 
equal” doctrine established in the Plessy v. Ferguson case. In 1955, the Brown II decision 
                                                 
16Ibid., 30. 
 
17Mark Whitman, Removing a Badge of Slavery: The Record of Brown v. Board of Education 
(Princeton and New York: Markus Wiener Publishing, Inc. 1993), 15. 
 
18Ibid. 
 
19Ibid. 
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established that school districts should seek to integrate schools with “all deliberate 
speed.” 
In 1954, the Brown v. Board I decision finally struck down the decades old 
premise that the segregation of races was a constitutional practice. What it did not do was 
aggressively hold states and their school districts to a timeline by which the 
desegregation process would happen. In 1955, in what was termed Brown II, the court 
issued its enforcement decree.20 The courts took this opportunity to ensure the practices 
set forth in Brown I would be enforced across the country. 
The Brown decision established the idea that the concept of separate but equal 
denied individuals of their rights. The Brown decision required school districts to 
integrate Black and White students within the same schools in efforts to provide a quality 
education for all. This would guarantee that the same effort given to educate Whites 
would be given to their non-White counterparts.  
Following the Brown v. Board of Education decision, many school systems 
entered into judicially supervised Consent Decrees. These Consent Decrees sought to 
compel school boards and their officials to desegregate their districts as federal trial 
courts retained jurisdiction over the disputes until they fully complied with the terms of 
their agreements.21 
A Consent Decree is an order of a judge based upon an agreement, almost always 
put in writing, between the parties to a lawsuit instead of continuing the case through trial 
                                                 
20Barbara Loomis Jackson, “Race, Education, and Political Fear,” Educational Policy 22, no. 130 
(2008). 
 
21Charles J. Russo, Encyclopedia of Education Law (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc, 
2008), 2. 
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or hearing. A Consent Decree is a common practice when the government has sued to 
make a person or corporation comply with the law or the defendant agrees to the Consent 
Decree in return for the government not pursuing criminal penalties. 22 
Consent Decrees in educational disputes are negotiated equitable agreements 
between plaintiffs and defendants in elementary and secondary school settings and in 
higher education. They involve a wide array of issues, such as desegregation and special 
education, wherein courts accept the agreed-upon settlements. In Consent Decrees in 
education defendants, usually school boards or other educational entities, agree to 
discontinue specified illegal activities such as segregation based on race, disability, or 
gender.23 
Organizations often utilize a Consent Decree to prevent their case from entering a 
courtroom. It can be seen as an admission of guilt, as organizations often find themselves 
on the cusp of lawsuits they believe they can’t win. Consent Decrees as they relate to 
racial discrimination in education are no different.  
Many school districts across the country have shown difficulty in developing 
schools that can live up to the requirements set forth in Brown v. Board. San Francisco 
and Seattle are examples of two large cities that have battled with issues of discrimination 
within their schools districts, which resulted in them being forced to work under the 
parameters of a Consent Decree. 
                                                 
22http://dictionary.law.com/, Incisive Media US Properties 2009 (Merriam Webster, 2009). 
 
23Russo, Encyclopedia of Education Law, 27. 
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 In 1982, the San Francisco NAACP brought a legal action in the United States 
District Court [1] in San Francisco stating that San Francisco schools were illegally 
segregated.24 While this litigation initially focused on segregation of African Americans, 
it evolved to include all racial and ethnic minorities.25 In this case both parties agreed to 
enter into a Consent Decree. 
In 2007, the Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle School 
District case challenged whether it was constitutional for the Seattle School District to 
use race as one of the tiebreakers for admission to schools.26 This strategy was put into 
place as a result of a Consent Decree. The Seattle case went all the way to the Supreme 
Court, and on June 28, 2007, the Supreme Court issued its opinion. Justice Kennedy 
stated: 
In the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities it 
is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to adopt 
general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which 
is its racial composition. School boards may pursue the goal of bringing 
together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, 
including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones 
with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating 
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a 
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other 
statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to 
different treatment based on a classification that tells each student he or 
                                                 
24San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified School District, United States District Court, 
N.D. California, Civ. No. C-78-1445, 576 F. Supp., 34. 
 
25Ibid. 
 
26Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu/, 
accessed December 5, 2008. 
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she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand 
strict scrutiny to be found permissible.27 
 
 Justice Kennedy’s reading of the court’s opinion further demonstrated a 
commitment to creating more equitable schools. By being afforded the ability to use race 
as a determining factor in enrollment, school districts were better able to diversify their 
student bodies. 
Public school systems continue to struggle with issues related to ethnicity, race, 
diversity, and multiculturalism.28 Although the Brown decision was in place to make 
education more equitable, inequality as it relates to educational opportunities still exists 
along with the persisting issues associated with race.29 
In 1980, the United States Justice Department set out to sue the Chicago Public 
Schools Board of Education for running a segregated school system.  
The United States has filed a complaint alleging that the Board of 
Education of the City of Chicago (the “Board”) has engaged in acts of 
discrimination in the assignment of students and otherwise, in violation of 
federal law. The United States alleges further that such acts have had a 
continuing system-wide effect of segregating students on a racial and 
ethnic basis in the Chicago public school system.30 
 
The school district was accused of operating in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
                                                 
27Seattle Public Schools. “New Release: Supreme Court Rules in PICS v. Seattle School District."  
By Patti Spencer. June 28, 2007. http://www.seattleschools.org/area/news/0607/ 
SupremeCourtDecision.pdf, accessed June 1, 2009. 
 
28Gail L. Thompson, Through Ebony Eyes (San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2004), 1. 
 
29Ibid. 
 
30United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, United States District 
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 80 C5124, 1980, 1. 
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1964.31 The complaint alleged that the Chicago Public Schools engaged in actions 
regarding student/faculty assignment and other educational practices that promoted 
inequalities regarding how students were educated. Specifically, these practices included 
drawing attendance zone boundaries, adjusting grade structures of schools in racially and 
ethnically segregative ways, allowing racially segregative intra-district transfers by White 
students, maintaining severely overcrowded and thereby educationally inferior schools 
for African American students and less crowded schools for White students, and 
assigning teachers and staff to schools in racially segregative ways.32 
The Board’s stance was ambiguous, neither acknowledging nor denying 
allegations set before them. While they agreed that the school system suffered from 
racially isolated schools, they also acknowledged that it would be financially difficult to 
address the issues.  
The Board neither admits nor denies the allegations of the complaint in 
this action. It recognizes, however, that the Chicago public school system 
is characterized by substantial racial isolation of students… 
 
The Board believes that litigation of this action would require a substantial 
expenditure of public funds and a substantial commitment of Board and 
staff time and resources, at a time when financial and personnel resources 
that are already greatly limited…33 
 
                                                 
31United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, United States District 
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 80 C5124, 2003, 1. 
 
32Ibid. 
 
33United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, United States District 
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 80 C5124, 1980, 2. 
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The two sides, based on the presented information, determined that they would 
settle the action and resolve the United States request for relief by the entry of a Consent 
Decree.34 The original Consent Decree consisted of several basic objectives: 
2.1 Desegregated Schools - The plan will provide for the establishment of 
the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated schools, 
considering all circumstances in Chicago. 
 
2.2 Compensatory Programs in Schools-remaining Segregated - In order to 
assure participation by all students in a system-wide remedy and to 
alleviate the effects of both past and ongoing segregation, the plan shall 
provide educational and related programs for any Black or Hispanic 
schools remaining segregated. 
 
2.3 Participation - To the greatest extent practicable, the plan will provide 
for desegregation of all racial and ethnic groups, and in all age and grade 
levels above kindergarten. 
 
2.4 Fair Allocations of Burdens - The plan shall ensure that the burdens of 
desegregation are not imposed arbitrarily on any racial or ethnic group.35 
 
The Board set out to utilize several techniques to establish the objectives set forth 
in the Consent Decree:  
4.1 Voluntary Techniques. 
4.1.1 Permissive transfers that enhance desegregation, with transportation 
at Board Expense. 
4.1.2 Magnet schools that enhance desegregation 
4.1.3 Voluntary pairing and clustering of schools. 
4.1.4 If magnet schools or other voluntary techniques are used, 
each shall contain racial/ethnic goals and management 
controls (e.g., an alternative that would require mandatory re-
assignments) to ensure that the goals are met. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34Ibid. 
 
35Ibid., 4. 
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 4.2 Mandatory Techniques Not Involving Transportation 
 
  4.2.1 Redrawing attendance areas. 
  4.2.2 Adjusting feeder patterns. 
4.2.3 Reorganization of grade structures, including creation of 
middle schools. 
4.2.4 Pairing and clustering of schools. 
4.2.5 Selecting sites for new schools and selecting schools for 
closing to enhance integration. 
 
            4.3 Mandatory Reassignments and Transportation- Mandatory 
reassignment and transportation, a Board expense, will be included to 
ensure success of the plan to the extent that other techniques are 
insufficient to meet the objective stated in 2.1. The plan may limit the 
time or distance of mandatory transportation to ensure that no student 
shall be transported for a time or distance that would create a health 
risk or impinge on the educational process. These limitations may vary 
among different age and grade levels.  
 
            4.4 Priority and Combination of Techniques- The plan may rely upon the 
techniques listed above and any other remedial methods in any 
combination that accomplishes the objective stated in 2.1.36 
 
 In 2001, the United States and the Chicago Public Schools reviewed the school 
district’s implementation of and compliance with the original Consent Decree and the 
Desegregation Plan.37 It was determined by the court that there were areas of the plan that 
had not reached full compliance.38 These areas related to magnet schools, transfers, 
school openings and closings, attendance zone changes, controlled enrollment, 
assignment of faculty and school based administrators, compensatory programs and 
                                                 
36Ibid, 6-7. 
 
37United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, United States District 
Court, Northern District of Illinois, 80 C5124, 2004, 3. 
 
38Ibid. 
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services for English Language Learner students.39 Twenty-four years after the Original 
Consent Decree came into existence, the United States and Board of Education of the 
City of Chicago entered into a Modified Consent Decree.40 The Modified Consent Decree 
encompassed the original plans set forth in the original Consent Decree of 1980, along 
with new requirements such as new reporting obligations, specific limits on 
desegregation budget, and significant obligations with respect to the Chicago Public 
Schools programs serving English Language Learners.41 The new Modified Consent 
Decree was designed with the intention that its full implementation would address the 
goals set forth in the original Consent Decree and Desegregation Plan.42 The new 
Consent Decree also established a timetable that would bring the case to a final 
resolution.43 
 In 2005, the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois asked the 
United States and the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education to consider what 
provisions of the Modified Consent Decree would continue.44 The court revisited the 
Modified Consent Decree because of the significant changes in racial demographics in 
Chicago’s neighborhoods and schools.45 The student population of the Chicago Public 
                                                 
39Ibid. 
 
40Ibid. 
 
41Ibid., 4. 
 
42Ibid. 
 
43Ibid. 
 
44United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago (August 10, 2006), 1. 
 
45Ibid. 
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Schools did not resemble that of the school population that existed during the creation of 
both the original and modified versions of the Consent Decree.46 As a result of the court’s 
inquiry, and further discovery by both parties, the United States of America and the 
Board of Education of the City of Chicago jointly requested that they vacate the Modified 
Consent Decree and be allowed to enter a Second Amended Consent Decree.47 In the 
proposed Consent Decree, the two parties requested that the Consent Decree 
automatically expire in June.48 The court approved the request to enter a Second 
Amended Consent Decree; however, established that the Consent Decree could not 
automatically expire without the determination being through the court.49  
 The Chicago Public Schools continued to plead its case to try to remove itself 
from the court monitored Consent Decree. The trial was ongoing, as the school district 
continued to struggle with proving its academic programs, school faculty, and facilities 
are equally sufficient for both White and minority students. Fifty-five years after the 
Brown v. Board case refuted the idea that segregation eliminated the possibility of 
equality; the Chicago Public Schools found itself supporting a social pattern that 
encouraged it. Further perpetuating the cause, a new group of educational leaders trained 
to head the Chicago Public Schools have limited knowledge of Chicago’s history with 
segregation as it relates to education. This lack of understanding lends itself to allow the 
                                                 
46Ibid. 
 
47Ibid. 
 
48Ibid., 2. 
 
49Ibid. 
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current and future educational leadership to dismiss the importance of the Consent 
Decree, with the leader remaining oblivious to the idea of its support of the tenets set 
forth in the landmark Brown v. Board case.  
 Twenty-nine years after the proposal of the Consent Decree, U.S. Judge Charles 
Kocoras has ended the federal mandate requiring the district to integrate its schools.50 
This requires even more responsibility for the current and future educational leader. No 
longer with the Chicago Public Schools be required to answer to the courts, making it 
even more essential for educational leaders to embrace the concept of desegregation. 
Dismissing the Consent Decree as just another cumbersome external mandate is 
truly missing the reason why its implementation is so important. Without accurate 
knowledge of the Consent Decree in terms of the history behind its origin, the purpose 
behind its stipulations, and the implications it has on leadership, both current and future 
educational leaders will not be able to carry out the tasks necessary to foster an equitable 
learning environment.    
Throughout the graduate program at Loyola University Chicago, it has been 
established that as agents of change, school leaders should be committed to supporting 
the ideas of social justice. Many educators across multiple fields of study offer several 
definitions of social justice, as well as defining social justice leadership.51 What is 
                                                 
50Azam Ahmed, “Chicago Schools Desegregation Decree Lifted: Federal Judge Says Vestiges of 
Discrimination are no Longer,” Chicago Tribune (September 26, 2009), 4. 
 
51Kathryn McKenzie, Dana Christman, Frank Hernandez, Elsy Fierro, Colleen Capper, Michael 
Dantley, Maria Gonzalez, Nelda McCabe, and James Scheurich, “From the Field: A Proposal for Educating 
Leaders for Social Justice,” Educational Administration Quarterly 44 (2008), 111. 
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consistent with the many interpretations of the social justice concept is that educational 
leaders need to become activist leaders with a focus on equity.52  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to provide the current and future educational leader a 
historical analysis of the Consent Decree, illustrating its relationship with the Brown v. 
Board of 1954. The historical analysis will document the discriminatory practices 
responsible for the Consent Decrees origin, the goals established within the decree itself, 
the strategies used to implement the decree’s goals, the supports and obstacles that 
effected the decree’s implementation, and the effect of the decree’s implementation on 
current and future leaders.   
Research Questions 
The study will answer the following research questions:  
1.  What discriminatory practices, in violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown 
v. Board decision, led to the creation of the Consent Decree?     
2. What were the goals set forth in the Consent Decree aimed at remedying the 
discriminatory practices that were in violation of the tenets set forth in the 
Brown v. Board decision? 
3. According to available documentation, what did educational leaders have to 
do to implement the guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree aimed at 
supporting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision? 
                                                 
52Ibid. 
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4. According to available documentation, what supports/obstacles did the 
Chicago Public Schools and educational leaders face while implementing the 
Consent Decree aimed at supporting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board 
decision?  
5. What implications does the implementation of the Consent Decree aimed at 
meeting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision, have on current 
and future educational leadership?  
Methodology 
 
The research methodology used for this study is historical documentary research. 
“Historical research involves much more than the accumulation of facts, dates, figures, or 
a description of past events, people or developments.”53 Historical researchers utilize 
these resources, but also attempts to reconstruct and present facts and figures in a way 
that represents an understanding of the events from more than one view point.54  It is 
constructed in a manner that is beyond the retelling of past facts, rather it is a flowing, 
fluid, dynamic account of past events that attempts to recapture the complex nuances, 
individual personalities, and ideas that influenced the events being investigated.55  
Primary and secondary sources will be used as research tools for this study. A 
primary source can be an artifact or document in which the creator was a direct witness or 
                                                 
53Burke Johnson and Larry Christensen, Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative, and 
Mixed Approaches (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2004), 391. 
 
54Ibid.  
 
55B.L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon), 
114. 
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in some other way directly involved or related to the event.56 Examples of primary 
sources utilized for this study are documents from the Chicago Public Schools Policy 
Manual, official reports of the proceedings of the Board of Education of the City of 
Chicago, transcripts from the signing of the original, modified, and amended versions of 
the Consent Decree, and court documents from the Brown v. Board court case. 
A secondary source is created from primary sources, secondary sources, or some 
combination of the two.57 These sources give an account of an event from a second hand 
perspective. Examples of books representing secondary sources utilized for this study 
include: Eyes on the Prize by Juan Williams, All Deliberate Speed by Charles Ogletree, 
and Separate and Unequal by Harvey Fireside. 
To document the history of Brown v. Board, court transcripts will be used as 
primary documentation to give an accurate account of what took place during the Brown 
v. Board case as well as establishing the guideline set forth in its decision. Various 
newspaper articles will also serve as primary documentation to provide a sense of what 
was going on socially during the time of the Brown v. Board case. Secondary documents 
will be used to provide commentary about events that took place during the time of the 
litigations, and how the decision affected school leaders of the time. Most of these 
documents will be presented through books that illustrate their own depiction of what 
was took place during the landmark case, as well as providing analysis of the effects of 
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the Brown v. Board decision. The research for both the Plessy v. Ferguson case as well as 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 will also utilize both primary and secondary sources. 
             Actual court documents, board reports, and the Chicago Public Schools press 
releases will be utilized as sources of primary documentation to further inform readers 
about the Consent Decree. Archived periodicals from Chicago’s two major newspaper 
publications, The Chicago Tribune and The Chicago Sun-Times, will provide first-hand 
accounts of the reactions to the court order that established the agreed upon the Consent 
Decree. Archive periodicals from the Chicago Catalyst, an independent educational 
reform publication, will provide some of the educators’ perspectives of the Consent 
Decree. 
             The aforementioned primary and secondary documents will be used to provide 
support for commentary as it relates to the Consent Decree and its creation due to a direct 
violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case. These documents will also be 
used in providing an illustration of the implications on current and future educational 
leaders due to the creation of the Consent Decree. 
The researcher will acquire resources for this study from the Law Libraries 
located in the Chicagoland area such as the Northwestern Pritzker Research Center, 
Loyola University School of Law Library, and the University of Illinois Chicago Louis L. 
Biro Law Library. The researcher will also use resources acquired at the Library of 
Congress in Washington, DC and the Chicago History Museum. Primary documentation 
regarding the Consent Decree will be attained through the Chicago Public School’s Law 
Department as well as from the Chicago Public Schools archivist. 
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Significance of the Study 
Mandates, whether federally or locally imposed, often have a hand in shaping the 
way we educate children. Leaders find themselves in a position that requires them to 
implement these mandates that they may not agree with, or see as viable options for their 
individual schools. The Consent Decree is in place because the Chicago Public Schools 
did not do its part living up to the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision. The 
irony is that many of today’s leaders were not even born when the Brown v. Board case 
took place. 
To properly implement the strategies associated with the Consent Decree, current 
and future educational leaders must understand the Consent Decree’s importance. 
Without understanding the premise behind the creation of the Consent Decree, current 
and future educational leaders will never truly internalize the meaning behind the 
strategies within its contents, making it impossible to foster their true benefits. 
The significance of this study to the field of leadership is that it provides an 
historical perspective as it relates to the Consent Decree. The study provides current and 
future educational leaders with an understanding of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. 
Board decision and how the Consent Decree was developed directly due to a violation of 
these tenets. 
The success of an initiative’s implementation often depends on leaders at the 
building level to implement them. Without some level of “buy in” from the school leader, 
the efforts of ensuring an initiative’s success will be minimal at best. The findings in this 
study will provide current and future educational leaders a comprehensive background 
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illustrating why the Consent Decree came into existence. It is with this new knowledge 
that current and future educational leaders will be armed with the necessary tools to 
ensure the tenets of Brown v. Board case are embraced within their school culture. It will 
also prepare current and future educational leaders to empower their staffs, establishing a 
vision that represents social justice.  
The implications for current and future educational leaders after reviewing this 
study are: 
1. Current and future educational leaders will have a clear picture of the 
correlation between the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision and the 
Consent Decree. This knowledge will give the current and future educational 
leaders a clear understanding of the importance of the Consent Decree. 
2. Current and future educational leaders will have a comprehensive 
understanding of the Consent Decree as it relates to its origin, contents, and 
strategies for implementation. This knowledge will give current and future 
educational leaders a working knowledge of the Consent Decree, making it 
feasible to develop strategies for its full implementation. 
3. Current and future educational leaders will have the necessary knowledge to 
create a framework embracing the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case 
and the effective implementation of strategies set forth in the Consent Decree. 
Previous dissertations have discussed the Chicago Public Schools and its issues 
with racial integration, but not necessarily the Consent Decree itself. These dissertations 
generally looked at issues that took place before the Consent Decree of 1980. The studies 
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emphasized some of the practices of past administrators and the Chicago school district 
that perpetuated racial inequality. In this study an emphasis will be placed on how the 
Chicago Public Schools has been forced to deal with problems of racial inequality under 
the Consent Decree, and what the decree’s implementation means to both current and 
future educational leaders.  
Implications for the Urban School Leader 
 
 Urban school leadership has changed dramatically since the Civil Rights efforts 
during the 50’s and 60’s to achieve educational equity for all.58 The task of leading an 
urban school continually becomes more complex, taxing, and social-service oriented.59 
Urban school principals find themselves facing challenges that would be inconceivable to 
school leaders prior to the Brown v. Board decision.60 
As an urban school principal, the researcher has dealt with the challenges that 
hinder children’s education head on. Children are not only up against the ills of their own 
environments, but also must deal with social and economic issues that are beyond the 
control of the school that they attend. Urban schools across the country are often most 
populated by minorities. These schools often represent some of the city’s lowest 
performing educational institutions.  
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Spencer Academy, where the researcher currently serves as school principal, has 
reaped some benefit from the implementation of the Consent Decree by allowing Spencer 
to work closely with the Chicago Public School’s Office of Academic Enhancement. The 
Office of Academic Enhancement (OAE) was created in 1981 as the Office of Equal 
Educational Opportunity Programs, in conjunction with the development of the Student 
Desegregation Plan for the Chicago Public Schools.61 The primary responsibility of the 
office was to maintain excellence and equity of educational opportunity for all students 
and achieve a prescribed racial/ethnic balance through the creation of the greatest 
possible number of stably desegregated schools.62 The office continues to provide 
coordination and management for educational options for students.63 One of OAE’s main 
responsibilities is to create academic programs that can be utilized by students in 
neighborhood schools. This usually translates in academic distinctions being given to 
schools that remain racially segregated.  Spencer school began with a Math and Science 
distinction, which provided the school both a Math and Science specialist along with 
additional support in both subject areas. The reality though is that although this 
distinction allowed students to apply to Spencer from all across the city, their population 
is still 99.5% African American. The reality is that even with the additional support 
Spencer school is still on probation and has failed to make AYP yet another year. Can 
schools that are segregated by race, mirroring the demographics represented in many of 
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Chicago’s neighborhoods, truly provide equal opportunities for students to be educated? 
That is the question with which the urban school principal struggles with on a daily basis. 
Limitations of the Study 
 
 This study is subject to limitations beyond the control of the researcher and the 
limited scope of the research. The researcher is aware that it is essential to the research 
process that these limitations are acknowledged. The researcher acknowledges these 
limitations and the effect they will have on the study.  
The researcher acknowledges that the research is limited to only analyzing the 
Consent Decree associated with the Chicago Public Schools. This limits the scope of 
study to only Chicago’s desegregation policy, although the implementation of the 
Consent Decrees has affected school districts across the country. The study will only be 
able to provide the reader a perspective of how the Consent Decree was created and 
implemented in the Chicago Public Schools, without consideration of how similar 
decrees effected school leadership in other school districts throughout the United States.  
 The researcher acknowledges that his perspective is limited to that of an 
educational leader, with limited knowledge of the legal system and its policies. This 
limits the amount of legal perspective included within the study. The study emphasizes 
the effect of the implementation of the Consent Decree on current and future leaders, and 
provides limited information on its ramifications and historical significance to the legal 
system. 
The researcher acknowledges that the research does not take into consideration 
the effect of the Consent Decree on student achievement. This limits the ability of the 
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researcher to prove the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the Consent Decree as it relates 
to students and their performance in the classroom. As a result, the reader’s interpretation 
of the decree’s importance must be made without the benefit of knowing its effect on the 
achievement of the students the Consent Decree was created to protect. 
The researcher acknowledges that the research is limited to available documents, 
and does not include the perspective of educational leaders through oral representation. 
This limits the study by potentially excluding the perspectives of many of the school 
leaders who had a hands-on experience during the Consent Decrees implementation. The 
reader will only be provided this perspective from available documents, rather than 
interviews providing personal accounts.  
Biases of Researcher 
The researcher acknowledges the potential biases that could skew the way 
information is presented within this study.  The researcher has maintained a journal 
throughout this study as a strategy to deal with any existing predispositions as they relate 
to information accumulated by the researcher. The journal was shared with the 
dissertation director on an ongoing basis to ensure the integrity of the research, keeping it 
free of individual biases and the manipulation of how data is presented.  
The researcher acknowledges that his racial make-up is the same as that of the 
individuals who experienced the discriminatory practices that led to the Brown v. Board 
decision and the creation of the Consent Decree. The fact that the researcher is of 
African-American descent may create the potential for research to be presented in a 
manner that is in support of the researcher’s race, and make it impossible to look at the 
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Consent Decree objectively. In order to protect the integrity of the study, the researcher 
will keep a journal to express personal feelings or emotions he may have towards 
information accumulated during his research. 
The researcher acknowledges that he works as an educational leader in a Chicago 
Public School that is composed of a student body that is made up of a single race. The 
fact that the researcher works in a single race school may skew his perspective of how he 
perceives the Consent Decree. This perspective may potentially shape how information is 
presented in the study. In order to protect the integrity of the study, the researcher will 
keep a journal to express personal feelings or emotions he may have towards information 
accumulated during his research. 
 The researcher acknowledges that he has personally witnessed administrators 
express frustration with the implementation of the Consent Decree. This experience may 
have negatively influenced the researcher’s perception of the Consent Decree, and could 
possibly have an adverse effect on how the researcher presents it in the study. In order to 
protect the integrity of the study, the researcher will keep a journal to express personal 
feelings or emotions he may have towards information accumulated during his research. 
The researcher acknowledges that he currently works as an administrator in a 
Chicago Public School that has benefited from the implementation of the Consent 
Decree. The fact that the researcher works in a school that has benefited from the 
implementation of the Consent Decree may affect how the researcher presents 
information about its implementation. In order to protect the integrity of the study, the 
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researcher will keep a journal to express personal feelings or emotions he may have 
towards information accumulated during his research. 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter II, Historical Perspective: Prelude to the Consent Decree, provides a 
historical narrative discussing some of the significant events that led up to initiatives such 
as the Chicago Public School Consent Decree. It begins with a synopsis of the Plessy v. 
Ferguson case of 1896. This case was significant because it established that racial 
separation was constitutional.64 The case’s decision served to support more than half a 
century of Jim Crow legislation.65 The Jim Crow laws were the source of many of the 
restrictions placed on Blacks from the late 1800’s to the Brown v. Board litigations.  
Moving from the Plessy v. Ferguson case which was a catalyst in establishing 
racial segregation, the next part of this chapter focuses on the court case that challenged 
it. The Brown v. Board of Education case worked against the concept of separate but 
equal, embracing the idea that there were great disparities between Blacks and Whites of 
the time.   
Although the verdict was handed down in 1954, the plan for school integration 
practices was never fully implemented. The justices tempered the impact of their ruling 
by holding a formal Consent Decree to put the decision into effect.66 Legal experts of the 
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time believed it may be years before the Supreme Court ordered states to comply with its 
decision outlawing racial segregation in the nation’s public schools.67 Although school 
districts were hesitant in implementing the laws of desegregation, eventually they were 
forced to act in accordance with the court’s decision.  
The next part of the chapter discusses the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The bill was 
first introduced by John F. Kennedy in 1963 and was signed into law by Lyndon B. 
Johnson. It was originally designed to uphold the 14th amendment enacted in 1868.68  The 
bill served as a deterrent towards practices of segregation in public places, employment, 
and education.69 Its implementation brought forth a true effort to integrate the nation’s 
school systems. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the years leading up to 
the Consent Decree after the passing of the Civil Rights Act, providing a brief 
introduction of what will be further discussed in Chapter III. These years span between 
the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1980 when the Consent Decree was 
agreed upon.  
Chapter III, An Analysis of the Chicago Public School Consent Decree, provides a 
historical background of the Consent Decree of 1980. The beginning of the chapter 
discusses some of the issues that were going on with the Chicago Public Schools that 
were in direct violation of the tenets set forth in Brown v. Board, which consequently led 
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to the agreement from the Chicago Public Schools to enter into a Consent Decree. In 
1953, Benjamin Coppaage Willis became the new superintendent of the Chicago Public 
Schools.70 During his tenure, the Chicago Public Schools had no system in place to 
collect data on the racial composition of its student body or teaching force until they were 
legislatively mandated in 1963.71 Disparities in how Blacks and Whites of the time were 
educated are well documented. In 1962, the Urban League conducted a study wherein all 
of one of the city’s largest populated elementary schools was in Black neighborhoods.72 
Practices such as these brought attention to a reoccurring problem, and eventually led to 
the lawsuit and eventual court intervention. 
The next part of the chapter discusses the mission and objectives of the Consent 
Decree. This part of the chapter will discuss the original Consent Decree of 1980, the 
Modified Consent Decree of 2004, and the Amended Consent Decree of 2006. The 
Chicago Public Schools claimed to have been working towards desegregated schools for 
some period of time. In a Chicago Tribune article written in 1972, a representative from 
the Chicago Public Schools was quoted: 
The racial desegregation of the Chicago Public Schools is an objective 
pursued for a number of years by government agencies both local 
(Chicago Public Schools Board of Education) and national (the 
Department of Health education, and Welfare).73  
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Despite their commitment, the Chicago school district’s discriminatory practices 
forced them to enter into the Consent Decree.  As stated earlier in the chapter, the 
Chicago Public Schools laid out several goals that were consistent with the tenets set 
forth in the Brown v. Board decision, to be achieved with the original decree’s 
implementation.  
The chapter then discusses what school leaders had to do to implement the 
guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree. Included within this chapter will be a 
discussion about the creation of magnet schools and other similar alternatives designed to 
make schools more diverse. It will also encompass the city’s attempt to create more 
diverse teaching faculties as well as the debate about student travel and schools of choice. 
The chapter ends with a discussion about public perception in regard to the 
implementation of the Consent Decree. One of the requirements of the Consent Decree 
was for Chicago to establish a comprehensive desegregation plan. There were mixed 
reviews as to how communities felt about the Consent Decree and the plan’s 
implementation. Two strategies that caused quite a bit of controversy were the busing of 
students and the integration of school faculties. Although integration seemed like a 
worthy cause, not everyone shared the same sentiment. In the 1970’s, many teachers and 
administrators were transferred to particular schools as part of a system wide faculty 
desegregation strategy. Some of Chicago’s North side schools found themselves newly 
populated with African American students and staff. In an article featured in the Chicago 
Catalyst, a Chicago Public School principal recounts her experiences when she became 
principal of a predominately White school that had just taken on African American 
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students being bused from the Westside of Chicago. “There were phone calls, threats 
[from] some Nazi group, the John Birch Society, the KKK.”74 “So that was my 
welcome.”75 Others, who believed that the current state of education was unjust, 
welcomed the opportunity of better educational circumstances. 
Geography also seemed to play a large role in how people perceived the Consent 
Decree. Chicago, as most urban cities, was not only divided by race, but also 
geographically. Neighborhoods could be easily identified as either White or Black. “The 
very high degree of inequality in the system reflected the new pattern of spatial 
differentiation emerging in Chicago and other large cities.”76 Social scientists have 
consistently regarded Chicago as one of the most residentially segregated cities in the 
country.77 
The attitudes toward the Consent Decree often were predicated on where an 
individual lived. This was no better illustrated than in the Chicago Public Schools Board 
of Education’s first public hearing on desegregation. In a Chicago Tribune article 
covering the event, three women from different parts of the city gave their opinion about 
desegregating schools. 
A woman from the West Side said:  
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We have no quarrel with desegregation, but as parents we should be heard. 
We wish you all would just listen to us for awhile. Please think children, 
not money, because our children are suffering very badly.78 
 
A woman from the Northwest Side said: 
Our [educational] council supports equal education. We are opposed to the 
mass movement of students to enhance desegregation.79 
 
A woman from the Southwest Side said: 
 
I speak for both Black and White parents. We want better schools. We 
want to use the money that might be spent on busing on schools.80 
 
 This excerpt illustrates people’s varying attitudes towards the desegregating of the 
Chicago Public Schools as well as the viewpoints that influenced the public’s feelings 
toward the Consent Decree. As the end of Chapter III concludes with a discussion about 
public perception, it is important to understand that geography played a huge part in how 
people perceived Chicago’s quest toward the desegregation of its school system.  
 Chapter IV, Challenges to the Implementation of the Chicago Public School 
Consent Decree, discusses some of the supports and barriers that occurred during the 
attempt to implement the goals of the Consent Decree.  
The chapter begins discussing some of the issues that went on related to travel. 
The prospect of integrating schools was challenging due in part to the fact that 
neighborhoods were not often integrated. This called for students as well as staff to be 
relocated to other schools to racially balance out a school’s population. Busing was 
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always a controversial topic because of its cost. This chapter looks at the Chicago Public 
Schools and their experiences with transportation as it relates to integrating schools. 
The next part of the chapter discusses the abundance of White citizens that moved 
out of Black urban areas. This phenomenon is often referred to as White Flight. As White 
citizens moved into suburban areas, the demographics of the Chicago Public School’s 
student body began to drastically change. This made the concept of desegregation even 
more elusive. 
The next part of the chapter discusses teacher displacement. One of the 
stipulations set forth in the Consent Decree was to create a more diverse faculty within 
the schools. In order to accommodate this strategy, the Chicago Public Schools adopted 
an involuntary teacher transfer system. The plan developed in September of 1977 
required schools to have a faculty comprised of 35 to 60% minority members.81 This in 
itself brought about issues that stifled the desegregation cause. 
The chapter then discusses the concept of schools of choice, and how the Consent 
Decree placed an emphasis on providing minority students particularly, different options 
for their education. Within this part of the chapter, magnet schools and magnet cluster 
schools will be introduced. The creation of these schools represents some of the many 
strategies the Chicago Public Schools utilized to satisfy the goals of the Consent Decree. 
The chapter moves into a discussion about the lack of government funding 
provided to carry out the Consent Decree. Transportation and building modifications 
accounted for just some of the cost associated with complying with the decree’s 
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implementation. Lack of federal funding not only was a problem in Chicago, but also 
became an issue with desegregation efforts across the country. Requests for funds 
through state legislation were not available here in Chicago, and efforts had to rely on a 
possible $13 million in federal funds under the Emergency School Aid Act.82  This 
chapter looks at how funding the Consent Decree became problematic in its 
implementation. 
The final part of the chapter will discuss the concept of re-segregation, referring 
to the idea that schools, despite all efforts, are becoming segregated once again. This part 
of the chapter will discuss the concepts of desegregation and integration, defining each 
term and laying out their fundamental differences. Making this distinction is imperative 
in understanding the idea of schools being re-segregated. The chapter will then discuss 
some of the viewpoints individuals had about desegregation during the Civil Rights 
Movement, and look at where we are now in comparison to their earlier expectations.  
Chapter V, The Final Analysis, looks directly at the Consent Decree and its 
implications on current and future educational leaders. This chapter will provide the 
findings from this study based on the analysis of historical documents.  
The first part of the chapter reflects on the discriminatory practices that were in 
violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision and led to the creation of 
the Consent Decree. This part of the chapter gives current and future educational leaders 
an accurate understanding of why the Consent Decree came into existence.  
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The next part of the chapter revisits the goals set forth in the Consent Decree 
aimed at remedying the discriminatory practices that were in violation of the tenets set 
forth in the Brown v. Board decision. This part of the chapter gives current and future 
educational leaders a clear illustration of the how the goals of Consent Decree were 
consistent with the expectations laid out in the Brown v. Board case. 
The chapter continues by reflecting on what school leaders had to do to 
implement the guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree that supported the tenets set 
forth in the Brown v. Board decision. This part of the chapter gives current and future 
educational leaders an example of how desegregation effected school leaders and 
influenced their leadership practices. 
The next part of the chapter discusses the supports/obstacles the Chicago Public 
Schools and its school leaders faced while implementing the Consent Decree aimed at 
supporting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision. This part of the chapter 
gives current and future educational leaders a perspective on how presence of external 
influences effected the implementation of the Consent Decree.  
The chapter concludes with a look at the implications the implementation of the 
Consent Decree, aimed at meeting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision, has 
on current and future educational leaders. This part of the chapter will move the 
discussion forward, looking at how the implementation of the Consent Decree affects 
current and future educational leaders. It will also discuss the responsibilities of leaders 
now that the decree has ended. 
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Key Terms 
Consent Decree –  
An order of a judge based upon an agreement, almost always put in 
writing, between the parties to a lawsuit instead of continuing the case 
through trial or hearing. It cannot be appealed unless it was based upon 
fraud by one of the parties (he lied about the situation), mutual mistake 
(both parties misunderstood the situation) or if the court does not have 
jurisdiction over the case or the parties. Obviously, such a decree is almost 
always final and non-appealable since the parties worked it out. A Consent 
Decree is a common practice when the government has sued to make a 
person or corporation comply with the law (improper securities practices, 
pollution, restraints of trade, conspiracy) or the defendant agrees to the 
Consent Decree (often not to repeat the offense) in return for the 
government not pursuing criminal penalties. In general a Consent Decree 
and a consent judgment are the same.83 
 
Desegregation - “To break down separation of the races and to promote greater 
equality of opportunity.”84 
Defacto Desegregation - Segregation that takes place because of segregated 
circumstances. “Segregated schools created in segregated neighborhoods.”85 
Dejure Desegregation - Segregation that is initiated intentionally. “Segregated 
schools that are created in a dual school system, one for White children and one for 
minorities.”86 
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Elementary Magnet School – 
Generally, magnet schools do not have a neighborhood attendance 
boundary. Magnet schools offer a curriculum focused on a specific 
programmatic theme. Every student in the school is involved in the 
magnet theme or focus offered at the school. The Chicago Public Schools 
uses non-testing admissions procedures for its magnet schools.87 
 
Elementary Magnet Cluster School – 
A magnet cluster school is a neighborhood school with a defined 
attendance area and accepts students who live within that boundary. 
Students who live outside of the neighborhood attendance boundary must 
submit an application in order to be considered for acceptance. Magnet 
cluster schools are located in groups of no less than four schools clustered 
nearby in a manner that provides the benefits of magnet programs to as 
many students as possible. Magnet cluster schools offer a curriculum 
focused on a specific programmatic theme. Each school in a cluster offers 
a programmatic theme in collaboration with its companion schools in the 
neighborhood cluster. The Chicago Public Schools uses non-testing 
admissions procedures for its magnet cluster schools.88 
 
Historical Research – “The process of systematically examining past events or 
combinations of events to arrive at an account of what happened in the past.”89 
Integration - “To bring together people of different colors and ethnic 
backgrounds so that they associate not only on an equal basis but also make a real effort 
to respect the autonomy of other people and to appreciate the virtues of cultural 
diversity.”90 
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Primary Source - “A source in which the creator was a direct witness or in some 
other way directly involved or related to the event.” 91 
Secondary Source - “A source that was created from primary sources, secondary 
sources, or some combination of the two.”92 
White Flight - “The departure of Whites from places (as urban neighborhoods or 
schools) increasingly or predominantly populated by minorities.”93 
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CHAPTER II 
 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PRELUDE TO THE CONSENT DECREE 
Introduction 
Significant effort by the United States of America has been and continues to be 
expended towards the desegregation of schools; however, 147 years post the signing of 
the Emancipation Proclamation, complete desegregation of schools remains a challenge 
in the United States. This chapter discusses various actions and significant events as they 
relate to desegregation in America, including the Emancipation Proclamation and 
associated Amendments, Plessy versus Ferguson, Brown versus the Board of Education 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.   
On September 22, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed into existence the 
Emancipation Proclamation. The proclamation declared "all persons held as slaves within 
any States, or designated part of the State, the people whereof shall be in rebellion against 
the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free."1 The Emancipation 
Proclamation did not free all slaves; rather it provided freedom to slaves in the 
Confederate states. In 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution, 
and along with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, attempted to give Blacks and 
Whites equal rights. 
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President Lincoln was fully aware that the Emancipation Proclamation was just a 
start in ensuring the freedom of all slaves. The Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished 
slavery across all the states. Section one of the Thirteenth Amendment states: 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.2 
 
With the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, the United States found a final 
constitutional solution to the issue of slavery. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provided citizenship to former slaves. During 
slavery, Black people were deprived of citizenship and rights afforded to citizens of the 
United States. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.3   
 
The Fifteenth Amendment made it possible for citizens to vote.  Section one of the  
 
Fifteenth Amendment states: 
 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.4 
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3U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14 (June 13, 1866). 
 
4U.S. Constitution, Amendment 15 (February 26, 1869). 
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 Despite efforts by the United States of America to create equality amongst 
different races, there were still many barriers that made this seem to be an impossible 
feat. Despite the newly adopted amendments to the constitution, some states attempted to 
create their own rules, which facilitated further separation between Blacks and Whites. In 
1890, Louisiana passed a statute called the Separate Car Act.5 This Act mandated “that all 
railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches shall provide equal but separate 
accommodations for the White and colored races, by providing two or more passenger 
coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as 
to secure separate accommodations.”6 Employees of the railways were held accountable 
for ensuring there was no mixing of the two races. They were required to assign 
passengers to their proper car or compartment, and if they failed, were subject to a 
maximum of 20 days in jail and a $25 fine.7 Passengers who did not comply could be 
subject to the same penalty, as well as be refused service.8 
 This statute was the cause of great distress for Blacks throughout the country. 
Seventeen Blacks, all members of the American Citizen’s Equal Rights Association, 
spoke out against the statute in a memorial filed on May 24, 1890.9 Their arguments were 
to no avail, and the legislation passed.  
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Plessy v. Ferguson 
 
 On September 1, 1891, a group of individuals who resided in New Orleans 
organized a group, which became known as the Citizens’ Committee. The Citizens’ 
Committee challenged the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Act.”10 The group 
solicited the legal expertise of Albion W. Tourgee, one of the country’s most prominent 
White publicists in regards to Negro rights.11 Tourgee took the case without fee, and was 
joined by a local New Orleans lawyer James C. Walker.12  
The team began their attack by challenging the Separate Car Act as an 
unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce.13 Their strategy was to create a 
scenario wherein a Black passenger would begin his trip in an area that did not practice 
segregation, and would continue his trip in an area that did. The passenger would then be 
forced to move to a segregated car. Daniel F. Desdunes, a 21-year old fair skinned man, 
served as a volunteer for the team’s strategic maneuver.14 Desdunes was instructed to buy 
a first-class ticket from the Louisville Nashville Railroad to an out-of-state destination.15 
He was then asked by a train conductor, who was aware of Desdunes’ intentions, to move 
to the colored car.16 When Desdunes refused he was arrested. 
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Before the Desdunes’ case could come to trial, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
declared in a different case, Abbott v. Hicks, that the segregation statute was invalid as it 
applied to interstate travel.17 The language used in the Interstate Commerce Act 
prohibited discriminatory practices; however did not specifically prohibit segregation 
practices adopted by each individual state.18 These practices were only considered invalid 
if they were thought to be discriminatory in nature.19  The team was forced to take its 
argument in another direction.  
Their new strategy was to challenge the Louisiana Law on the grounds that it 
violated the equal protection clause.20 The attorneys began developing strategic plans, 
which detailed how they would challenge the law, and bring a case before the courts. 
They developed a strategy that was not grossly dissimilar to their first attempt. The new 
focus would be on intrastate travel, and would determine whether a state had the right to 
force Blacks into separate railway cars.21    
 On June 7, 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy, a young man in his late 20s, prepared to 
take a first class trip across the state of Louisiana.22 He was a fair skinned man who was 
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one eighth Black, appearing White to the casual observer.23 He handed his ticket to the 
conductor J.J. Dowling, and stated to him that according to Louisiana Law he was a 
colored man.24 After refusing to move to the colored only car, Plessy was arrested for 
violating the Louisiana Separate Car statute. 
 The Plessy case did not take place until nearly five months later in the state 
district court on October 28, 1892, with Judge H. Ferguson presiding.25 Assistant district 
attorney Lionel Adams reiterated to the courts the conditions of the Louisiana law. He 
also claimed, through the use of police testimony, that Plessy intentionally broke the 
law.26 Adams pointed out that the segregation railway law made it illegal for White 
passengers to take seats in the colored car.27  He continued to communicate that the 
state’s intentions were to avoid hostile situations that might occur between individuals 
due to their racial differences.28 
 James Walker, one of  Plessy’s attorneys, argued that the Separate Car Act was 
unconstitutional because it established: 
….distinction and discrimination between Citizens of the United States 
based on race which is obnoxious to the fundamental principle of National 
Citizenship, perpetuates involuntary servitude as regards Citizens of the 
Colored Race under the merest pretense of promoting the comfort of 
passengers on railway trains, and in further respect abridges the privileges 
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and immunities of Citizens of the United States and the rights secured by 
the XIIIth and XIVth amendments to the Federal Constitution.29 
 
Adams referred to the law’s requirement that accommodations be equal, and 
referenced previous federal court decisions that upheld racial separation in common 
carriers.30 He also asserted that Whites were inconvenienced by the foul odors of Blacks 
in close quarters as well as having to cope with other interracial repugnancies.31 Adams 
used these tactics in an attempt to establish that the Louisiana law and its requirements 
were reasonable.32    
Judge John H. Ferguson made the determination that the Louisiana state statute 
did not promote discriminatory practices because it provided consequences for both 
Black and White passengers when they attempted to occupy a car in which they didn’t 
belong.33 It was determined that a state could regulate its railways as they desired as long 
as accommodations were considered equal.  
Plessy appealed the case to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Plessy and his lawyers 
sued Judge Ferguson to prohibit Ferguson from proceeding with the original case.34 The 
case then took on the title, Plessy v. Ferguson; although, the party in interest was the state 
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of Louisiana.35 The Louisiana Supreme Court supported Ferguson’s decision, and 
deemed the law as constitutional.       
Plessy filed a petition for writs of error and certiorari to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, arguing that the Separate Car Act was in direct violation of both the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.36                                                                                                     
Justice Henry Brown was responsible for providing the majority opinion of the 
Supreme Court. The Thirteenth Amendment argument was immediately struck down by 
the court. Justice Brown states: 
That it does not conflict with the thirteenth amendment, which abolished 
and involuntary servitude, except a punishment for crime, is too clear for 
argument. Slavery implies involuntary servitude, a state of bondage; the  
ownership of mankind as chattel, or, at least, the control of the labor and 
services of one man for the benefit of another, and the absence of legal 
right to the disposal of his own person, property, and services…. 
 
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between White and 
colored races a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, 
and which must always exist so long as White men are distinguished from 
the other race by color has not tendency to destroy the legal equality of the 
two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude. Indeed, we do 
not understand that the thirteenth amendment is strenuously relied upon by 
the plaintiff in error in this connection.37 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment was considered to be the primary argument of the 
case and became the major focus of the majority opinion.38 The constitutionality of 
segregated transportation under the Fourteenth Amendment had never been questioned by 
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the Supreme Court, so the Justices chose to examine the record for legal precedents.39 
State law had segregated public schools much longer than railroads, so many of the lower 
courts had already confronted the Fourteenth Amendment argument.40 In making its 
determination, the Supreme Court pointed to Roberts v. City of Boston, a case decided in 
1849 that determined races could remain separate in public schools.41    
During the late 1700s, public schools in the city of Boston were integrated. 
African American parents and students felt that they were mistreated by their White 
counterparts, and sought to have separate accommodations created for them. When 
denied public funding to establish an African American school, a private school was 
developed in 1798. Parents were still responsible for paying taxes to support public 
schools; although, their children were not welcome there. While the case was a joint 
community action, Benjamin Roberts served as the lead Plaintiff. Parents explained to the 
courts that their children had been denied entrance into all Boston schools except for the 
one that was privately established. The courts determined that there was no wrong doing 
because special provisions had been made for Black students to attend school. 
As it related to railway travel, courts found carriers to have a common law 
obligation to provide passengers with substantially equal seating.42 Carriers also held the 
discretion to decide which seat a passenger would get, even if their decision was based on 
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race.43 Courts relied on this definition of equality as a barometer for determining if state 
statutes that segregated passengers did so without the presence of discrimination.44 The 
opinion of the court reflected the idea that the 14th Amendment was designed to assure 
equality between the races, but did not discourage separation when it was in the best 
interest of either party. 
Justice Brown stated: 
The object if the amendment (14th) was undoubtedly to enforce the 
absolute equality of the two races before the law but in the nature of 
things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon 
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from the political equality, or a 
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws 
permitting, and even requiring, the separation in places where they liable 
to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either 
race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as 
within the competency of the State legislation in the exercise of their 
police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the 
establishment of separate schools for White and colored children, which 
have been held to be valid exercise of legislative power even by the courts 
of States where the political rights of the colored race have longest and 
most earnestly enforced.45 
 
While the judgment of the court was clear, it did not represent the opinion of all 
of the Supreme Court Justices. Justice John Marshall Harlan represented the dissenting 
opinion, one that is almost as well known as the verdict itself.46  During his dissent, 
Justice Marshall states: 
                                                 
43Ibid. 
 
44Ibid. 
 
45Supreme Court of the United States, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, December 9, 
1952. 
 
46Bogen, Why the Supreme Court Lied In Plessy, 411. 
 
  
48
The White race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And 
so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. 
So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains fast to the 
principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the 
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class 
of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens… 
 
It is scarcely just to say that a colored citizen should not object to 
occupying a public coach assigned to his own race. He does not object, 
nor, perhaps, would he object to separate coaches for his race, if his rights 
under the law were recognized. But he objects, and ought never to cease 
objecting to the proposition that citizens of the White and Black races can 
be adjudged criminals because they sit, or claim the right to sit, in the 
same public coach on a public highway… 
 
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and 
perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments, 
which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior 
and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied 
by White citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning of such 
legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.47 
 
The Plessy v. Ferguson verdict was a major setback for individuals fighting to end 
segregation. Although the decision was directed towards a state law requiring separate 
railway accommodations, the “separate but equal” doctrine it endorsed was soon applied 
to many other situations including public schools.48 Many educational systems across the 
country already instituted practices in segregation.  The Plessy verdict further justified 
this social ideology that existed as early as the 1700s. 
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NAACP: Taking a Stand 
On February 12, 1909, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) was established.49 It was created in part to respond to the practice of 
lynching and race riots that had taken place in Springfield Illinois.50 Their stated goal was 
to secure for all people the rights guaranteed in the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution.51 This included dismantling the practices of Jim Crow, which gained 
further momentum with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Plessy v. Ferguson 
case.52 
Nathan Margold developed a plan for the NAACP to eliminate school segregation 
in 1930.53 The original plan was to sue for equal schools at the elementary and high-
school levels.54 The NAACP, in its quest to achieve equality in education had to deal 
with many of the realities of society due to Southern influences such as: 
1. Local school districts admitted to disparities in educational funding, 
but lied or exaggerated about efforts underway to ameliorate them. 
 
2. States and local school districts were primarily responsible for public 
school educational policy and funding inhibited litigation at the federal 
level. 
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3. There was the awesome weight of tradition and social custom; Plessy 
was the precedent upon which Jim Crow rulings rested. 
 
4. Because of the above, state courts did not consider state-sanctioned 
Jim Crow to be in violation of the 14th Amendment right of Blacks to 
equal protection under the law and, therefore, left Jim Crow intact. 
 
5. The defendants and courts alike variously ignored, trivialized, masked, 
neutralized, explained away, and accepted the pervasive reality of 
separate and unequal.55 
 
Margold’s plan was later modified by NAACP lawyer Charles Houston.56 
In 1929, Mr. Charles Hamilton Houston served as Dean at the Howard University 
Law School, one of a few Black Law schools that were in existence.57  A group of 
talented young men and women began matriculating onto Howard’s campus, and became 
key strategists in the plan to challenge segregated education.58 Howard University 
produced some of America’s most talented litigators, most famously Thurgood 
Marshall.59 
In 1935, Charles Houston became special counsel to the NAACP.60 Houston 
believed that focusing efforts on higher education would be more feasible because the 
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idea of integration would be met with far less resistance.61 In the book Simple Justice, 
Houston’s reasoning is depicted as follows: 
The Black attack [on school segregation] ought to begin in an area where 
the Whites were most vulnerable and least likely to respond with anger. 
That segregation had produced blatantly discriminatory and unequal 
schools systems, Houston calculated, was most obvious at the level of 
graduate and professional schools…. There were [only two] graduate or 
professional schools at any Black college in the South….Here was an area 
where the educational facilities for Blacks were neither separate nor equal 
but non-existent….[Through legal action] the South would either have to 
build and operate separate graduate schools for Blacks or admit them to 
White ones.62  
 
A young Thurgood Marshall later joined Mr. Houston and began taking on cases 
in both law and graduate schools in which their practices were discriminatory. Marshall 
eventually took over as chief counsel of the NAACP, and soon after developed a separate 
organization called the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.63             
The Court Cases 
Murray v. Maryland (1936) 
The Murray v. Maryland case represented one of the first successful test cases for 
the NAACP, and their strategy to take on America’s institutions of higher learning. It was 
also Thurgood Marshall’s first civil rights case.64 In a Baltimore City court in 1935, 
Thurgood Marshall put forth the argument that Donald Gaines Murray, an African 
American male, was just as qualified as his White counterparts to attend the University of 
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Maryland’s School of Law.65 Marshall argued that Murray was denied admission because 
of his race. Marshall also argued that the “Black” law schools Murray would be forced to 
attend were not of the same academic caliber.66 This would violate the principal of 
“separate but equal.” With the disparities between the schools being so vast, Marshall 
argued that the only remedy would be to allow Murray to attend Maryland University’s 
law school.67 The courts sided with Murray, but the University appealed the decision. In 
1936, The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the original decision and sided with Murray, 
ordering the Maryland law school to acknowledge Murray’s application for admission.  
Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada (1938) 
Lloyd Gaines, a graduate student of the all-Black college Lincoln University, was 
denied admission into the University of Missouri’s Law School because of his race.68 The 
State of Missouri offered Gaines an opportunity to attend a newly built all-Black law 
school, or receive compensation to attend another law school within a neighboring state.69 
Gaines rejected both offers, and sought the support of Thurgood Marshall and the 
NAACP. In 1933, the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, where a six-member 
majority sided with Gaines. It was determined by the court that since a Black law school 
did not exist in the state of Missouri, the equal protection clause required a legal 
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education for Gaines within the state’s boundaries.70 This was the same education that the 
state provided for Whites. 
Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library 1945  
Louise Kerr attempted to join a training program in a Baltimore library and was 
denied because of his color. The opposition for Kerr’s participation was not the library 
itself, but rather its patrons. Kerr launched a civil suit alleging that the library’s actions 
were in violation of the equal protection act. The courts acknowledge that the library did 
not have a racist purpose, but still sided with Kerr and his claim. Out of this case came 
what is known as the Kerr principle, which determined when and why the state is 
responsible for enabling exclusive preferences, whether by an overextended applicable 
rule that assist them or by state inaction that fails to block them. 
Sweat v. Painter (1950) 
In 1946, an African American mail carrier named Herman Sweat applied to the 
University of Texas’ White law school.71 The University, in fear of having to integrate its 
law program, created an inferiorly funded Black law school within its campus.72 The case 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1950. Thurgood Marshall’s argument was that the 
Black law school did not offer the same quality of education as the White law school. 
The justices agreed, and decided in favor of Herman Sweat. 
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McLaurin v. Oklahoma Board of Regents of Higher Education (1950) 
 George McLaurin was reluctantly admitted to the University of Oklahoma’s 
doctoral program in 1949.73 Although McLaurin was accepted at the University, he was 
not allowed to sit with his White classmates during lunch or class sessions.74 McLaurin 
believed these practices adversely effected how he was being educated, and solicited the 
services of Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP to argue his case.75 When the case finally 
went to the Supreme Court, the justices ruled on the side of Mr. McLaurin and the 
University was required to cease all discriminatory practices immediately.76  
 Shortly after the Sweat and McLaurin decisions, Thurgood Marshall felt it was 
time to fight against segregation head on.77 The emphasis in all education cases would be 
to create integrated school settings, rather than attempt to create separate but equal 
accommodations for students of different races.78 The NAACP supported Marshall’s 
stance, and the group began looking for cases. Each case was represented jointly by a 
local lawyer and a lawyer from the NAACP’s national headquarters.79 Each school 
differed with regards to their levels of inequality. There were instances when segregated 
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schools were equal in some aspects.80One consistency was that all of the schools in 
question were segregated by law, and the NAACP’s stand was that equality could not be 
reached without the end of segregation.81 
Brown v. Board 
 The Brown v. Board of Education case actually included appeals from decisions 
in a total of five cases, all in separate states (Delaware, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
Kansas).82 
Belton (Bulah) v. Gebhart (Delaware) 
 This case was originally petitioned in 1951, and actually represented two separate 
cases dealing with the same issue. The argument was that two schools established for 
African American students were inferior compared to those designed for Whites. The 
cases were brought forth by Ethel Belton and Shirley Bulah, two parents who believed 
their children were being discriminated against. Chancellor Collin Seitz of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery ruled that the all White schools would have to admit Black students 
who had proved that the education they were receiving was substandard. The Delaware 
Supreme Court conquered, but would not put on record that the segregation of students 
was an unconstitutional act. The Board of Education appealed the decision, making the 
Belton v. Gebhart case the only one of the five that was brought to court by the 
defendants and not the plaintiffs. 
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Briggs v. Elliot (South Carolina) 
 Harry Briggs, along with nineteen other parents brought a suit against R.W Elliot, 
the president of the school board for Clarendon County, South Carolina. Parents’ 
frustration originally came from the idea that they were denied busing, a service that was 
provided for their White counterparts.83 This prompted them to seek legal representation, 
and file a suit challenging the concept of segregation as a whole.84 A school principal, 
Reverend J.A. DeLaine, aggressively recruited parents for the complaint and sought out 
the NAACP. Harold Boulware, a local lawyer, along with Thurgood Marshall filed the 
Briggs v. Eliot case in the fall of 1950.85  The U.S. District Court decided against the 
plaintiffs’ idea of abolishing school segregation. 86The court ordered the school board to 
begin a plan to make the Black schools equal with the White ones.87 The lone dissenting 
opinion came from Judge Julius Waring, who adamantly spoke out against school 
segregation practices.88 
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Davis v. County Board of Prince Edward County (Virginia)  
 
A group of high-school students, led by student Barbara Rose Johns, participated 
in a strike to protest inferior school conditions in Farmville, Virginia.89 The protest lasted 
two weeks, and included over four hundred fifty African American students from Moton 
High School.90 Moton High School lacked some of the resources available at other high 
schools such as a gymnasium, cafeteria, and an infirmary.91 The students sought 
assistance from the NAACP branch office in Richmond, Virginia.92 In 1951 Spottswood 
Robinson and Oliver Hill, members of the local NAACP, filed a suit on behalf of one 
hundred and seventeen students.93 The goal was to end the practice of segregated schools. 
The U.S. District Court rejected the request of the students, and ordered the school board 
to continue trying to equalize the African American schools.94 The plaintiffs were still 
denied access to White schools.95 The case was sent to the Supreme Court along with the 
four other cases. 
                                                 
89Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965 (New York: Viking 
Penguin Inc., 1987), 25. 
 
90Ibid. 
 
91Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education, 28. 
 
92Ibid. 
 
93Ibid. 
 
94Ibid. 
 
95Ibid. 
 
  
58
Bolling v. Melvin Sharpe (D.C.) 
In 1947, Garden Bishop and the Consolidated Parents Group, Inc. began their 
fight against school segregation in Washington, DC. In 1950, the group attempted to 
enroll eleven African American students into the newly built John Phillip Sousa Junior 
High School. Charles Houston provided legal services for the group.96 When Houston 
became ill, he was replaced by James Nabrit Jr.  Nabrit wanted to change the original 
strategy by placing emphasis on ending school segregation, rather than focusing on 
developing separate but equal accommodations.97 The U.S District court dismissed the 
case on the basis of the ruling by the Court of Appeals in Carr v. Corning, which 
determined that the segregation of schools was constitutional in the District of 
Columbia.98 Nabrit filed an appeal, and later the case was heard with the other four cases 
before the Supreme Court. 
Brown v. Board of Education (Kansas) 
The Brown v. Board of Education case was spearheaded by the local NAACP 
chapter in Topeka, Kansas.99 The group attempted to solicit individuals whom were being 
discriminated against by their neighborhood schools.100 Thirteen parents volunteered to 
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participate in the NAACP’s strategy.101 At the beginning of the 1950 school year, these 
parents attempted to enroll their children in the neighborhood school.102 Instead, they 
were forced to attend one of four schools in the city designated for African Americans. 
The suit was filed against the Topeka Board of Education on behalf of the parents and 
their twenty children.103 The case was named after Oliver Brown, a minister, because he 
was the first parent listed on the suit.104 The case was first filed in 1951. 
  All of the lawsuits were trying to attain the same constitutional goal: the 
dismantling of Jim Crow education as a violation of the equal protection of the laws.105 
The suits did not only represent the specific plaintiffs of each case, but also those in 
communities who were victims of the same plight.106 
The Case 
The arguments in Brown took place in three stages: 
1. The initial presentation of the case, which did not allow the justices 
sufficient time to consider all of the presented evidence. 
 
2. A second phase, which argued the intentions of the 14th Amendment’s 
framers. 
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3. After the court struck down Plessy v. Ferguson (Brown I), a call for a 
remedy to segregation was initiated. (Brown II).107 
 
Chief Justice Fredrick M. Vinson served as the primary judge when the five cases 
initially were brought before the Supreme Court.108 Vinson had previously ruled on both 
the McLaurin and Sweatt cases.109 Six days after the hearings began, the Court convened 
to consider the evidence that had been brought before them.110Southern attitudes and 
values favoring segregation permeated the Judge’s Chambers, and many of the Justices 
were concerned about the impact of integration.111 While the Court understood that it was 
imperative to render a decision, and decide whether to combine the five cases into one, 
the court suffered from deep internal divisions causing Vinson to delay the decision.112 
The Court announced it would need more information before it could make its final 
determination.113 Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter drafted five questions that 
were approved by the court, and would need to be addressed by the NAACP lawyers in 
the next session.114 Three of the questions were concerned with the interpretation of the 
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Fourteenth Amendment and judicial power under the amendment while the other two 
dealt with decrees which the court might issue.115 The questions were: 
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the state 
legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 
contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not 
understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools? 
 
2. (If not) was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the 
Amendment: 
 
(a) the future Congress might, in the exercise of their power under 
Section 5 of the Amendment abolish such segregation, or 
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future 
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such 
segregation of its own force? 
                         
3. On the assumption that the (earlier) answers do not dispose of the 
issues, is it within the judicial power, in constructing the Amendment, 
to abolish segregation in public schools? 
 
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment  
 
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits 
set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should 
forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or  
 
(b)  may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an 
effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing 
segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?  
 
5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and 
assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the 
end described in question 4 (b),  
 
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases; 
  
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;  
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(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a 
view to recommending specific terms for such decrees;  
 
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with 
directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general 
directions should the decrees of this Court include and what 
procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at 
the specific terms of more detailed decrees?" 116 
 
On December 7, 1953 when the Court assembled for the rehearing, quite a bit had 
changed.117 In September of that same year, Chief Justice Vinson, at the age of sixty-
three, died of a heart attack in his hotel apartment in Washington.118 President 
Eisenhower chose Governor Earl Warren of California as Vinson’s successor.119 
When Judge Warren provided the majority opinion, he carefully approached how 
he addressed the Plessy v. Ferguson decision. It was apparent that the “separate but equal 
doctrine” would need to be eradicated in order to fully create equal education for all. This 
could not be done without alienating those whom were against the mixing of races, 
particularly those who lived in the South. Part of Justice Warren’s opinion, foreshadowed 
the idea that the Supreme Court decision was going to look at segregation much 
differently than the courts did in 1896. Part of Warren’s opinion read: 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when 
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson 
was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. 
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Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools 
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.120 
 
 Justice Warren addressed the importance of education, and how its benefits 
should be available to all. Warren spoke of education as a necessity, and that those 
without would have a minimal opportunity to be successful. He also painted a picture that 
illustrated educated individuals as being an asset to the country as a whole. After 
articulating the benefits of education, Warren then addressed the importance of education 
being equal for all. The majority opinion reads: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally 
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.121 
 
 Once Justice Warren provided the importance of education, specifically equal 
education, he then began to clearly express the court’s opinion on school segregation. 
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in 
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical 
facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of 
the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it 
does.122 
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 As Justice Warren continued the majority opinion, he described the harms of 
segregation. Warren made clear references of how segregation negatively affects students 
of color. He also explicitly discussed how segregation practices enforced by law 
consequently create a feeling of inferiority for Blacks.  
Segregation of White and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it 
has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually 
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A sense of 
inferiority effects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the 
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and 
mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the 
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.123 
 
 Warren’s opinion regarding the detrimental effect segregation had on Black 
children was likely the result of Thurgood Marshall and his team’s incorporation of 
psychological and sociological testimony during the hearings.124 Marshall and his team 
felt it was important to demonstrate the psychological and intellectual consequences of 
segregation; therefore, they collaborated with Kenneth Clark, a Black psychologist who 
studied how segregation affected children.  
 In 1939 and 1940, psychologist Kenneth Clark along with his wife Mamie Phipps 
tested Black children in Washington, D.C. and New York City to determine how the 
children perceived themselves.125 They used four plastic dolls with identical features 
except their color. One doll resembled a White individual while the other represented a 
Black. These dolls were shown to Black children between the ages of three and seven 
                                                 
123Ibid. 
 
124Ibid. 
 
125Williams, Eyes on the Prize, 23. 
 
  
65
who attended both integrated and segregated schools.126 They were then asked questions 
to determine racial perception and preference. The results showed that each child easily 
identified the specific race of each doll. The children also correlated positive 
characteristics and attributes with the White doll opposed to the Black one, and showed 
preference to the White doll over the Black one. Dr. Clark also provided the children with 
outline drawings of a boy and girl and told them to color the figures in a like image of 
themselves. Children who were darker in color tended to color the figures with a White or 
Yellow crayon. It was concluded that prejudice, discrimination, and segregation caused 
Black children to develop a sense of inferiority and self-hatred. The study was published 
in 1940 in the Spring issue of the Journal of Experimental Education.127 The study also 
became the subject of a paper Dr. Clark presented at a White House Conference on 
Children and Youth in 1950.128  Clark provided a critical social science testimony in the 
Briggs, Davis, and Delaware cases. Clark’s work was later cited in the Brown decision. 
 The long debated topic about the Fourteenth Amendment was also addressed in 
Justice Warren’s reading of the decision. 
We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of 
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason 
of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the 
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes 
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unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.129 
 
 In the Brown decision of 1954, the Court delayed any directives for 
compliance.130 The new arguments the Court asked for delayed the implementation of the 
practices Brown set forth for a year.131 
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this 
decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the 
formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable 
complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was 
necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality of 
segregation in public education. We have now announced that such 
segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we 
may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the 
cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to 
present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by 
the Court for the reargument….132 
 
 In 1955, in what was termed Brown II, the court issued its enforcement decree.133 
This was the court’s opportunity to assure the practices set forth in Brown I would be 
accepted by all Northerners and Southerners alike. In Judge Warren’s reading of the 
court’s opinion, he put the burden of desegregating the schools on school authorities and 
the local court system. 
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution 
of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary 
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; 
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courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities 
constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional 
principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible 
need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can 
best perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it appropriate 
to remand the cases to those courts.134 
 
Judge Warren continued to discuss the roles of the local court system, relying on 
them not to allow biases to get in the way of desegregating schools. 
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by 
equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a 
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting 
and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise 
of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal 
interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as 
practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may 
call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to 
school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles 
set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly 
take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in 
a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the 
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply 
because of disagreement with them.135 
 
 The 1955 ruling attempted to place a time frame on when the desegregation 
requirements would be implemented. It was a far cry from the original decision in 1954, 
although many debate that its vagueness served as a detriment to the cause. 
While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts 
will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward 
full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been 
made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the 
ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to 
establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent 
with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the 
courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the 
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physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, 
personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact 
units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools 
on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may 
be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider 
the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these 
problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory 
school system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain 
jurisdiction of these cases.136 
 
 Judge Warren’s last comments again placed the responsibility on the local court 
system to assure the proper desegregation of schools. The phrase “with all deliberate 
speed” was mentioned by Justice Warren as it related to the time frame in which schools 
would need to be integrated.  
The judgments below, except that, in the Delaware case, are accordingly 
reversed, and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such 
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion 
as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these 
cases.137 
 
 As Marshall and his team reflected about the court’s decision, they tried to find 
meaning in the phrase “all deliberate speed.”138 This phrase later took a meaning of its 
own, allowing others to interpret its true definition.139 For those districts and communities 
for which the directive applied, the phrase was taken literally, allowing them for almost 
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ten years to have minimal compliance.140 Those who chose not to comply utilized many 
tactics to discourage the court’s wishes. 
When South Carolina threatened to dispose of the public school system entirely 
rather than integrate its schools, officials in the state made it known that they would not 
support the idea of Black teachers working in White schools.141 The sentiment of 
Southerners at the time was illustrated publicly in a form letter created specifically for the 
Black elementary school teachers in the Topeka school district. The letter was written by 
Wendell Godwin, superintendent of schools in Topeka. It read: 
Dear Miss Buchanan, 
Due to the present uncertainty about enrollment next year in schools for 
Negro children, it is not possible at this time to offer you employment for 
next year. If the Supreme Court should rule that segregation in the 
elementary grades is unconstitutional our Board will proceed on the 
assumption that the majority of people in Topeka will not want to employ 
Negro teachers next year for White children. It is necessary for me to 
notify you now that your services will not be needed for next year. This is 
in compliance with the continuing contract law. If it turns out that 
segregation is not terminated, there will be nothing to prevent us from 
negotiating a contract with you at some later date this spring. You will 
understand that I am sending letters of this kind to only those teachers of 
Negro schools who have been employed during the last year or two. It is 
presumed that, even though segregation should be declared 
unconstitutional we would have need for some schools for Negro children 
and we would retain our Negro teachers to them. I think I understand all of 
you must be under considerable strain, and I sympathize with the 
uncertainties and inconveniences which you must experience during this 
period of adjustment. I believe that whatever happens will ultimately turn 
out to be best for everybody concerned. 
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Sincerely, Wendell Godwin  
 
Superintendent of Schools 
WG:la 
Cc: Mr. Whitson142 
 
The feelings of those who expressed disdain towards integration practices were 
evident in what has been termed as the Southern Manifesto.  This effort was spearheaded 
by U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Senior.143 The Southern Manifesto was a document that 
spoke in opposition to the new laws of desegregation, and was signed by over one 
hundred southern office holders.144 The document attempted to convey a message that the 
decision of how children were educated should be made by each individual state. It also 
tried to communicate the notion that such integration laws would cause dissention 
amongst the races.  An excerpt of the document reads:  
The unwarranted decision of the Supreme Court in the public school cases 
is now bearing the fruit always produced when men substitute naked 
power for established law… 
 
We regard the decisions of the Supreme Court in the school cases as a 
clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal Judiciary 
undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress, and to 
encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the people… 
The unwarranted exercise of power by the Court, contrary to the 
Constitution, is creating chaos and confusion in the State principally 
affected. It is destroying the amicable relations between the White and 
Negro races that have been created through 90 years of patient effort by 
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the good people of both races. It has planted hatred and suspicion where 
there has been heretofore friendship and understanding.145 
 
  On February 25, 1956, Byrd Senior called for what is known as the Massive 
Resistance.146 Massive Resistance consisted of a group of laws put in place to stop the 
integration of the public school system.147 The laws passed in 1958, and put into place a 
pupil placement board, tuition grants for students who contested integration and a system 
for relinquishing state funds from schools that chose to integrate.148 
  States that complied with the desegregation laws did so in a cautious manner. 
School officials were aware of the concerns held by members of the White community, 
and did their best to assure that their children would still get a quality education despite 
integration. An excerpt from a Charleston newspaper illustrates these types of attempts 
most clearly. In an article in the Charleston Gazette, Superintendent L.K. Lovenstein 
states: 
There is no indication that educational standards have suffered from the 
desegregation move. For the most part the Negro teachers are well trained, 
and the Negro children have been able to keep up with their White 
counterparts. In extra-curricular activities, the same situation is evident. 
Negroes are elected to class offices, they work on the school newspapers, 
they play on the football, basketball and baseball teams, and they 
participate in class plays.149 
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 These types of pleads became less necessary as years passed, but it was evident 
that it would take more than the recent Brown decision to make the desegregation of 
schools an acceptable practice across the country. 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 
 While it seemed that the Brown decision encompassed all of the negativity 
associated with racial discrimination, the demise of separate-but-equal practices did not 
take place for another ten years.150 Although it was determined that state imposed 
segregation practices in public schools was unconstitutional, implementing the ruling in 
the nation’s school districts required local plaintiffs, money, and data.151 Finding 
plaintiffs that were willing to take their case to the courts was a difficult task. They were 
often afraid of retaliation southern communities.152 Filing suit also required the 
employment of a local attorney, which also served as a difficult task.153 Both perspective 
plaintiffs and attorneys had to consider the possibility of job loss and physical harm if 
associated with a lawsuit against a Southern school district.154 
 On June 11, 1963, President John F. Kennedy announced publicly that he would 
submit to Congress a comprehensive civil rights bill that would end racial segregation in 
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public schools as well as public accommodations along with ensuring African Americans 
the right to vote.155 
 President Kennedy would be murdered before he could see the Civil Rights Bill 
through its fruition.156 Five days after Kennedy’s death, President Lyndon John and 
members of Congress worked aggressively to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964.157 Their 
efforts were met with great opposition, as a group of southern senators spoke out against 
the bill’s passing, claiming that the federal government was superseding its authority by 
denying American citizens their basic economic, personal, and property rights for the sole 
benefit of the Black population.158 
 Despite resistance, the bill was passed by a majority vote in Congress.159 The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 consists of several key provisions, with Title IV and VI having a 
significant effect on the desegregation of schools.160 Title IV is broken into ten sections 
that further describe how the government planned to protect individuals from 
discriminatory practices. 161  
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 Section 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided the Commissioner of 
Education the opportunity to assess the desegregation efforts of states and school 
districts. This was a far cry from the vagueness associated with Judge Warren’s 
request for desegregation efforts to be done with “all deliberate speed” as set forth 
in the Brown v. Board decision. Section 402 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
states: 
The Commissioner shall conduct a survey and make a report to the 
President and the Congress, within two years of the enactment of this title, 
concerning the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for 
individuals by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin in public 
educational institutions at all levels in the United States, its territories and 
possessions, and the District of Columbia.162 
 
 Section 407 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave the Attorney General the ability 
to sue school districts who continued to endorse desegregation practices. Section 407 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: 
(a) Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing--  
(1) signed by a parent or group of parents to the effect that his or their 
minor children, as members of a class of persons similarly situated, are 
being deprived by a school board of the equal protection of the laws, or 
 
(2) signed by an individual, or his parent, to the effect that he has been 
denied admission to or not permitted to continue in attendance at a public 
college by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin, and the 
Attorney General believes the complaint is meritorious and certifies that 
the signer or signers of such complaint are unable, in his judgment, to 
initiate and maintain appropriate legal proceedings for relief and that the 
institution of an action will materially further the orderly achievement of 
desegregation in public education, the Attorney General is authorized…  
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to institute for or in the name of the United States a civil action in any 
appropriate district court of the United States against such parties and for 
such relief as may be appropriate, and such court shall have and shall 
exercise jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section, 
provided that nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the 
United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any 
school by requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one 
school to another or one school district to another in order to achieve such 
racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to 
insure compliance with constitutional standards.163 
 
 Title VI addressed federally funded programs, and how they were to be 
implemented. This was important because it directly affected the finances of those 
districts who continued to prescribe to practicing desegregation. Section 601 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 states: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.164 
 
Moving Towards the Consent Decree 
 
 With the federal government taking a more aggressive role in enforcing the tenets 
set forth in the Brown v. Board case, the Chicago Public School district, as well as other 
school districts around the country, was forced to develop ways to promote desegregation 
to maintain their federal funding. The years between the introduction of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1965 and the agreed upon the Consent Decree in 1980 would prove to be filled 
with failed attempts to create schools that could truly live up to Brown. In the two 
decades that span this time period, the Chicago Public Schools would operate under the 
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leadership of five superintendents, each with his or her own strategies in how they would 
tackle the issue of desegregation. Ultimately, their failed tactics to eliminate segregative 
practices within the Chicago Public Schools led to the signing of the decree.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION CONSENT DECREE  
Introduction 
 
 The shaping of public education in Chicago can be directly attributed to the rapid 
changes of society. Shortly after World War II, many of Chicago’s White constituents 
migrated to the suburbs in part due to housing shortages, stimulated road building, and 
new modes of transportation. Ninety percent of Chicago’s population of nearly 3.4 
million people was White. By 1960, Whites only made up seventy percent of the 
population. These demographic changes greatly affected the make-up of Chicago’s 
neighborhoods. Predominately Black poor urban areas of the city found themselves 
surrounded by suburbs occupied by a majority White population.1   
 Education in the Chicago Public Schools mirrored the same racial isolation that 
was going on in traditional society.2 The Chicago Public Schools had a history of 
segregated public schools that continued the cycle of promoting racial isolation.3 Black 
students attended the Chicago Public Schools as early as 1837. They were not formally 
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segregated from their white peers; however, they were not encouraged to attend school.4 
Compulsory attendance laws were not put in place until 1919, requiring all children to 
attend school.5 As other minorities began to migrate to the city, Chicago’s population 
became more diverse.6 Eventually, the neighborhoods within the city became segregated 
based on race, ethnicity, and religious identity.7 The concept of the neighborhood school 
was embraced by the Chicago Public Schools, and as neighborhoods became more 
segregated so did their school’s populations.8  Ninety-one percent of elementary schools 
along with 71% of high-schools were made up of a single race b y 1956.9 
 The racial isolation that plagued the Chicago Public Schools was not only 
perpetuated by neighborhood demographics, but also by some of the practices of the 
Chicago Public Schools itself.10 “Official restrictive housing covenants, and 
neighborhood school policies established to be consistent with them, worked to contain 
blacks and other minorities in specified areas of the city.”11  Actions such as these put the 
Chicago Public Schools in direct violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board 
case.  
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 Before the Chicago Public Schools entered into the Consent Decree, the school 
district would be led by several different educational leaders, each with his/her own 
perspective on the importance of desegregation. These leaders would be responsible for 
spearheading Chicago’s attempts to desegregate its schools, spanning from the fifties up 
until the early eighties when the Consent Decree was agreed upon. In their attempts, 
educational leaders would find themselves dealing with many hindrances to their cause 
such as, a lack of federal funding, community backlash, and in some cases what appeared 
to be their own biases. Regardless of what circumstances there might have been, the 
success of their attempts to desegregate the Chicago Public Schools was minimal as the 
district found itself bound by court supervision when it entered into the Consent Decree. 
Leadership and the Attempt at Desegregating the Chicago Public Schools 
The Willis Era: 1953-1966 
 Benjamin C. Willis became the superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools in 
1953 and played a major role in the Chicago Public School’s discriminatory practices.12 
On the surface, Benjamin Willis appeared to have a profound positive effect on the 
Chicago Public Schools, increasing enrollment at a pace of ten thousand students a year 
while diminishing classroom sizes by 20%.13  Teacher salaries increased along with a 
system enabling them to advance their education.14  Willis was also credited for the 
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construction and expansion of 208 elementary schools and 113 high schools during a 
time when the district was benefiting from public support.15  
 Benjamin Willis became one of the most celebrated school leaders of his day.16 
His accomplishments were well documented, as stated in a Time magazine article entitled 
“The Education of Big Ben.” An excerpt from the article reads: 
Willis is the U.S.'s highest-paid public school official. His $48,500 salary, 
indeed, ranks him fourth among all U.S. public officials, after President 
Kennedy, Governor Rockefeller and New York's Mayor Wagner. Willis is 
also an exceedingly able administrator who oversees 552,000 pupils, 
22,000 teachers and a $300 million annual budget with brisk efficiency. 
During his ten years in his post, he has recruited 6,000 additional teachers, 
nearly doubled the salary scale, added enough classrooms to trim the 
average class from 39 pupils to 32, and eliminated all double-shift 
instruction despite a school-age population explosion. He has planned and 
overseen a $250 million building program, completed without a single 
major scandal.17 
 
 While Willis’s leadership brought a sense of stability to the Chicago 
Public Schools, it did not come without a price. Willis was a strong advocate of 
the values and virtues associated with the concept of neighborhood schools.18 This 
philosophy was detrimental as illustrated in this excerpt of “The Education of Big 
Ben”: 
In Chicago, even more than in most U.S. cities, whites and 
Negroes live apart, in separate neighborhoods. That has been the pattern 
for generations. Since each child attends the school in his own 
neighborhood, most Chicago public schools are either predominantly 
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white or predominantly Negro. About 90% of the city's Negro elementary 
school pupils attend schools that are virtually all Negro.19 
 
 Blacks during Willis’ tenure demanded that the Chicago Public Schools be 
desegregated, but their wishes were met with little regard.20 Blacks not only felt their 
education was segregated, but also unequal.21  According to a survey by the Chicago 
Urban League, teacher salaries in Black schools were only 85% as high as their White 
counterparts, while operating expenses per Black pupil were only 66% as high as that of 
White pupils.22 Although Willis was known for building academic structures, schools in 
Black neighborhoods weren’t the beneficiary of these new facilities.23 When schools in 
black communities were overcrowded, Willis utilized various tactics to increase 
classrooms within these schools. He allowed schools to operate with a proportionately 
high number of mobile classrooms that became known as Willis Wagons. 24  He also 
implemented plans that made it necessary to accelerate building schedules, teachers to 
work double shifts, and commercial facilities to be converted into schools. These 
strategies enabled Willis to circumvent any efforts designed to integrate schools.25  
                                                 
19“The Education of Big Ben,” 82. 
 
20Ibid. 
 
21Ibid. 
 
22Ibid. 
 
23Roger L. Pulliam, “Historical Review of Black Education: Chicago,” Negro Educational Review 
29, no. 1 (January 1978): 24. 
 
24Ibid. 
 
25Chicago Urban League, “Racial Segregation in the Chicago Public Schools, 1965-66,” Research 
Report, Chicago. 
  
82
Willis vehemently denied the prospect that the use of mobile classrooms was a 
tactic to discriminate against minority students. In a report Willis made to the Chicago 
Public Schools Board of Education on January 24, 1962, Willis depicted the use of 
mobile classrooms being utilized at LeMoyne and Parker Elementary schools.26 In his 
report it was indicated that the mobile classrooms contained the light, heat, space, 
educational facilities and attractiveness of a regular classroom.27 The report also 
conveyed that the mobile classrooms were used to eliminate double shift assignments. 
The mobiles were used until a new school was built and could be used in areas with a 
sudden population increase.28 According to Willis: 
It would seem that the mobile classroom might better be called the model 
classroom. In the comments of observers, the word delightful keeps 
recurring. Certainly an atmosphere that calls forth this response can be an 
invaluable asset, a motivation, and an inspiration in educating our 
children. And let us not forget the economic impact of this, which means a 
classroom for approximately $900 instead of $30,000.29 
 
 Blacks were enraged and grew impatient with Willis and his actions which were 
perceived to perpetuate segregation.30 Civil rights activist, as well as many Black leaders, 
saw the use of mobile classrooms as a way to make sure that Blacks were contained in a 
certain area of the city preventing their migration to areas that were designated as all-
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White.31 Blacks organized sit-ins at the Board of Education headquarters as well as 
demonstrations wherein volunteers would lie in front of the mobile classrooms in protest 
of overcrowded conditions.32 
Willis strayed away from conversations of race claiming to be oblivious to the 
amount of Black or White students enrolled at a particular school since the district did not 
maintain records of students’ nor employees’ race, color, or creed.33 Willis stated he was 
not working to maintain desegregated schools in the city of Chicago, but rather to 
preserve the concept of the neighborhood school.34 Willis did put forth a transfer plan 
that appeared to be just “for show” at best, as only a total of 32 children moved to other 
schools.35  
Eventually Willis’ discriminatory practices would be unveiled. Willis was 
charged by the federal government with developing plans to utilize federal funding in 
areas that did not accommodate high populations of low-income underprivileged 
minorities.36 This resulted in the launching of an investigation.37 The federal government 
made the determination that they would withhold their financial support provided to the 
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city of Chicago pending the hearing on the complaints to the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) on segregation in the Chicago Public Schools.38 Based on 
the results of the hearing, a suit was brought by the Coordinating Council of Community 
Organization (CCCO) in 1965.39 The CCCO was led by a former teacher named Al Raby, 
and would be a focal point of Black mobilization around school issues for the next few 
years.40 Part of the suit initiated by the CCCO read: 
In 1964-65, with the addition of 10 new elementary schools and two new 
secondary schools accommodating an increase of 642 white and 264 other 
pupils, segregation in the Chicago schools was shown to have increased. 
Absolutely segregated elementary schools now constituted 82.3% of the 
total, and in both categories, segregated schools now constituted 74.4% of 
the total.41  
 
 In 1963, the Chicago Public Schools created an advisory panel headed by Philip 
Hauser to study the problem of segregation in the Chicago Public Schools.42 The panel 
was designed to analyze and study the school system with particular regard to schools 
attended entirely or predominantly by Negroes. After completing the assessment, the 
panel was required to submit to the Board of Education a comprehensive report that 
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included detailed plans to eliminate any prevailing educational, psychological, and 
emotional problems or inequities in the school system.43   
 After twenty-four days of deliberation, the panel determined that the segregation 
that plagued the Chicago Public Schools was not uncommon in other large urban cities.44 
The segregation of its school system was not the intent or design of the Chicago Public 
Schools Board of Education, but rather a by-product of segregated patterns of settlement 
and housing.45 As a result of residential concentration, the black population like white 
immigrants before them, found their children attending segregated schools.46 While the 
Hauser Report acknowledged the fact that whites and blacks both found their children 
attending de facto segregated schools, it also depicted an environment that discriminated 
against black children solely based on their skin color. 
The Negro, unlike the white immigrant, was and is an American citizen; 
the Negro remains visible and therefore identifiable, even after long 
residence in the City; in addition to the handicaps of being a newcomer, 
the Negro carries the added burdens of his heritage of slavery, the 
destruction of his African culture, underprivileged rearing, denigration, 
and widespread racial prejudice. In consequence, although they have made 
considerable progress in Chicago as measured by higher levels of 
education, occupation, and income, Negroes have not been as free as their 
white immigrant predecessors to break out of segregated settlement area 
and to achieve rapid economic and social advance.47 
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 The report also directly criticized Willis for his stance on race in the Chicago 
Public Schools, calling him “a giant of inertia, inequity, injustice, intransigence and 
trained incapacity.”48 Despite the fact that the Hauser Report represented the opinion of 
experts in the field, Willis dismissed the report’s contents and refused to allow others 
opinions effect his management of the Chicago Public Schools.49He believed that schools 
were to be led by educational experts, without external forces hindering the process.50 
Willis’ commitment to this philosophy made him oblivious to other’s cries of racial 
inequality, and consequently made him the symbol of resistance to school desegregation 
in Chicago.51  
 In 1963 Charles Armstrong, a Chicago representative to the Illinois General 
Assembly, introduced House Bill 113 which was successfully passed by the assembly 
and would make significant changes to the School Code of Illinois.52 An excerpt from the 
bill that would eventually be termed as The Armstrong Law read: 
In erecting, purchasing, or otherwise acquiring buildings for school 
purposes, the Board shall not do so in such a manner as to promote 
segregation or separation of children in public schools because of color, 
race, or nationality. As soon as practicable, and from time to time 
thereafter, the Board shall change or revise existing (attendance) units or 
create new units in a manner which will take into consideration the 
prevention of segregation, and the elimination of separation of children in 
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the public schools because of color, race, or nationality. All records 
pertaining to the creation of attendance units shall be open to the public.53 
 
In 1966, Benjamin C. Willis resigned from the Chicago Public Schools 
charging that the Board had invaded his administrative domain amidst the 
segregation controversy going on in the Chicago Public Schools.54     
The Redmond Era: 1966-1975 
On May 25, 1966, James F. Redmond was appointed as the superintendent of the 
Chicago Public Schools.55 He was the unanimous choice of the Board of Education’s 
committee responsible for choosing the successor of Benjamin C. Willis.56 Redmond’s 
original contract extended over a four year period paying him $48,500 a year.57 
Redmond’s demeanor contrasted that of his predecessor, placing emphasis on issues and 
goals rather than himself.58 
When James Redmond took over as Superintendent of the Chicago Public 
Schools, the district was still segregated. Only 28% of white students were served by 
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schools that had more than a 5% population of black students.59 In contrast, only 4.7% of 
black students were served at schools that were considered to be predominately white.60 
Redmond’s resolve was tested right away. In January 1967, the United States 
Office of Education for Civil Rights provided a statement of findings and 
recommendations as they related to the operation of the Chicago Public Schools.61 This 
report was entitled Report on Office of Education Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago 
Public Schools under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.62 The report highlighted 
four areas of concern which included: faculty assignment patterns, boundaries and 
student assignment policies, the apprenticeship training program and the open enrollment 
for vocational and trade schools.63  
In response to these findings, Redmond developed a proposal requesting a 
planning grant from the U.S. Office of Education under Section 405 (a) (2) of Title IV of 
Public Law 88-352 to fund a specialist to assist in developing a plan to address 
concerns.64 The grant was approved, and Redmond and his team began working to 
resolve some of the problems associated with the operation of the Chicago Public 
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Schools. Out of these collaborations Dr. Redmond developed the following 
recommendations: 
I.    Apprenticeship Training Programs 
 
A. Cooperate with the U.S. Office of Education and the U.S. 
Department of Labor in review of the Mayor’s program to increase 
enrollment of students from Negro and other minority groups. 
B. Develop plans for working on a continuing basis with 
apprenticeship councils to assist in increasing minority 
representation in apprenticeship programs and to develop public 
confidence in the procedures of the councils. 
C. Develop a program to more effectively inform students from 
minority groups about apprenticeship opportunities and to plan 
additional programs to prepare such students to achieve eligibility. 
 
II. Open Enrollment for Vocational and Trade Schools 
 
A. Arrange conferences with the U.S. Office of education to explore 
additional procedures to implement the open enrollment policy 
now in effect in Vocational and Trade Schools in order to increase 
integration in these schools. 
B. Investigate opportunities for extension of career development 
programs. 
 
III. Boundaries and Student Assignment Policies 
 
A. Retain independent and objective specialists to work with the staff. 
B. Review attendance boundaries and assignment policies of students. 
C. Determine feasibility of various actions within the power of the 
Board of Education to reduce segregation. 
 
IV. Faculty Assignment Patterns 
 
A. Retain personnel administration experts as consultants. 
B. Involve representatives of teacher organizations. 
C. Review teacher personnel assignment procedures to plan for 
increased integration of faculties. 
D. Develop feasible plans to equalize the distribution of experienced 
teachers to the greatest possible degree. 
  
90
E. Identify characteristics and conditions of schools which distinguish 
desirable and less desirable schools as seen by teachers.65 
 
At a special session of the Board of Education, Redmond presented the plan 
entitled Increasing Desegregation of Faculties, Students, and Vocational Education 
Programs.66 It was considered to be the first out-and out integration program in 
Chicago’s history, and would later be known as the Redmond Report.67 
One of the first major implementations of the Redmond Report was a proposal for 
busing to encourage the integration of the Chicago Public Schools.68 The plan only called 
for the busing of black students to white schools that had low black enrollment. 
Arrangements to bus white students to predominately black schools were not included in 
the plan due to anticipated resistance from the white community.69 
At the beginning it seemed as if Redmond and his plan would have a strong 
legion of support. The school board endorsed the new plan that aggressively worked to 
integrate the Chicago Public Schools.70 However, as time passed implementation costs, 
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lengthy traveling times, and the fear of bodily harm to students caused board members to 
reassess the plan and eventually reject the busing project.71   
The Hannon Era: 1975-1979 
In 1975, James Redmond made the announcement to the Chicago Public Schools 
Board of Education that he would not seek another term as the general superintendent.72 
On July 24, 1975, Dr. Joseph P. Hannon was appointed as General Superintendent of 
Schools for four years with an effective date of September 14, 1975. 73 Hannon took on 
the Chicago Public Schools at a time when reading scores were low; there was an 
increase in minority student population yet a decrease in minority teachers; the United 
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare threatened to relinquish up to $100 
million dollars in federal funding due to the school district’s failure to integrate their 
faculties; integrating students appeared to be an elusive goal, and a teacher strike was 
currently in progress.74  
In the early part of 1976, Hannon submitted a plan to the Office for Civil Rights 
in response to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s request to remediate 
segregation policies in order to comply with Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act by September 1976.75 The plan was Hannon’s effort to put together in one 
booklet the facts and figures related to the Plan to Integrate Local School Facilities, 
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Equalize Staff Services, and Provide Special Services to National Origin Minority 
Children.76 Before the plan was submitted, Hannon had to get approval from the Chicago 
Public Schools Board of Education. In a General Committee meeting designed to review 
his plan, Hannon explained to the Board of Education the procedures used in its 
development. Hannon stated: 
On January 21, 1976, the Board of Education authorized the General 
Superintendent to develop a plan to integrate school faculties and 
concomitant procedures necessary to achieve specific goals, and review 
with the Board Committee, now a committee of the whole, the Chicago 
Teachers Union, and the Chicago Principal’s Association, the plan to 
further enhance the further racial/ethnic integration of school faculties as 
delineated in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.77 
 
Hannon’s opening statement to Board illustrated that the desegregation process would 
need to involve all stake holders. Hannon sought representation from both the Teachers 
Union as well the Chicago Principals Association understanding how important they 
would be in the desegregating of the Chicago Public Schools. Ultimately, the decision to 
approve Hannon’s plan would still rest in the hands of the Board. 
 Hannon’s closing statements would clearly illustrate that Hannon believed the 
proposed plan would rid the Chicago Public Schools of segregation without 
compromising its educational programs. He reiterated his commitment to providing a 
quality education for all students.  It also made clear that Hannon was truly behind this 
plan, and believed that through its implementation, federal government requirements 
would be satisfied. 
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 Hannon stated:- 
When the request from the Office for Civil Rights was reviewed on 
January 21, I said that quality education must go hand-in-hand with ethnic 
and racial equality. This plan is concerned with quality education, with 
ethnic and racial equality, and with the students, teachers, and citizens in 
this city. We cannot and should not separate the school system from the 
city or the city from the school system. A productive school system is 
essential to a dynamic, progressive city. 
 
This plan has been prepared with care and with concern for the ongoing 
instructional programs provided to the children in our schools and for the 
viability of the communities in Chicago. It is based on the firm belief that 
it can be done without disruption of our schools and their educational 
programs. It is a sound plan- - a plan which I believe will work. It is a plan 
which I strongly urge the Board of Education to adopt and the Office for 
Civil Rights to accept.78 
 
Despite Hannon’s hard work and the plan’s approval from the Chicago Public 
Schools Board of Education, the plan was rejected by the Office for Civil Rights and 
Hannon was asked to provide additional information.79 The Office for Civil Rights 
informed Hannon that it reviewed data to determine the process for assigning faculty and 
staff to develop racially identifiable schools.80 They also wanted to know if teachers 
assigned to work with minority students had less experience and professional training 
than those assigned to work with their nonminority counterparts.81 Lastly, the office 
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wanted to determine if minority children were being offered equally effective educational 
opportunities as others.82   
The Office for Civil Rights requested a plan be submitted within sixty days 
explaining how the Chicago Public Schools would develop a process to assign faculty so 
that it would comply with the goals for desegregation.83 They also expected that the ratio 
of minority to nonminority personnel in individual schools be the same as the ratio across 
the entire district by September 1976.84 At the same time it was expected that the 
proportion of teachers with extensive professional education and experience, and those 
teachers with lesser education and experience, be comparable in number in all of the 
district’s schools.85  
Dr. Hannon requested an extension of 60 days to respond to the expectations 
provided by the Office for Civil Rights, and provided an outline of the steps necessary for 
Chicago to comply with the provisions of Title VI. Hannon outlined the following nine 
steps: 
1.) Collecting  and analyzing current data on the characteristics of 
students and programs for the 1975-76 school year as they relate to the 
regulations of Title VI; 
 
2.) developing assessment techniques for the identification of the English 
language proficiency of national origin minority students; 
 
3.) reviewing the regulations of Title VI with the Chicago Teachers 
Union; 
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4.) reviewing and discussing the provisions of Title VI with the board of 
education and developing recommendations related to a plan for 
compliance for the board’s approval; 
 
5.) coordinating the regulations of Title VI with the requirements of the 
State of Illinois for mandated bilingual education programs and for 
school district desegregation plans; 
 
6.) developing instructional models that meet programmatic needs in 
schools with students of national minority origins who have English 
language problems; 
 
7.) identifying sources of funding for the development of assessment 
techniques, instructional models, and staff inservicing; 
 
8.) studying alternative methods of reallocating support services in 
schools attended by national minority students; and 
 
9.) establishing procedures for identifying individual racial and ethnic 
data on students and staff.86 
 
The Board of Education passed a resolution prescribed by the Illinois Board of 
Education to develop, adopt, and implement a comprehensive Equal Educational 
Opportunity Plan created to meet the criteria for conformance with the Rules Establishing 
Requirements and Procedures for the Elimination and Prevention of Racial Segregation 
in Schools.87 A draft of the plan was created and submitted to the Office for Civil Rights 
to ensure that it would meet the Illinois resolution and also comply with the guidelines set 
forth by the Office of Civil Rights.88 The plan explained how the Chicago Public Schools 
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would integrate faculties by September 1977, eliminate any identifiable pattern of 
principal assignment, and provide appropriate bilingual services.89 
 In February of 1977, a federal judge made the determination that the Chicago 
Public Schools was in violation on the federal faculty/staff racial factor and bilingual 
issue but was not in violation of the faculty experience factor.90 A special consultant was 
designated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to assist in the 
negotiations with the Board in the settlement of the Title VI proceedings.91 On May 25th, 
the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education adopted the Plan for the Implementation 
of Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Related To: Integration of 
Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals and Bilingual Education Programs.92 The 
plan, under Dr. Hannon’s leadership became known as Access to Excellence.93 
 Access to Excellence was designed to increase the quality of educational 
opportunities for all students in a desegregated setting.94 The plan was designed to be 
implemented within a five year period and to be completed by the 1982-1983 school 
year.95 The plan consisted of three major parts: 
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1.) District Programs- Educational initiatives that will be undertaken by 
each of the 27 districts to serve primarily, but not exclusively, the 
students of the district. 
 
2.) System Programs- educational initiatives that will enroll students from 
all parts of the city. 
 
3.) Administrative Actions- Initiatives that give students the opportunity 
to extend their school day year through the summer, to enroll in the 
school of their choice, and to have improved educational facilities.96 
 
District programs were established to provide necessary support for students that 
were struggling academically. It was explicitly stated in the Access to Excellence plan 
that students who needed extra assistance in specific subject areas would have access to 
services to assist them in their learning. 
District programs calls for each district to establish a basic skills program 
so that students needing intensive work in reading, mathematics, and 
language arts may have access to services that will help them gain the 
skills necessary for further learning. In addition, each district is to develop 
and implement a program to serve a particular need or interest of students 
in the district.97  
 
 System programs were designed to offer educational alternatives for both low and 
high achieving students. These programs were created to encourage the integration of a 
diverse body of students who shared a common interest.  
These programs will serve students from preschool through high school; 
they appeal to many diverse interests by offering a broad range of subjects 
and instructional approaches; they provide alternatives to meet the needs 
of students who are below mastery level as well as to challenge students 
who are academically gifted. Every program in every category is designed 
to attract racially and ethnically diverse group of students with common 
interests and aspirations.98 
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System programs activities were divided into six categories: 1) Academic 
Interest Centers, 2) Enrichment Studies Programs, 3) High School 
Bilingual Centers, 4) Career Education Programs, 5) Magnet Schools, 6) 
Preschool Programs.99 
 
 Administrative actions brought about the opportunity for students to extend their 
own learning. Moreover, it provided the opportunity for students to attend other schools 
that offer programming suited to their interests. It was also made clear that students 
would no longer be subjected to environments that hindered their ability to learn. 
Administrative Actions provides further opportunities for students: 
summer school extends their learning opportunities; permissive enrollment 
allows students to seek out the schools in the city that offer the programs 
they desire; the removal of mobiles and construction of new facilities 
gives students environments conducive to learning.100 
 
 In the spring of 1979, the federal government accused the Chicago Public Schools 
of continually supporting segregation in its schools, and stated that they would file a suit 
against the district if they did not develop a comprehensive desegregation plan by 
September.101It was stated to Dr. Hannon in a letter from Joseph Califano that the 
Board’s Access to Excellence program did not correct the identified violations.102 David 
Tatel, Director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Office of Civil 
Rights, delivered a document to Hannon expressing concern for Chicago’s segregated 
schools.103 The document expressed the need for negotiations for a citywide 
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desegregation plan to begin right away.104 Tatel stated that if Chicago refused to 
participate in negotiations, the case would be referred to the Justice Department for court 
action.105 Tatel also believed that the school board could do more to increase 
desegregation beyond the Access to Excellence Plan. To make matters worse, the federal 
government rejected the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education’s application for 
desegregation funds under the Emergency School Aid Act with the hope that Chicago 
would develop a plan that would give them eligibility.106 Federal officials gave Hannon 
and the Chicago Public Schools the options of participating in a “show cause” hearing to 
prove the charges incorrect or the opportunity to request a waiver to receive funding.107 
Hannon chose to participate in the hearing, as he believed accepting the waiver would be 
an admission of guilt.108 
Hannon set out to challenge the government’s findings and prove to federal 
officials that Chicago and its commitment to the Access to Excellence plan had made 
substantial strides toward desegregating the Chicago Public Schools.109 On May 4, 1979, 
Hannon met with the officials of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to 
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prove why the Chicago Public Schools should still receive federal funding.110 During the 
proceedings, Hannon asked federal officials to revoke their findings that the Chicago 
Public School District was deliberately segregating its schools, and to reinstate the 
district’s eligibility for $36 million dollars in funds under the Emergency School Aid 
Act.111 Hannon’s efforts could not persuade the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare to change their mind. They did not agree with the district’s definition of what 
constituted a school being desegregated. Chicago’s standard for desegregation was when 
a school operated with no more than 90 percent of its student population belonging to 
only one race.112 The definition as it related to federal criteria, considered a school 
desegregated when the school’s full time student enrollment was 25 to 50% white and 50 
to 75% black.113 
In a newspaper article featured in the Chicago Tribune in 1979, the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare was quoted as saying that “although there were many 
sound educational programs contained in the Access to Excellence plan, it did not correct 
the unlawfully segregated conditions that had been identified.”114   
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Hannon returned to Chicago, and under the directive of his administration, the 
Chicago Public Schools Board of Education approved an expansion of the Access to 
Excellence plan. This would call for the addition of thirteen sites administering preschool 
programs, classical schools, and language academies beginning in September of 1979.115 
Hannon took a firm stance on the concept of a voluntary integration plan, shunning any 
strategies that would be mandatory such as busing. Hannon believed that the 
implementation of voluntary access to quality education was Chicago’s best option 
despite the fact that the city was residentially segregated.116  Furthermore, mandatory 
integration would not be an effective strategy due to the low white student enrollment 
throughout the district.117 
On July 13, 1979, Mayor Jane Byrne announced that she participated in a meeting 
with Dr. Hannon to discuss the status of the desegregation negotiations between the 
district and the federal government. She stated that Hannon and his staff were preparing 
an expanded desegregation plan. This plan would include clustering, a strategy that 
would combine the school populations of three or more schools within the same 
proximity. This strategy along with the use of magnet schools would require little 
busing.118 Hannon and his team also had to consider an alternative to their voluntary 
plans. The federal government demanded that mandatory backup measures be instituted if 
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voluntary efforts failed to meet the goal of achieving desegregation that was acceptable to 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.119 
While mandatory integration strategies were not looked at favorably by the 
Chicago Public Schools, the federal government still believed they were a viable option. 
David Tatel, Director of the Office for Civil Rights stated: “We have decided that further 
progress would be enhanced by developing some specific desegregation option; one of 
the options will be busing.”120 Tatel also stated that the plan would need to be developed 
and approved by September 15th with an implementation date to be determined through 
later investigations.121 On August 26th, Patricia Harris would be newly appointed as the 
secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.122 Although she stated 
she would assist Chicago in mapping out an acceptable school desegregation plan, the 
September 15th deadline would not be extended.123 
On August 31, HEW developed a proposal for the Chicago Public Schools that 
required the mandatory busing of 114,000 elementary students.124  It would not be a 
requirement for Chicago to accept the proposal, but if they chose to do so, it would 
desegregate 60% of the district’s schools and involve 55% of the district’s student 
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population.125 Hannon’s response to the proposal was that busing 114,000 school children 
to achieve the government’s definition of integration would be costly and would not 
improve education nor aid the city’s stability.126 
In mid September, Hannon submitted to Washington D.C. the plan, Access to 
Excellence: Further Recommendations for Equalizing Educational Opportunities, 
designed to achieve greater racial balance throughout the district.127 On September 26, 
1979, the HEW informed the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education that their 
submission would not be accepted because it did not adequately remedy the alleged 
segregated conditions in the Chicago Public Schools.128 On October 17, 1979, HEW 
announced it would continue negotiations if the Chicago Public Schools Board of 
Education agreed to their definition of a desegregated school and submit an effective 
desegregation plan by November 17, 1979.129 The Board refused to proceed with 
negotiations under the terms set forth by the HEW.130 The following day, Hannon 
informed the board that he would be receiving a letter announcing that Chicago’s 
desegregation case would be received by the Department of Justice.131   
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On October 29, 1979, HEW presented the matter to the Department of Justice 
with the intention that it would initiate litigation.132 Hannon was encouraged by board 
members and his close advisors to take a public stand and fight the desegregation issue in 
court.133 The Chicago Public Schools Board of Education rejected the idea of creating a 
citywide desegregation plan that coincided with the stipulations set forth by HEW.134 
Hannon echoed their sentiments referring to HEW’s proposal as “unworkable and 
unreasonable.”135 
On November 14, 1979, the General Superintendent of Schools set out to meet 
with members of government to work out a solution on pupil assignment.136 Hannon was 
in opposition of the charges against his school district, but agreed to cooperate with HEW 
to resolve the desegregation issue in hopes to reclaim federal funding.137 Later that year 
the Board submitted an application to HEW requesting ESAA funds for the 1980-81 
school year only to be denied once again by the HEW due to alleged discrimination.138  
Hannon found himself in a position of great scrutiny with various communities 
requesting his removal. In particular, a coalition of black civic and church leaders urged 
the Board to remove Hannon and replace him with the black deputy superintendent who 
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was presently serving.139 Hannon would announce that he would resign effective January 
25, 1980.140 It was revealed to sources close to him that Hannon believed the schools 
would never be able to work through their financial issues, as well as those dealing with 
desegregation until education was put before politics.141 At a time when things appeared 
to be at their lowest point, Angeline P. Caruso, Associate Superintendent of Curriculum 
and Instruction Services was appointed superintendent.142   
The Love Era: 1980-1985  
Caruso served in the superintendent’s capacity until Dr. Ruth Love, Chicago’s 
first black school superintendent was hired in April of 1980.143 On April 21, 1980, the 
Department of Justice found the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education guilty of the 
unlawful segregation of students based on their race.144 They were prepared to file a suit 
against the board unless it was assured that voluntary compliance could be put in place to 
remedy the alleged violations.145 The Department of Justice provided the Chicago Public 
Schools Board of Education an opportunity to enter into negotiations in order to reach an 
agreement that would resolve the desegregation matter.146  
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On June 11, 1980, the Board developed a Committee on Desegregation to meet 
with the United States Department of Justice to try to resolve the district’s legal issues.147 
The Committee recommended to the board that it continue to promote racial integration 
in its schools and that the programs they developed to achieve integration must be guided 
by legal requirements as well as educational objectives.148 
The Committee reached an agreement with the Department of Justice and 
Education that centered on a three-step process to eradicate segregation in the Chicago 
Public Schools.  First, the parties’ agreed to a preliminary commitment to develop and 
implement a plan which included principles that would guide the plan’s development. 
The next step was to develop a detailed plan, with the participation by appropriate experts 
and by the community, and an adoption of the plan by the Board no later than March 
1981. Finally, the parties agreed to implement the plan beginning September 1981.149  
The initial commitment would be carried out by entering into a Consent Decree 
agreed upon by the Board and the Department of Justice and submitted to the United 
States District Court for Approval.150  Initially, the Consent Decree was made up a set of 
basic elements. The Board committed itself to the development of a plan consistent with 
the requirements of the Constitution of the United States. In choosing among the many 
variations that were constitutionally acceptable, the Board retained complete discretion to 
design the plan that best meet the needs of the Chicago Public Schools and the City of 
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Chicago. The preliminary commitment would only state the general principles to guide 
the development of the plan, with further details being developed and established by the 
Board in collaboration with students, parents, community groups, appropriate experts, 
Board staff, and other interested parties.151  
The Committee recommended that the Board accept the terms of the proposed 
Consent Decree and seek to have it judicially approval.152 The Consent Decree was 
approved, providing the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education not only a viable 
solution to student desegregation, but also to areas that hindered their eligibility for 
federal funding such as classroom integration, bilingual program staffing, and faculty 
assignment.153 
Under the agreed upon Consent Decree, the Board of Education and the United 
States submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and recognized that subject matter 
jurisdiction existed over this action under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.154 The Court would have full jurisdiction of the Consent Decree and would 
determine when it could be terminated.155 
The plan would be developed in accordance with the following time table: 
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October 15, 1980 Appointment of principal plan development 
consultants. 
 
November 17, 1980 Progress report to Justice Department 
December 4, 1980 Identification of plan components appropriate for      
funding in the basic and magnet categories under 
the Emergency School Aid Act and submission of 
appropriate funding proposals to the Department of 
Education 
  
 December 15, 1980     Progress report to Justice Department 
 
 January 15, 1981         Progress report to Justice Department    
 
 February 16, 1981       Progress report to Justice Department 
 
 March 31, 1981          Completion of final plan and adoption of plan by 
                                     the Board. The plan would be conveyed to the 
                                     Justice Department and filed with the Court.156 
 
Mission and Objectives 
The Original Consent Decree: 1980 
In 1980, the United States Justice Department set out to sue the Chicago Public 
Schools Board of Education for running a segregated school system.  
The United States has filed a complaint alleging that the Board of 
Education of the City of Chicago (the “Board”) has engaged in acts of 
discrimination in the assignment of students and otherwise, in violation of 
federal law. The United States alleges further that such acts have had a 
continuing system-wide effect of segregating students on a racial and 
ethnic basis in the Chicago public school system.157 
 
The school district was accused of operating in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
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1964.158 The complaint alleged that the Chicago Public Schools engaged in actions 
regarding student/faculty assignment and other educational practices that promoted 
inequalities regarding how students were educated. Specifically, these practices included 
drawing attendance zone boundaries, adjusting grade structures of schools in racially and 
ethnically segregative ways, allowing racially segregative intra-district transfers by white 
students, maintaining severely overcrowded and thereby educationally inferior schools 
for black students and less crowded schools for white students, and assigning teachers 
and staff to schools in racially segregative ways.159 
The Board’s stance was ambiguous, neither acknowledging nor denying 
allegations set before them. The Board acknowledged that the segregation of students 
hindered their education. While they agreed that the school system suffered from racially 
isolated schools, they also acknowledged that it would be financially difficult to address 
the issues.  
The Board believes that racial isolation is educationally disadvantageous 
to all students and that educational benefits will accrue to all students 
through the greatest practicable reduction in the racial isolation of 
students… 
 
The Board neither admits nor denies the allegations of the complaint in 
this action. It recognizes, however, that the Chicago public school system 
is characterized by substantial racial isolation of students… 
 
The Board believes that litigation of this action would require a substantial 
expenditure of public funds and a substantial commitment of Board and 
staff time and resources, at a time when financial and personnel resources 
that are already greatly limited…160 
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The two sides, based on the presented information, determined that they would 
settle the action and resolve the United States request for relief by the entry of a Consent 
Decree.161 The original Consent Decree consisted of several basic objectives: 
2.1 Desegregated Schools- The plan will provide for the establishment of 
the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated schools, 
considering all circumstances in Chicago.162 
 
This objective states implicitly that the desegregation of all of the Chicago Public 
Schools may not be possible. It also acknowledged that the idea of desegregating 
the Chicago Public Schools was an important and worthwhile goal despite the 
obstacles. As long as it was feasible, the Chicago Public School District would be 
committed to desegregating its schools. 
2.2 Compensatory Programs in Schools-remaining Segregated- In order to 
assure participation by all students in a system-wide remedy and to 
alleviate the effects of both past and ongoing segregation, the plan shall 
provide educational and related programs for any Black or Hispanic 
schools remaining segregated.163 
 
This objective addresses the idea that all schools will not be totally integrated and that 
there may be schools that still operate with a majority of minority students as their 
population. This objective commits the Chicago Public Schools to providing quality 
educational programming to those students who remain in racially isolated schools. 
2.3 Participation- To the greatest extent practicable, the plan will provide 
for desegregation of all racial and ethnic groups, and in all age and grade 
levels above kindergarten.164 
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This objective specifies that the desegregation plan is designed to benefit all races. It also 
establishes the fact that it is targeted for students in grades first through twelfth. 
Remaining consistent with the aforementioned objective 2.1, the Board specifies that its 
actions to desegregate schools will take place when at all possible. 
2.4 Fair Allocations of Burdens- The plan shall ensure that the burdens of 
desegregation are not imposed arbitrarily on any racial or ethnic group.165 
 
This objective makes the desegregation of the Chicago Public Schools an obligation for 
all races. It assures that whatever race represents the majority population will not be held 
responsible for their school’s demographics. 
The Modified Consent Decree: 2004 
In 2001, the United States and the Chicago Public Schools reviewed the school 
district’s implementation of and compliance with the original Consent Decree and the 
Desegregation Plan.166 It was determined by the court that there were areas of the plan 
that had not reached full compliance.167 These areas related to magnet schools, transfers, 
school openings and closings, attendance zone changes, controlled enrollment, 
assignment of faculty and school based administrators, compensatory programs and 
services for English Language Learner students.168 Twenty-four years after the Original 
Consent Decree came into existence, the United States and Board of Education of the 
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City of Chicago entered into a Modified Consent Decree.169 The Modified Consent 
Decree encompassed the original plans set forth in the original Consent Decree of 1980, 
along with new requirements such as new reporting obligations, specific limits on 
desegregation budget, and significant obligations with respect to Chicago Public Schools 
programs serving English Language Learners.170 The new Modified Desegregation 
Consent Decree was designed with the intention that its full implementation would 
address the goals set forth in the original Consent Decree and Desegregation Plan.171 The 
new Consent Decree also established a timetable that would bring the case to a final 
resolution.172 
In the Modified Consent Decree, the following goal as it relates to student 
assignment was established: 
The parties recognize that, given the geographical size of the Chicago 
Public Schools and the demographics of the Chicago Public Schools and 
the City of Chicago, it is not practicable for all the Chicago Public Schools 
to have enrollments that are desegregated. Therefore, in assigning students 
to schools, the Chicago Public Schools shall use a variety of strategies to 
assign students to schools, and in implementing these strategies, the 
Chicago Public Schools shall establish and maintain as many schools with 
stably desegregated enrollments as practicable.173 
 
This part of the Modified Consent Decree acknowledges the fact that the size of the 
Chicago Public School District hindered its ability to desegregate all of its schools. It also 
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alludes to the idea that Chicago’s distinctive separation of neighborhoods is also reflected 
in the organization of students within their neighborhood schools. With these obstacles in 
place, the Chicago Public Schools agreed to establish desegregated schools when at all 
feasible. 
In the Modified Consent Decree, the following goal related to faculty assignment 
was established: 
The goal is to have the racial ethnic composition of full-time teachers in 
each school to be within plus or minus 15 percentage points of the racial 
and ethnic composition of full-time teachers district wide serving the same 
grade levels… 174 
 
 This part of the Modified Consent Decree establishes that the Chicago Public Schools is 
committed to maintaining staffs that are racially diverse when at all feasible. Requiring 
staffs to have a racial composition that reflects that of the district wide average prevents 
schools from creating staffs made up of a single race. By adding the specific grade level 
component, schools are not allowed to over saturate specific grade levels with a teaching 
staff composed of one particular race.  
The Second Amended Consent Decree: 2006 
 
 In 2005, the courts asked both parties if provisions of the Modified Consent 
Decree should continue, and set up a formal hearing to take place on May 15, 2006 to 
address the question.175 The court revisited the Modified Consent Decree because of the 
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significant changes in racial demographics in Chicago’s neighborhoods and schools.176 
The student population of the Chicago Public Schools in no way resembled that of the 
school population that existed during the creation of both the original and modified 
versions of the Consent Decree.177 As a result of the court’s inquiry, and further 
discovery by both parties, the United States of America and the Board of Education of the 
City of Chicago jointly requested that they vacate the Modified Consent Decree and be 
allowed to enter a Second Amended Consent Decree.178 The motion was granted in part 
as well as denied in part.179 In Section VI of the proposed amended decree, the two 
parties requested that the Consent Decree automatically expire in June.180 The court 
approved the request to enter a Second Amended Consent Decree; however, established 
that the Consent Decree could not automatically expire without the determination being 
through the court.181  
The goals and objectives set forth in all three versions of the Consent Decree were 
consistent with the precedence set forth in Brown v. Board I and II. Within the Brown v. 
Board decision, it was determined by the court that the desegregation of students based 
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on race deprived children of the minority group equal educational opportunities.182 As 
stated by Justice Warren in the landmark case, education can be considered the most 
important function of both local and state government. An individual’s success would not 
be likely if he or she was denied an opportunity of receiving an education.183 This 
opportunity must be available to all on equal terms.184 These goals and objectives of the 
Consent Decree illustrated the Chicago Public School District’s new commitment to 
remedying the discriminatory practices that violated the tenets set forth in the Brown v. 
Board decision. 
Implementation Strategies 
The Original Consent Decree: 1980 
In order to ensure that the Consent Decree of 1980 was successful, the Chicago 
Public Schools utilized a series of strategies and techniques.185 The Chicago Public 
Schools utilized techniques that were classified as both voluntary as well as mandatory to 
help desegregate the Chicago Public Schools.186  The Board established that they may 
utilize the following techniques among others to establish desegregated schools: 
Voluntary Techniques 
4.1.1 Permissive transfers that enhance desegregation, with 
transportation at Board expense. 
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4.1.2 Magnet schools that enhance desegregation. 
 
4.1.3 Voluntary pairing and clustering of schools. 
 
4.1.4 If magnet schools or other voluntary techniques are used, each 
shall contain/ethnic goals and management controls (e.g., an 
alternative that would require mandatory re-assignments) to ensure 
that the goals are met.187 
 
This excerpt from the original Consent Decree establishes the voluntary techniques the 
Chicago Public Schools set out to implement in order to establish desegregated schools. 
In this excerpt, the concept of Magnet schools is introduced. It also conveys the idea that 
Board funded transportation may be utilized to create more racial balance at the school 
level. In the last part of this excerpt in section 4.1.4 of the Consent Decree, the Chicago 
Public Schools makes it clear that these voluntary actions will be monitored and 
supported with mandatory mandates if necessary to support the desegregation of the 
Chicago Public Schools. 
Mandatory Techniques Not Involving Transportation 
 
4.2.1 Redrawing attendance areas. 
 
4.2.2 Adjusting feeder patterns 
 
4.2.3 Reorganization of grade structures, including creation of  
         middle schools. 
 
4.2.4 Pairing and clustering of schools. 
 
4.2.5 Selecting sites for new schools and selecting schools for schools  
         closing to enhance integration.188 
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This section of the original Consent Decree establishes the mandatory techniques the 
Chicago Public Schools set out to implement in order to establish desegregated schools. 
In this excerpt the Chicago Public Schools introduces the idea of modifying the way in 
which students are assigned to schools using methods such as changing attendance 
boundaries, changing the schools students go to after elementary graduation, and 
developing a middle school model. In this excerpt, the Chicago Public Schools also 
stated that it will identify new areas to build schools in order to enhance integration. 
Mandatory Reassignment and Transportation 
 
Mandatory reassignment and transportation, at Board expense, will be 
included to ensure success of the plan to the extent that other techniques 
are insufficient…189 
 
This section of the original Consent Decree establishes that mandatory student 
reassignment and transportation may be implemented in mandatory techniques, voluntary 
techniques, or a combination of the two in order to establish desegregated schools. This 
section also provides the Chicago Public Schools with an opportunity to utilize order to 
establish desegregated schools if other methods are deemed as insufficient. It also states 
that any costs associated with these mandatory techniques will be incurred by the Board. 
Priority and Combination of Techniques 
 
The plan may rely upon the techniques listed above and any other 
remedial methods in any combination that accomplishes the objective 
stated in 2.1.190 
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This section of the original Consent Decree establishes that the Board will utilize other 
tactics that may not be listed in the decree to reach the goal of desegregating the Chicago 
Public Schools.  
The Modified Consent Decree: 2004 
The creation of the Modified Consent Decree was based on a review by the 
United States in conjunction with the Chicago Public Schools to determine the Chicago 
Public Schools compliance with the plan set forth in the original Consent Decree.191 It 
was determined that the areas that had not achieved full compliance were related to 
magnet schools, transfers, school openings and closings, attendance zone changes, 
controlled enrollment, assignment of faculty and school based administrators, 
compensatory programs and services for English Language Learner students.192 
Within the Modified Consent Decree, the Chicago Public Schools established 
several guidelines as they related to the function of their Magnet schools. It was first 
established that the goal for faculty integration set forth in the original Consent Decree 
would also be included in the Modified Decree.  
Magnet schools and specialized schools shall be considered desegregated 
if they have enrollments that are 15% to 35% White and 65% to 85% 
Black.193 
 
The Modified Consent Decree established that Magnet schools would be open to 
students from across the city. It also gave a clear description of how a student lottery 
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system would be used to select students when there are more applicants than the school 
can accommodate. The strategy would help to assure that the selection process remained 
equitable. 
Magnet schools are open to students from throughout the Chicago Public 
Schools…If there are more applicants than seats, the Chicago Public 
Schools shall use a lottery process to select students…If there are fewer 
applicants available than seats available, the Chicago Public Schools shall 
admit all applicants.194 
 
The following two excerpts from the Modified Consent Decree established the 
idea that the Chicago Public Schools would put systems in place to guarantee racial 
equity in its magnet schools. In the first excerpt it is mentioned that the Chicago Public 
Schools will actively recruit students from all races to attend its magnet schools. In the 
second excerpt it is established that the Chicago Public Schools will conduct a study 
analyzing the acceptance rate of students accepted into magnet schools to determine if 
new magnets need to be built. It is also established the idea that the Chicago Public 
Schools will also continue to review its existing policies as they relate to Magnet schools 
to ensure that they are committed to serving desegregated populations of students. 
The Chicago Public Schools shall revise and update, if necessary, its 
magnet school recruitment guidelines and procedures to ensure that 
student from all races and ethnicities have equitable access to magnet 
schools and that a variety of strategies…continue to be used to recruit 
students from all races and ethnicities to achieve a desegregated 
enrollment.195 
 
The Chicago Public Schools shall conduct a study of its magnet schools, 
which shall analyze whether, in light of the number of students who have 
applied for and who were not accepted into magnet schools or other 
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quality school options due to space constraints, the Chicago Public 
Schools should establish additional magnet schools…In addition, the 
Chicago Public Schools shall review and update, if necessary, the 
curriculum, recruitment procedures, transportation limitations and other 
aspects of magnet schools to enhance their ability to attract a racially 
ethnically diverse pool of applicants and to enroll desegregated student 
bodies.196 
 
The Chicago Public Schools also developed a strategy for those schools that may 
remain racially isolated. Their strategy was to put quality academic programming within 
neighborhood schools. These schools would be available to students who lived within the 
school’s attendance boundary. 
Magnet cluster schools are open to students who live in the attendance 
boundary for a particular magnet cluster school…Where possible, the 
Chicago Public Schools shall identify schools to be part of a magnet 
cluster that are in close geographical proximity and that may contribute to 
desegregation of the schools in the cluster.197  
 
Each school within a magnet cluster implements one of six academic areas 
of focus: Fine and Performing Arts; the International Baccalaureate 
Middle Years; the International, the Chicago Public Schools Scholars 
Program; Literature and Writing; Math and Science or World Language.198 
 
Within the Modified Consent Decree, it is mentioned that the Chicago Public 
Schools transfer policy will be reviewed and updated to make sure that it is aligned with 
the goals of the Consent Decree. The following excerpt from the Modified Consent 
Decree illustrate some of the monitoring strategies the Chicago Public Schools put in 
place to work toward desegregating it schools. 
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The Chicago Public Schools shall review and update, if necessary, its 
transfer policy to provide for open enrollment transfers, majority-to-
minority transfers and NCLB transfers to ensure that the transfer policy is 
consistent with this Consent Decree.199  
 
For those students who attended schools that were considered underperforming, 
the Chicago Public Schools put into place a system that gave them an opportunity to 
transfer to a better performing school. This process went along with the idea of providing 
quality academic programming for all students. 
Students attending a Title I school identified for School Improvement, 
Corrective Action, or Restructuring pursuant to NCLB have the 
opportunity to transfer to a school that is not identified for School 
Improvement, Corrective Action, or Restructuring…Where feasible, the 
Chicago Public Schools shall identify schools to which students may 
transfer where transferring shall promote or maintain desegregated 
enrollments.200 
 
The Chicago Public Schools attendance policy would also be reviewed and 
updated as stated in the excerpt below. 
 The Chicago Public Schools shall review and update, if necessary, and 
publish a policy for establishing and revising attendance boundaries. This 
policy shall include the process and procedures for setting these 
boundaries, including the public hearing requirement, which is now in 
effect. In addition, the policy shall include the process and information 
that shall be provided by the Board. The policy shall require that 
alternatives or options be developed for each proposed attendance 
boundary and that a range of factors be considered, including the 
capacities of each of the school involved in the proposed boundaries.201   
 
 The allegation of overcrowded neighborhood schools was addressed directly 
within the Modified Consent Decree. It was apparent that some schools experienced these 
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conditions more than others and it often coincided with the race of the school’s 
population. The Chicago Public Schools explicitly acknowledged this problem and put 
procedures in place to ensure equal conditions for all students while promoting the idea 
of desegregated schools.   
 The Chicago Public Schools shall alleviate any racially and ethnically 
disproportionate overcrowding of school sites, to the extent practicable.202 
 
 The Chicago Public Schools shall review and update, if necessary, and 
publish its procedures regarding overcrowded schools and controlled 
enrollment to include a) a provision that the Chicago Public Schools shall 
determine whether there exists a racially or ethnically disproportionate 
overcrowding of schools district wide and b) a provision that the Chicago 
Public Schools shall consider a variety of factors when alleviating 
overcrowding in schools. These factors shall include maintaining or 
promoting stable desegregated enrollments at sending and receiving 
schools.203 
 
 The Modified Consent Decree also placed a checks and balances system on those 
schools who utilized a controlled enrollment strategy. It ensured that schools who 
implemented controlled enrollment did not abuse it. 
 The Chicago Public Schools shall develop and implement a plan to 
monitor enrollment at schools that are overcrowded and the 
implementation of the controlled enrollment procedures at these schools to 
ensure that schools do not remain part of the controlled enrollment process 
after such time that enrollment drops to capacity where additional students 
may be enrolled.204 
 
 The Modified Consent Decree also addressed the integration of school faculties, a 
goal established within the original Consent Decree. It was important to assure that the 
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racial make-up of a school’s staff was a direct reflection of the district’s commitment to 
integrating its schools.  
The Chicago Public Schools shall make every good faith effort to follow 
assignment and transfer practices for teachers that, when taken together as 
a whole on a frequently reviewed periodic basis, promote and maintain 
individual school full-time teaching faculties that more nearly approach 
the district wide proportion of full-time minority teachers at schools 
serving the same grade levels…205 
 
The Modified Consent Decree also addressed the procedure by which 
administrators were assigned to schools. The Chicago Public Schools wanted to ascertain 
that the race of a school’s administrator and teaching staff would not determine the race 
of the student population to which it served.  
The Chicago Public Schools shall make every good faith effort to follow 
assignment and transfer practices for school-based administrators so that a 
school is not racially identifiable by student enrollment and by the 
teachers and school based administrators assigned to the school.206  
 
 The Modified Consent Decree also revisited the addition of compensatory 
and supplementary programs as a means of increasing students’ achievement. The 
Modified Consent Decree first established that the goal of compensatory and 
supplementary programs remained consistent with the goals established within the 
original decree. 
...the overriding goal of the compensatory and supplementary programs 
required by…the 1980 Decree is to address minority students’ educational 
needs through improving achievement in all schools, with particular 
emphasis on schools with the greatest needs and attended by children who 
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have been the most disadvantaged. The parties agree that this goal shall 
remain in effect…207 
It is also established within the Modified Consent Decree how these programs 
would be funded, as well as examples of the kinds of programs that would be put in 
place. It is clearly established that these programs would be targeted for schools who 
service minorities and who remain in racial isolation.  
The Chicago Public Schools has initiated programs that address the 
compensatory and supplementary program goal and funds such programs 
independent of its desegregation budget through other local, state, and 
federal funds…208 
 
…examples of such programs include the Chicago Public Schools 
Reading Initiative which provides supplemental reading sources to 
approximately 300 schools. The Chicago Public Schools has fully 
implemented a math/science initiative at 84 schools…The Chicago Public 
Schools has expanded its early childhood, full day kindergarten, and after-
school program. During the life of this Consent Decree, the Chicago 
Public Schools shall maintain, and increase, if practicable, these programs 
at African American and Hispanic racially-isolated schools.209 
 
The Modified Consent Decree also established how the schools that implemented 
these programs would be identified, and that their participation would be included within 
their school report card. This would give potential students and their guardians an 
opportunity to know what these schools had to offer. 
The Chicago Public Schools shall identify the schools that are 
implementing the reading initiative, the math/science initiative, early 
childhood education programs, and full-day kindergarten programs or 
after school extended day programs. The Chicago Public Schools shall 
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include in the school’s report card which of these programs are being 
implemented.210 
 
Within the Modified Consent, the Chicago Public Schools reaffirms its 
commitment to ELL students. It is established that the programs for these students 
will be readily accessible without hindrance.  
The Chicago Public Schools continues to be committed to providing 
language acquisition programs to all eligible students…The the Chicago 
Public Schools shall not assign or reassign ELL students to schools in a 
manner that interferes with their participation in language acquisitions 
programs.211 
 
The Second Amended Consent Decree: 2006 
 
The United States of America and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago 
jointly requested that they vacate the Modified Consent Decree and be allowed to enter a 
Second Amended Consent Decree.212 The motion was granted in part and denied in 
part.213 In Section VI of the proposed amended decree, the two parties requested that the 
Consent Decree automatically expire in June.214 The court approved the request to enter a 
Second Amended Consent Decree; however, established that the Consent Decree could 
not automatically expire without the determination being through the court.215  
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Within the Second Amended Decree is a list of reporting structures established to 
guarantee that strides would be made between the two parties to reach the goals set forth 
in the Consent Decree. These reporting structures would give the courts an opportunity to 
see the progress the Chicago Public Schools had made before allowing the Consent 
Decree to expire. 
The Chicago Public Schools shall report to the United States and amici 
curiae: a) the number and percentage of students, disaggregated by 
race/ethnicity, per school and in the Chicago Public Schools as a whole; b) 
the number and percentage of teachers, disaggregated by race/ethnicity, 
per school and in the Chicago Public Schools as a whole; c) the race of the 
principals of each school; d) for each magnet school, the number and 
percentage of students, disaggregated by race/ethnicity, who applied, were 
accepted, enrolled, and denied admission to the school; and e) the number 
of students, disaggregated  by race/ethnicity who applied, were accepted, 
and enrolled as M-to-M transfers by sending and receiving school.216 
 
The Chicago Public Schools shall submit to the United States and amici 
curiae a listing of each compensatory program at each school.217 
 
The implementation strategies set forth in all three versions of the Consent Decree 
were consistent with the precedence set forth in Brown v. Board I and II. Chicago has 
always been segregated by neighborhoods and consequently relied on racially isolated 
neighborhood schools to educate its students. This lent itself as an obstacle for Chicago to 
embrace the desegregation of its schools.  As stated within the Brown v. Board cases, 
many obstacles may have to be eliminated to create integrated schools.218 Within the 
original Consent Decree, the strategy of utilizing a mandatory reassignment and 
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transportation as a means of supporting desegregation is a direct reflection of what was 
established in Brown v. Board. The Modified and later Amended versions of the Consent 
Decree supported the same agenda, adding a monitoring structure as well as additional 
accountability. 
Public Perception 
 
 A requirement of the Consent Decree was that the Chicago Public Schools 
develop and implement a system-wide student desegregation plan.219  This plan consisted 
of three parts: 1) Recommendations on Educational Components; 2) Student Assignment 
Principles, Financial Aspects and General Policies; 3) The Comprehensive Student 
Assignment Plan.220 Each part of the plan came with its own share of public criticism. 
 On April 15, 1981, the Board approved Recommendations on Educational 
Components, the first part of the Student Desegregation Plan.221 This part of the plan 
outlined several strategies for ensuring educational equity and raising the achievement 
levels of students.222 Specific components addressed in the plan included student 
discipline, staff development, special education and testing, bilingual education, magnet 
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schools, and faculty desegregation and affirmative action, as well as monitoring and 
evaluation.223 
 On April 29, 1981, the Board approved Student Assignment Principles, Financial 
Aspects and General Policies, part two of the Student Desegregation Plan which 
established the framework and timetable for development of a comprehensive student 
assignment plan.224  It also established the definitions for integrated and desegregated 
schools under the plan.225  
 Part I and II of the plan were highly criticized by citizen groups. The Puerto Rican 
Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund believed the plan failed to ensure equal educational opportunities for 
Hispanic students.226 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
believed that ridding the schools of operating in racial isolation should be the point of 
emphasis.227 This concern was also shared by the Citizens School Committee, a 
multicultural association of parents, community and civic leaders, educators, and other 
concerned citizenry.228 The Citizens School Committee also expressed a concern about 
the quality of education in these schools, stating that only 45 of the 350 schools in 
question benefited from enhanced compensatory educational programs. 
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 On January 22, 1982, the Board adopted The Comprehensive Student Assignment 
Plan, the final part of the Student Desegregation Plan.229 The plan was designed to reduce 
the amount of racially isolated schools in the system.230 In order to achieve this goal, four 
basic strategies were to be implemented: 
1. to attract children back to the Chicago Public Schools by directly 
competing with private, parochial, and suburban schools; 
 
2. to stabilize and increase the desegregation that already exists in some 
schools; 
 
3. to the greatest extent practicable, to desegregate those schools that are 
not desegregated; and 
 
4. to avoid the unnecessary use of compulsory measures.231 
 
  The Comprehensive Student Assignment Plan was highly criticized by the 
Hispanic community because they believed that Hispanic students would remain in 
racially isolated schools.232 They believed that Hispanic students would have to rely on 
quality educational programs to guarantee an equal education. This was consistent with 
their emphasis on having access to compensatory programs.233 
  The Chicago Urban Leagues believed that the plan’s intentions to minimize white 
flight brought about additional burdens and restrictions on blacks.  These included: 
1. the failure to require black participation in the definition of the remedy 
of past racial isolation; 
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2. allowing a system with only 17 percent whites to retain 70 percent 
white schools; 
 
3. the creation of restrictions against minorities transferring into schools 
that would thereby drop below 50 percent white; 
 
4. the exemption from racial quota transfer-out restrictions granted 
exclusively to whites (who wish to attend magnet school) when such 
preferential treatment does not even assume that the goal of 
desegregation will be enhanced in any individual instance; 
 
5. the failure to explicitly require any whites to attend a school outside 
their residential neighborhood while continuing to mandate that blacks 
attend schools outside their residential neighborhood.234  
 
  Members of the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education also found fault in 
the Comprehensive Student Assignment Plan, barely approving it with a six-to-five 
vote.235 Board member Joyce A. Hughes, who voted against the plan, believed it suffered 
from two fundamental flaws. She felt it protected white students at the expense of black 
students, and it regarded racial minorities as being interchangeable.236 
 In spite of the numerous amounts of negative criticism, the Court found Chicago’s 
Student Desegregation Plan to be constitutional.237 The Consent Decree had 
accomplished something that had been a struggle thirty years after the Brown v. Board 
decision. Chicago had developed a comprehensive desegregation plan. Along with the 
plan’s implementation came quite a bit of change. In order to achieve the goals 
established by the Consent Decree and later supported through the Desegregation Plan, 
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the city and school district would deal with a variety of the supports and barriers. As we 
move into Chapter IV, we will take a close look at some of the things the Chicago Public 
Schools had to deal with in order to desegregate its schools. 
 
 
132 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHICAGO PUBLIC 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONSENT DECREE 
Introduction 
The prospect of integrating the Chicago Public Schools was a daunting task and 
would not be accomplished without pain and strife. In order to comply with the court’s 
order, the Chicago Public School District would have to work through a history of 
operating schools based on geographic location, regardless of conditions and available 
resources. The government threatened to cut funding to states that intentionally 
segregated schools and Chicago found itself as the first location where the issue would 
arise.1 Chicago not only represented the most powerful accusation of discrimination the 
Office of Education had received, but it also brought attention to the confrontation 
between superintendent Benjamin Willis and the city’s Black community.2 The Chicago 
Public School District would be led by several different educational leaders, and it 
became clear that they would have to take an aggressive approach in attempting to 
integrate the Chicago Public Schools. This would call for the use of several strategies that 
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amidst public criticism challenged Chicago’s ability to reach full integration in its 
schools.   
Transportation 
As stated in the original Consent Decree, mandatory reassignment and 
transportation had to be included and funded by the Chicago Public Schools Board of 
Education to ensure success of the plan to the extent that other techniques were 
insufficient to create desegregated schools.3 Chicago had dealt with transportation before 
in their quest to develop desegregated schools. Superintendent Benjamin Willis was 
highly criticized for his voluntary transfer plan which permitted the transfer of 
elementary students, most of them Negro, from some of Chicago’s most overcrowded 
schools.4 Part of the controversy developed because the burden of paying for the 
students’ transportation rested on the parents whom oftentimes were financially incapable 
of covering the cost.5  Superintendent James Redmond also took on the issue of busing 
when part of his proposed desegregation plan included the busing of over a thousand 
black children to schools outside of their neighborhood.6 Effective desegregation did not 
happen for a number of reasons including disinterest amongst parents, lack of private 
transportation, and extensive traveling time experienced by the students.7 Superintendent 
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Joseph Hannon’s plan attempted to avoid mandatory busing.8 Instead, the plan relied on a 
voluntary system allowing students who were chosen through a lottery system the 
opportunity to attend a magnet school. Even with the prospect of voluntary busing, the 
plan still had its detractors. In an article in Illinois Issues, Doris Galik, a parent from the 
Gage Park neighborhood stated: “The only thing Access to Excellence will teach us is 
how to ride a bus at the taxpayers’ expense.”9  
The concept of school busing as a desegregation strategy changed dramatically 
after the Supreme Court legitimated the use of busing in its April 1971 decision in the 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education case.10 In 1968, James Swann and 
other residents of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg North Carolina School District filed a 
lawsuit claiming that the current integration plan was ineffective. This case was unlike its 
predecessors, as it involved urban city schools. Swann was the victor in the case out of 
the federal district court, making the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District the nation’s 
first major urban district to bus children to achieve racial balance.11 The new integration 
plan implemented in 1970 would prove to be more expensive than previous plans as it 
included strategies such as busing to more aggressively work towards integration. The 
plan required that 29% of each of the district’s public schools consisted of black students, 
reflecting the amount of black students in the entire school district. It would also require 
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13,000 students to participate in a busing program, which consequently called for the 
district to purchase over one hundred new buses. With a half- million dollar price tag as 
well as an additional million dollars to get started, the school board met the new plan 
with great resistance. 
The verdict was brought to the Court of Appeals by the school board. The courts 
sided with the Board, and reversed part of the plan under the premise that it put too much 
burden on the school district. 
On appeal, the Court of appeals affirmed the District Court’s order as to 
faculty desegregation and the secondary school plans, but vacated the 
order respecting elementary schools. While agreeing that the District 
Court properly disapproved the board plan concerning these schools, the 
Court of Appeals feared that the pairing and grouping of elementary 
schools would place unreasonable burden on the board and the system’s 
pupils.12   
 
 As a result, the Legal Defense Fund of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Color People (NAACP) appealed the decision and took the case to the 
Supreme Court. On April 20, 1971, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of 
Swann.  The Supreme Court was led by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, who established 
within the court’s opinion, that some of the practices implemented by school district’s 
since the Brown v. Board decision were not consistent with tenets set forth in the 
landmark decision. 
…choices in this respect have been used as a potent weapon for creating 
or maintaining a state-segregated school system. In addition to the classic 
pattern of building schools specifically intended for Negro or white 
students, school authorities have sometimes, since Brown, closed schools 
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which appeared likely to become racially mixed through changes in 
neighborhood residential patterns.13 
 
 Within the reading of the court’s opinion, Chief Justice Burger also acknowledged 
the idea that many things hindered school districts’ ability to achieve desegregation. Part 
of the issue was that school districts acted against the court’s wishes. 
Over the 16 years since Brown II, many difficulties were encountered in 
implementation of the basic constitutional requirement that the State not 
discriminate between public school children on the basis of their race. 
Nothing in our national experience prior to 1955 prepared anyone for 
dealing with changes and adjustments of the magnitude and complexity 
encountered since then. Deliberate resistance of some to the Court’s 
mandates has impeded the good faith efforts of others to bring school 
systems into compliance. The detail and nature of these dilatory tactics 
have been noted frequently by this Court and other courts.14 
 
 One of the most significant opinions to come out of this case was the court’s 
stance on mandatory busing to establish desegregated schools. The concept of mandatory 
busing was frowned upon by Charlotte-Mecklenburg as it was a major point of their 
argument against the previously proposed desegregation plan. Chief Justice Burger 
established clearly in his reading of the court’s opinion that busing would become a 
significant part of the effort to desegregate public schools. As he began discussing the 
prospect of busing, he first established that the issue had never been clearly defined by 
the courts and that developing its definition would not be a clear cut process. He also 
stressed the importance of busing to the history of education. 
Chief Justice stated: 
                                                 
13Ibid. 
 
14Ibid. 
  
137
The scope of permissible transportation of students as an implement of a 
remedial decree has never been defined by this Court, and, by the very 
nature of the problem, it cannot be defined with precision. No rigid 
guidelines as to student transportation can be given for application to the 
infinite variety of problems presented in thousands of situations. Bus 
transportation has been an integral part of the public education system for 
year, and was perhaps the single most important factor in the transition 
from the one-room schoolhouse to the consolidated school.15 
 
 Chief Justice Burger also made it clear that the court would support the District 
Court’s original decision that busing could be used to help desegregate the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg school district. The Supreme Court’s opinion would contradict any idea that 
the desegregation plan put too much burden on the school district. 
The importance of bus transportation as a normal and accepted tool of 
education policy is readily discernible in this ….case. The District Court’s 
conclusion that assignment of children to the school nearest their home 
serving their grade would not produce a dismantling of the dual system as 
supported by the record.16 
 
Thus, the remedial techniques used in the District Court’s order were 
within that court’s power to provide equitable relief; implementation of 
the decree is well within the capacity of the school authority.17 
 
The strategy of using mandatory busing was the subject of great criticism, with 
people’s opinions falling in line with their views on desegregation. Integrationists who 
supported the decision of the Court viewed state imposed (de jure) school segregation as 
an evil and desegregation as an important end itself.18 Individuals who believed in 
mandatory desegregation strongly advocated for the idea of mandatory busing. They were 
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often argued against under the premise that transportation was costly, and that students 
would not be safe. Proponents of the busing strategy spoke out: 
Parents whose children utilize busing for transportation can rest assure in 
the fact that the National Safety Council regards the school bus as “the 
safest transportation in the United States.”19 
 
The argument about school bus safety usually only appears when 
desegregation is involved…. Riding on a school bus is ten times safer than 
walking to school and six times safer than riding in your own car.20 
 
Desegregation/integration does cost money, but not nearly as much as 
many opponents claim. A 1976 Rand Corporation study….indicates that 
student transportation expenses appear to level off at roughly three times 
the pre-desegregation magnitude.21  
 
The mandatory busing strategy gained momentum when in 1966 the U.S. Office 
of Education released a report entitled Equality of Educational Opportunity.22 This report 
was written by James Coleman who served as a sociologist at John Hopkins.23 The report 
would become known as the Coleman Report, and it appeared at a time when issues of 
race relations and equality were at the forefront of peoples’ consciousness.24 Coleman 
and a team of researchers utilized data from over 600,000 students and teachers across 
the country, coming to the conclusion that academic achievement was less related to the 
quality of a student’s school and more related to the social composition of the school, the 
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student’s sense of control of his environment and future, the verbal skills of teachers, and 
the student’s family background.25 Members of the media and policymakers placed their 
focus on one prediction taken out of the report: black children who attended integrated 
schools would have higher test scores if the majority of their classmates were white.26 
This would give validity to the idea of mandatory strategies such as busing to ensure the 
integration of the nation’s public schools. 
 Anti-busing citizens believed that segregation was an accidental result of private 
decisions (defacto desegregation) and that desegregation should only take place if it could 
be proved that the process yielded educational gains.27 Those who were against the 
busing strategy often believed that integration should be a voluntary process and not one 
that is mandated by a government entity. Opponents of the busing strategy were against it 
for many reasons. Walter Williams, a black professor at Temple University made this 
statement in an interview with Patrick Buchanon for a local newspaper. 
Forced busing is paternalistic and racist in its premise that a black child 
cannot learn unless the next desk is occupied by a white. And how can one 
even discuss such nonsense as busing when children are being hauled to 
schools where students arrive stoned on drugs and booze, and teachers and 
pupils are regularly molested, mugged, and raped.28 
 
There was also data that concluded that busing had been tried before with little 
effect on desegregating schools. On October 11, 1978, the National Association for 
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Neighborhood Schools put out a bulletin highlighting the negative effects of busing 
strategies utilized across the country. Some of the statistics included within the bulletin 
read: 
After an unprecedented but short lived stay obtained by BUSSSTOP, the 
buses rolled in Los Angeles on September 12, 1978—with one minor 
problem—they rolled practically empty! 
 
The courageous and innovative parents of the L.A. area are determined to 
prove to the State of California that their children still belong to them and 
not the state. These parents have turned to already established private 
schools, started their own private schools, or are having their children 
tutored in private homes. 
 
(New Castle County, Delaware) On September 30, 1977, actual attendance 
was 70,941. On September 19, 1978,… attendance in the forced busing 
area was only 59,333. That represents an attendance decline, in one year 
of 11,608 or 16.4%. 
 
Louisville has lost over 29,000 students since forced busing began and the 
figure increases to 32,000 when 3,000 kindergarten children were added to 
the figures of the 1976-1977 school year. This is nearly 25% of the total 
school population. 
 
(Dallas) The same decline in enrollment is being experienced in 1978-79 
as has been experienced since the 1971 forced racial balancing order. 
Enrollment on August 28, 1978, was 112,500 students, down 4,234 from 
the total of the 1977-78 year. This decline is being seen in grades 4-8, as 
these are the bused years in the Dallas school district. The 9-12th grades 
are experiencing an increase in enrollment, because the 1976 busing 
ordered nullified busing in those grades.29   
 
 The issue of busing was a delicate topic of discussion, especially for some of 
Chicago’s head politicians. Mayor Bilandic found that he had to consistently defend the 
fact that he refused to take a stand on the busing issue.30 In an article featured in the 
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Chicago Tribune in 1977, Bilandic stated that his duty as mayor was to provide safety for 
those involved and assist the school board in implementing its policies.31When Richard 
M. Daley became Mayor of Chicago, he also knew that he would have to say something 
about the issue of school busing, but taking a clear position would alienate a portion of 
his Democratic Coalition.32 Supporting mandatory busing would enrage many of the 
party faithful in the predominantly white areas of the city.33 Opposing it would insult 
blacks and white liberals who supported integration.34 
 In Gary Orfield’s book, Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy, 
Orfield provided a three pronged explanation of why busing was such a hot topic. 
The busing issue has become explosive for three reasons: First the schools 
are the largest and most visible of public institutions, directly effecting 
millions of families. Second, school assignment patterns, unlike housing 
or job patterns, are wholly determined by public officials and can thus be 
rapidly changed by a court order to those public officials. Third, because 
of the strong base of constitutional law and massive evidence of illegal 
local actions, school desegregation is still proceeding at a time when 
action against housing and job discrimination has been hampered by weak 
enforcement and controversial Supreme Court decisions.35 
 
With cost and safety already being topics of discussion, the idea of white 
migration out of the city limits also became a detriment to the desegregation cause.  The 
silent withdrawal of white students from public schools was the most significant form of 
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rejection to mandated busing efforts.36 There was quite a bit of opposition to school 
desegregation in Chicago as evidenced by the actions of white grass-roots groups which 
attempted to block the enrollment of black students at predominantly-white schools.37 
The school board was cognizant that the desegregation of its schools may stimulate an 
exodus of white constituents to the suburbs.38  
The topic of white migration out of urban cities would become a worldlier topic 
of discussion when in 1975 James Coleman, author of the Coleman Report, began 
denouncing the use of mandatory busing.39 In a press conference held before Congress, 
Coleman openly stated his opposition to mandatory busing.40  Coleman conducted a new 
study sponsored by the Urban Institute of Washington, DC analyzing racial data and 
trends in U.S. public schools from 1968 to 1973.41 In an article published in 1975 by 
Time magazine entitled “New Coleman Report,” Coleman spoke of how when there were 
only small numbers of “well-behaved, well-scrubbed” black children involved in busing, 
white parents did  not resist too much.42 When busing began to involve larger numbers of 
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low-income blacks from big-city ghettos, whites began to move out of the city.43 This 
type of scenario was consistent with the fears of those who spoke out against busing since 
its onset. 
 These same views as they relate to mandatory strategies for desegregation were 
shared by Coleman in his book, Prejudice and Pride. Coleman states: 
White exodus to the suburbs has produced a situation in which most of the 
largest central city school systems are majority black, while the 
surrounding ring remains predominantly white. Such segregation did not 
arise by official action-unless one wants to argue that actions of the courts 
in instituting racial balance orders which resulted in whites leaving the 
city are “official segregating acts.”44 
 
 The topic of white migration out of urban cities would now be realized as viable 
issue once Coleman made public the results of his new study.  His findings would serve 
as a topic for great debate for many years to come, familiarizing all with the concept of 
“White Flight.” 
White Flight 
 
 In 2006, the court revisited the Modified Consent Decree because of the 
significant changes in racial demographics in Chicago’s neighborhoods and schools.45 
The student population of the Chicago Public Schools no longer resembled that of the 
school population that existed during the creation of both the original and modified 
versions of the Consent Decree.46 As a result of the court’s inquiry and further discovery 
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by both parties, the United States of America and the Board of Education of the City of 
Chicago jointly requested that they vacate the Modified Consent Decree and be allowed 
to enter a Second Amended Consent Decree.47 
 Chicago’s population changed just as those of many other urban cities that 
developed some form of integration plan for its public schools. Those schools that once 
attempted to integrate their populations were now being depleted of their white students. 
The concept of white students leaving urban cities and their public schools became 
known as “white flight.”48 By the end of the 1970’s, there was an overall consensus that 
the “white flight” phenomenon truly existed, but there was no agreed upon cause.49 There 
were many researchers who began developing their own theories to why large 
populations of whites were leaving big cities after the implementation of desegregation 
practices. 
 In a publication put out by the Association of American Geographers, J, Dennis 
Lord classified “white flight” as a result of school desegregation into two forms.50 The 
first form of white flight consists of students abandoning public schools and enrolling in 
private schools.51 The second form is a locational response involving residential 
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movement of households.52 This form of white flight has been typically depicted through 
the movement of white households from large desegregating districts to nearby suburbs.53 
 Within the same publication, the question is discussed about a “tipping point” as it 
relates to black students. In other words, is there an established number or ratio of black 
students within a school district that when a school district reaches this number, there is a 
rapid acceleration of the number of white students who leave the school eventually 
leading to a predominantly black school system?54 The “tipping point” concept as it 
relates to white flight was conceptualized by Charles Clotfelter, who characterized the 
concept into two different forms: 1) when the black ratio reaches a critical value, all 
whites leave and the school district will automatically become black; 2) when the black 
ratio reaches a critical value it will effectuate a dramatic shift in the rate of white flight 
and will result in an all black system. The conclusion is that in either scenario the school 
system will become all black with the only difference being the time required for the 
transition.55 
 In August of 1975, James Coleman along with Sara D. Kelly and John Moore 
made public the results of their study entitled Trends in School Segregation 1968-73. Just 
as the original Coleman Report in 1966 added fuel to the debate of desegregating public 
schools, Coleman’s new study on integration was thought to bring about the same type of 
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controversy.56 The premise of this study was to analyze the current progress of student 
desegregation efforts amongst elementary and secondary schools in districts regardless of 
the source of segregation between school districts for the period of 1968 to 1973.57 The 
study provided a detailed statistical analysis of the status and trends in school segregation 
by race throughout the U.S. and utilized data sources and statistical reports collected by 
HEW.58 The study begins with an examination of the state of integration amongst schools 
within a district in 1968, later moving to an examination of the changes that occurred 
from 1968 to 1973.59   
 The researchers wasted no time in stirring up the busing issue. Within the 
introduction of the study the researchers provide a new definition of the concept of 
desegregation based on government control. There is then a scenario designed to give the 
new definition credence, which compares the emotions felt by a black mother who dealt 
with discriminatory practices in educating her child to those of a white mother forced to 
deal with busing so her child in order to participate in integrated schooling. 
Desegregation has meant many things during the period since 1954. The 
term initially referred to elimination of dual school systems, in which one 
set of attendance zones was used to assign white children to one set of 
schools, and the second set of attendance zones was used to assign black 
children to a different set of schools. The classic and plaintive query of the 
black mother in the South was why should her child be bused to a school 
far away, past a nearby school, merely because of the color of his skin. 
The extent of the change is that the same plaintive query is now heard 
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primarily from white mothers, primarily in large cities, where busing has 
begun to be used, not to segregate children by race, but to integrate 
them… 
 
From the initial meaning of eliminating a system of dual assignment, the 
term desegregation has come to mean reduction of any segregation within 
a system, and in the strongest meaning of the term, elimination of any 
racial imbalance of among schools in a system. Thus, desegregation, 
which initially meant abolition of a legally-imposed segregation, has come 
to mean in many cases, affirmative integration.60  
 
 As the researchers continue with the introduction of their study, they make clear 
that government intervention as it relates to school integration practices may not always 
be a good thing. While efforts may be well intended, results of government intervention 
may provide adverse effects.  
The researchers also allude to the concept of white flight in describing people’s 
individual actions against mandated desegregation policies. 
…there are numerous examples of government policy in which the result 
of the interaction between policy and response is precisely the opposite of 
the result intended by those who initiated the policy. It is especially 
important in the case of school desegregation to examine this interaction, 
because many of the actions taken by individuals, and some of those taken 
by their local government bodies have precisely the opposite effect on 
school desegregation to that intended by federal government policy. The 
most obvious such individual action, of course, is a move of residence to 
flee school integration.61 
 
One of the most controversial findings in Coleman’s study was the idea that 
desegregation efforts perpetuated segregation because white students would ultimately be 
removed from the public school population.62 Although data did not give evidence that 
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there was a continuing increased loss of white students once desegregation took place, it 
did illustrate an increase in the proportion of blacks in the schools which itself, increases 
the rate of white students leaving the system.63 It also increases the racial disparity 
between cities and their outlying suburbs, increasing the rate of loss.64 In a paper entitled 
“School Desegregation and Loss of Whites from Large Central-City School Districts,” 
Coleman directly addresses the question of the effect of school desegregation on the loss 
of white children from large central-city school systems. In the paper Coleman states: 
It is clear…that there is a segregating process occurring through individual 
movement, primarily of white families, from schools and districts in which 
there is greater integration or a greater proportion of blacks, to schools and 
districts in which there is less integration or a smaller proportion of blacks. 
The consequences of this, or course, are to partially nullify the effects of 
school desegregation as carried out by various governmental or legal 
agencies.65 
 
 The researchers involved in the Trends in School Segregation study realized that 
one way to gain a sense of the difference that desegregation makes in the racial 
composition of a city after implementation would be to consider a hypothetical city with 
specific characteristics and apply the coefficients of the equations to the changing 
population of the city on a yearly basis considering two conditions: with sharp 
desegregation in year one, and without any change in segregation.66  
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 The results of desegregation on this hypothetical city emphasized some of the 
same findings as shown through previous data: 
…the emerging patterns of segregation are those between large cities 
which are becoming increasingly black, and everywhere else, which is 
becoming increasingly white. Desegregation in central cities hastens this 
process of residential segregation but not by a great deal under the 
conditions specified in the example. It provides a temporary, bust fast 
eroding, increase in interracial contact among children within the central 
city. In districts with certain characteristics, however, (such as about 75% 
black and about .4 between-district segregation, as in Detroit, Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, or Chicago), the impact of full scale desegregation would 
be,…very large, moving the city’s schools to nearly all black, in a single 
year.67 
 
 Coleman’s study brought about many detractors, particularly those who were 
advocates for the implementation of desegregation policies such as Roy Wilkins and 
Kenneth Clark.68 Coleman served as the primary author of the Equal Educational 
Opportunity Survey, which had served as the chief evidence of the beneficial effects of 
school desegregation.69 Coleman’s new point of view was perceived as traitorous and 
critics began questioning it as well as the validity of the study.70 There were three major 
criticisms of Coleman’s new study: 1) the validity of his conclusions were in question 
because he did not look at a large enough pool of school districts and those that he did 
examine had not undergone court-ordered desegregation; 2) that white flight from central 
cities is a long term phenomenon predating school desegregation; and 3) the same level 
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of white flight is evident in big cities whether or not they have enacted desegregation 
plans.71 
  The concept of white flight brought about conflicting claims due to researchers 
utilizing different methods to complete their study.72 Edna Bonacich and Robert 
Goodman in 1972 conducted their case studies within one city.73 James Bosco and 
Stanley Robin in 1974 conducted their study utilizing a small quantity of central city 
school districts.74 David Armor restricted his investigation to cities experiencing 
segregation while Jackson in 1975 studied data from a large pool of school districts.75 
 Three types of research models can be used to test the hypothesis that school 
desegregation leads to declines in white enrollment.76 
1.) Pooled Model- Data for all districts and for all years are combined into 
one large model in which annual changes in white enrollment are 
related to annual changes in segregation and other independent 
variables. 
 
2.) Means Model- Seek to account for between-district variance in 
changes in white enrollment (or average white loss) using between-
district variances in changes in segregation (or average changes in 
segregation) as the primary independent variable. 
 
3.) Deviations Model- Considers within-district changes in white 
enrollment and relates them to within-district changes in school 
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segregation. The white flight hypothesis will be confirmed if it is 
found that there is an unusually large loss of whites during a year 
when an unusually large amount of integration took place.77 
 
In Coleman’s study, he and the other researchers relied primarily on the pool 
model to conduct their research.78 The researchers utilized data from 1968 to 1973 in 
which they obtained five one-year change observations for 67 school districts.79 
Observations from all districts and all time intervals were pooled and then one year 
changes in white enrollment were correlated to one-year changes in school segregation 
along with several other independent variables. From this research, Coleman found a 
significant correlation between reduction in segregation and declining white enrollments 
in public schools.80 Coleman then made the conclusion that desegregation plans may be 
counterproductive in increasing minority exposure to whites.81 
Christine Rossell, a political scientist at Boston University, provided evidence that 
contradicted Coleman’s findings as they related to the concept of white flight.82 Rossell 
supplemented HEW school desegregation data used by Coleman with pre-1967 and case-
history data which she collected from each district.83 Rossell assembled data on eighty-
six northern and western districts (26 had undergone no desegregation, 60 had 
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experienced varying degrees of desegregation with 11 being under court orders).84 This 
yielded an analysis of trends in pre and post desegregation white enrollment by district.85 
In the findings of the study there wasn’t a significant difference either between the full 
pre-desegregation trend and the trend for the first year of desegregation, or between the 
pre- and post desegregation trends.86 There wasn’t a significant difference in the rate of 
decline in the proportion of white students between pre and post desegregation years for 
any of the desegregating districts.87 When white migration was existent, there was not 
significantly more white flight in districts with court ordered desegregation than in those 
without it, districts with extensive desegregation than in those with minimal 
desegregation, or in districts with desegregation than in districts without.88 Rossell’s 
opposition was made clear in her paper “The Political and Social Impact of School 
Desegregation Policy: A Preliminary Report.” In it she states: 
Although Coleman has claimed in television appearances and to 
journalists he is conducting research on school desegregation policy, he is 
doing nothing of the sort. Indeed, there is no evidence he knows what 
school desegregation policy has been implemented in the school districts 
he is studying…By simply measuring the changes in school segregation 
(which is much easier than tracking down the data on school segregation 
policy), Coleman cannot distinguish between ecological succession in 
neighborhood school attendance zones and an actual identifiable 
governmental policy resulting in the same thing-integration. In the case of 
ecological succession in school attendance zones, the integration will be 
temporary and the eventual re-segregation will look like white flight 
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resulting from school desegregation. This confusion of two different 
phenomena means that his model is invalid for the case of governmental 
or court-ordered school desegregation policy.89  
 
Rossell also made it clear that she did not agree with Coleman’s methodology. 
She believed that because Coleman compared data as utilizing absolute numbers rather 
than percentages, that his findings as they relate to the frequency of white flight would be 
exaggerated.90 This was a key difference between Rossell’s and Coleman’s research. 
Rossell stated: 
Coleman…measures loss in white enrollment in a way that may tend to 
exaggerate white flight in some cities. He compares the raw figures on 
white enrollment in the previous year and then claims white flight in the 
latter is lower than the former. Yet one can easily predict cases where due 
to job layoffs, factory closings, etc., both whites and blacks leave a city at 
a faster rate than before, but blacks leave at a higher rate. Although this 
would result in the percentage of black decreasing and the percentage of 
white increasing, Coleman would still call this white flight, even though it 
might more properly be called black flight.  In the final analysis, the most 
important variable for policy purposes is the percentage white, not the 
number white.91 
 
Most researchers, even those who disagreed on the role of desegregation in 
producing white flight, agreed that white losses were greatest in districts containing large 
proportions of blacks.92 This plight was also evident in Chicago and its public school 
system. Even though the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education thwarted all 
demands for segregation in the early 1900’s, white constituents of the city and its public 
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schools continued to migrate outside of its boundaries.93 Before 1920, Chicago only had 
one elementary school that had a student enrollment that was over 90% black, but in 
1930, twenty-three elementary schools, two junior high schools, and one high school 
were over the 90% mark.94 White enrollment in the Chicago Public Schools continued to 
drop totaling 34.6% of the school district in 1970, 19% in 1980, and declined an 
additional 8% by 1990.95    
Although the cause for white migration out of the Chicago Public Schools can be 
up for debate, the aftermath of it taking place made it challenging for Chicago to fully 
desegregate its schools and consequently difficult to meet the goals of the Consent 
Decree. Without an equitable ratio of blacks and whites in the District, it became 
increasingly difficult to support integration. This would not be the only daunting task the 
Chicago Public Schools would face implementing what was set forth in the Consent 
Decree. The District had also made the commitment to integrate their teaching staff 
which would bring about a whole new set of problems. 
Faculty Integration 
 The original Consent Decree included the following provisions with regard to 
teacher assignment: 
The Board will promptly implement a plan to assure that the assignment of 
full-time classroom teachers to schools will be made in such a manner that 
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no school is identified as intended for students of a particular race, color, 
or national origin.96 
 
3.1 No later than November 1, 1981, with respect to the full-time 
classroom teachers in each faculty, the racial/ethnic composition and the 
proportion of experienced teachers will be between plus and minus 15 
percent of the system wide proportion of such teachers with respect to 
such characteristics, and the range of educational training will be 
substantially the same as exists in the system as a whole. 
 
3.2 The Board will make every good faith effort to follow professional 
staff assignment and transfer practices which, when taken together as a 
whole on a frequently reviewed periodic basis, will assure that the racial 
composition, the experience and the educational background of individual 
school faculties and administrative staff more nearly approach the city-
wide proportions of minority, experienced, and more extensively trained 
professional staff; provided, however, that nothing that nothing in this plan 
shall require the assignment or transfer of any person to a position for 
which he or  she is not professionally qualified. The Board will not adopt 
or follow assignment and transfer practices which will foreseeably result 
in the racial identifiability of school based on faculty or administrative 
staff composition or in unequal distribution of experienced and more 
extensively trained staff. 
 
3.3 The failure of a particular school or schools to meet the guidelines will 
not constitute noncompliance with the above guidelines if the district 
provides a detailed satisfactory explanation justifying such failure to meet 
guidelines.97 
 
 The original Consent Decree was not the first time Chicago was faced with the 
dilemma of having to integrate their teaching workforce. In January of 1967, the Chicago 
Public Schools received a statement of findings and recommendations from the United 
States Office of Education relating to Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.98 The 
Chicago Public Schools created a proposal initiating action in response to the report, 
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resulting in a grant which provided specialists to assist in seeking solutions to the 
problems indicated within the report.99 One of the issues addressed was Chicago’s 
desegregated teaching staffs. 
 As stated in a document highlighting the United States Office of Education report, 
the teaching staffs of the Chicago Public Schools was racially imbalanced.100 There were 
several forces that acted as barriers to Chicago’s quest to integrate its staff, including fear 
and uncertainty, misconceptions, representation of desertion of the teacher’s own people, 
and segregation in housing.101  
 The report also provided a series of recommendations designed to help assist in 
integrating Chicago’s teaching staff. Some of these recommendations focused directly on 
the teachers themselves as it related to their recruitment, teaching experience, and ability 
to be retained. 
1. A program is recommended through which teachers may become fully 
aware of staffing problems and may aid in their solution. 
2. A city-wide policy should be adopted which would result in each 
school having the same percentage of regularly certified teachers. 
3. It is necessary to build stability and reduce turnover in the staffs of all 
inner city schools. Inner city schools must be made more attractive to 
teachers. 
4. Significant numbers of more experienced and better qualified teachers 
are needed now to balance staffs in inner city schools. 
5. Intensive efforts should be made to recruit, prepare, and keep teachers 
in inner city schools.102 
6. Attention should be given to modifying the Illinois School Code to 
permit assignment and transfer which would promote staff integration 
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Some of these recommendations focused on supporting those teachers who taught 
at inner city schools. This support could be illustrated in many different ways such as 
providing additional safety measures for teachers’ safety, as well as providing an 
infrastructure that supported teacher growth. Some of these recommendations included: 
7. Teachers in inner city schools should be provided with guarded 
parking lots and/or transportation to and from school. 
8. Instructional groups consisting of the following members are 
recommended as a staffing pattern for each 150 students: 1 master 
teacher, 3 regular teachers, 1 beginning teacher, 2 practice teachers, 
and 3 aides. 
9. Teacher aides should be available immediately with or without new 
organizational patterns. 
10. Intensive efforts should be made to reduce absenteeism and to attract 
and keep substitute teachers.103 
                      
Some of these recommendations focused on teachers and their interactions with 
the community. The report made it clear that the Chicago Public Schools should be 
focused on the school/community relationship. Some of these recommendations included: 
11. Professional staff, special classes, and assistance of parents and 
community agencies should be more widely utilized in providing for 
children who have serious discipline problems. 
12. Community support of teachers should be immediately and widely 
cultivated.104 
 
The report also acknowledged that some of the Chicago Public School’s practices 
to promote desegregation were acceptable. It was recommended that these programs be 
expanded.  
Some of the activities already in progress should be continued and 
expanded: summer school staff integration, transfer on loan, exchange 
                                                 
103Ibid. 
 
104Ibid. 
  
158
programs within Chicago and with suburbs, and joint programs with 
teacher preparation institutions concerning inner city problems.105 
 
 A plan for the implementation of the provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was prepared by the Chicago Public Schools entitled The Chicago Public 
School’s Plan to Integrate School Faculties and Equalize per Pupil Costs.106 The plan 
was adopted by the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education on October 12, 1977.107  
As the plan was being presented to the public, the Board was keenly aware and included 
in their public statements that the educational quality would not suffer as a result of 
teacher redistribution.108 The plan stated that all future assignments would be made with 
the intention of ensuring that the racial composition, experience, and educational 
training of each school’s faculty would more nearly approach the citywide average +/- 
10 percent.109  This would be accomplished through the assignment of all new teachers 
with regular or temporary certificates; all teachers whose classification changed from a 
temporary certificated teacher to a regular certificated teacher; and all regularly 
certificated and appointed teachers returned from leave whose positions had been 
declared vacant.110  Consideration would be given to teachers 55 years old or older.111 
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These teachers would only be asked to transfer if a school could not be brought into 
compliance without their moving.112  This plan was not met without resistance. In July 
of the same year, thirty-six Chicago school teachers filed a federal class suit to block the 
transfers of more than 2,000 teachers.113 The teachers argued that the transfers were 
illegal because they constituted reverse discrimination, violated their contracts, and were 
done without determining if their current staffs were segregated.114 
 In April of 1981, the Chicago Public Schools adopted the Student Desegregation 
Plan, which reiterated the Board’s commitment that each school should have a faculty 
makeup reflecting within 15% of the system wide faculty composition.115 As a result of 
the plan the Board was required to conduct the Annual Desegregation Review which 
included an annual examination of the implementation of the plan, its objectives and 
requirements, and an assessment of faculty integration.116 In July of 1989, the Board 
adopted the School Reform Act limiting the power of Local School Councils to that of 
making recommendations to the principal concerning their appointments of persons to 
fill any vacant, additional, or newly created positions.117 Even with this new act 
                                                                                                                                                 
111Hurwitz and Gehrie-Porter, Managing Faculty Desegregation, 112. 
 
112Ibid. 
 
113Lee Strobel, “Plan Called Illegal: 36 Teachers Sue to Halt Transfers,” Chicago Tribune (July 
16, 1977), 5. 
 
114Ibid. 
 
115Chicago Department of Human Resources, Faculty Integration, March 4, 1992. 
 
116Ibid. 
 
117Ibid. 
  
160
providing an opportunity for community input, it still did not stray away from the 
precedence set forth in the Consent Decree. A provision of the reform act reads: 
The General Assembly does not intend to alter or amend the provisions of 
the desegregation obligations of the Board of Education, including but not 
limited to the Consent Decree or the Desegregation Plan in United States 
v. Chicago Public Schools Board of Education, 80 C 5124, U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Accordingly, the 
implementation of this amendatory Act of 1988, to the extent practicable, 
shall be consistent with and, in all cases, shall be subject to the 
desegregation obligations pursuant to such Consent Decree and 
Desegregation Plan.118 
 
 In September 1990, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago and the 
Chicago Teachers Union joined in an agreement that would take them through the 
1993 school year.119 The following articles contained within the Agreement 
address the issue of faculty integration: 
Article 38- Teacher Assignment Procedures 
38-1 … appointments shall be made so that they will assure that the racial 
compositions, experience and educational training of each school’s faculty 
more nearly approaches the system wide proportions. 
 
Article 42- Transfer Policy and Procedure 
42-2… when assignments are made, said assignments shall first be made 
from the transfer list if following said transfer, both the receiving school 
and the sending school remain within the compliance goals for faculty 
desegregation outlined in the Consent Decree entered and approved by the 
United States District Court. 
 
42-3… Upon being declared supernumerary, the Bureau of Teacher 
Personnel shall immediately provide the supernumerary teacher with a list 
of all vacant positions for which he or she further enhances or maintains 
the achievement  of the goals of the Plan to Implement the Provisions of 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and which as a result of his or her 
selection will assure that the racial composition, experience, and 
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educational training of the schools selected will more nearly approach the 
system wide proportions. 
 
42-4…Such selection of staff members shall be consistent with the 
compliance goals for faculty integration. 
 
 One of the tactics utilized by the Chicago Public Schools principals at the school 
level was the use of the faculty integration waiver. This tactic was used when a potential 
hire would place a school out of racial compliance because of the candidate’s race. The 
Department of Human Resources made this form available to principals electronically. 
If a candidate in which you selected takes your school out of racial 
compliance, a note will appear that states that your school is out of racial 
compliance. You will then be given the opportunity to download a Faculty 
Integration Waiver. The Waiver will need to be completed and submitted 
to the Department of Human Resources before the candidate begins 
working in your unit.120 
 
 The Chicago Public Schools utilized a Faculty Integration Compliance Committee 
to develop guidelines and procedures for the Department of Human Resources to meet 
the requirements of the Consent Decree relative to faculty integration.121  The mission of 
the Faculty Integration Compliance Committee reads: 
To develop and submit recommendations for consideration in the general 
superintendent’s final report to the desegregation committee, together with 
any necessary recommendations for board action, before the end of the 
school year. The recommendations shall include the identification of 
issues to be examined regarding necessary improvements in faculty 
integration requirements and processes, development and implementation 
of guidelines and procedures, and development of monitoring compliance 
measures.122 
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Under the jurisdiction of the Faculty Integration Compliance Committee, it was 
determined that the following personnel transactions would be subject to the terms of 
faculty integration: 
1. Administrative transfers 
2. Transfer list transactions 
3. Options for Knowledge positions 
4. Regular appointments from another school to a true vacancy 
5. Full-time-basis (FTB) substitute teacher appointments from another 
school to true vacancy 
6. Intraschool transactions, i.e., FTB to regular appointment 
7. Intraschool transactions, i.e. promotional opportunities 
8. Promotional opportunities from a another unit123 
 
 The Committee listed a group of scenarios that would constitute a transfer putting 
a school out of compliance. These types of personnel transactions would be considered as 
a hindrance to Chicago’s goal of integrating its teaching faculty. The list included the 
following scenarios: 
1. Sending school in compliance before transfer, but not after a transfer, 
but receiving school maintains or enhances compliance. 
2. Sending school in compliance before transfer, but not after transfer, 
and receiving school out of compliance before and after transfer. 
3. Sending school in compliance before transfer, but not after transfer, 
and receiving school in compliance before but out of compliance after. 
4. Sending school out of compliance and transfer compounds the 
noncompliance status but receiving school maintains or enhances 
compliance. 
5. Sending school out of compliance, transfer enhances compliance but 
receiving school out of compliance and noncompliance 
compounded.124 
 
 The following transactions were exempted from faculty integration requirements: 
Intraschool transfers, promotional opportunities i.e. assistant principal, acting assistant 
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principal, counselor, head teacher appointments cadre to full-time basis (FTB) substitute 
teacher, FTB substitute teacher to regular appointment.125 
 By explicitly listing these scenarios and exemptions, the Committee made it very 
clear to the Department of Human Resources, the Chicago Public Schools and its 
principals that they were committed to making sure that the implementation of the 
Faculty Integration plan was consistent with the provisions set forth in Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.126 This also held true in regards to how the Committee 
monitored the use of waivers. Waivers would be considered based on programmatic 
needs and personnel shortages in specialty areas.127 The Faculty Integration Compliance 
Committee determined the following transactions would not require a waiver: 
1. Sending school in compliance and maintains compliance and receiving 
school in compliance and maintains compliance. 
2. Sending school out of compliance maintains or enhances current level 
of compliance and receiving schools maintains or enhance current 
level of compliance.128 
 
 Despite Chicago’s efforts to integrate its teaching faculty, school leaders still 
found it to be an unlikely task for various reasons. Beverly Tunney, president of the 
Chicago Principals Association stated, “Principals have had difficulty integrating schools 
and filling positions because of distance and safety concerns.” “…in Chicago, we have a 
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teacher shortage. “We are finding it very difficult to get qualified teachers in the 
classrooms due to the integration guidelines.”129 
 Teachers also seemed to have issues with the faculty integration plan, sighting 
fear, resentment, and feelings of tokenism as some of the emotions that they were forced 
to deal with. White teachers were often categorized as being fearful when they found 
themselves working in all black schools. In an article published in the Chicago Tribune, a 
teacher recounts a statement she heard from one of her teaching colleagues: “I have heard 
white teachers say they were afraid of retaliation if they chastised a child in school –they 
thought somebody might beat them up. But children need discipline, and if a teacher isn’t 
providing it, he isn’t doing a job.”130 Resentment was felt by black teachers, who felt 
white teachers came with a patronizing attitude, feeling that black children were in need 
of love more than learning.131 An excerpt from an interview in the Chicago Tribune 
quoted a white educator stating: “If I were working in a suburban school I don’t think I 
would feel my students would need me as much, and I would feel a lot of effort I was 
putting out was wasted. They could get the same thing at home.”132 Tokenism was often 
the feeling of black teachers whom found themselves in all white schools. A teacher 
stated: “I think they look at me and might judge all blacks by what I am like. Black 
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people are different from another too, and I think white children should have an 
opportunity to learn that.”133 
 Chicago Public Schools still operated in racial isolation with over half of its 
schools being out of compliance with faculty guidelines on race.134 In September of 1980, 
29% of schools were out of compliance compared to 59% twenty years later.135 
  There were proposed changes to these guidelines on Wednesday, November 15, 
2000 when school board members voted unanimously to loosen guidelines for racial 
composition of faculty at individual schools.136 Former guidelines required schools to 
have faculties that required plus or minus 15% with the new plan expanding that number 
to 25%.137  
 Chicago continued to struggle as attempts to loosen federal guidelines were not 
fulfilled. One of the issues associated with the lack of integration in Chicago’s teaching 
faculty was a severe shortage of minority teachers.138 An example was provided in 
Chicago Tribune article written in 2002. It provided the following scenario: 
The system’s fastest growing student group is Hispanics, who compose 36 
percent of the public school population. Yet, only 12 percent of all 
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teachers are Hispanic. A plurality of Chicago teachers are white, although 
white students now make up 10 percent of the total.139   
 
 In the same article Deborah Lynch, president of the Chicago Teachers Union at 
the time, reaffirmed the idea that a shortage in minority teachers made it difficult to 
integrate teaching staffs. Lynch stated: “This is all confounded by the teacher shortage. 
There is the concern about the number of minority teachers who apply to Chicago. There 
are not enough.”140 Others faulted the principals, stating that hiring practices were done at 
a local level making it difficult for central administrators to address the ethnic and racial 
composition of faculties at individual schools.141 
Regardless of where the blame fell, faculty integration of the Chicago Public 
Schools teaching force appeared to be an elusive goal. Whether it was teachers’ negative 
experiences with the process, the lack of available teachers, or principal’s hiring 
practices, achieving the faculty integration portion of the Consent Decree remained a 
difficult feat. Just as student integration proved to be a difficult task for the Chicago 
Public Schools, developing teaching faculties that would be more racially balanced also 
brought about some complications. The Chicago Public Schools needed to have other 
strategies in place. One of them would be the development of magnet schools. 
Magnet Schools 
The federal courts have classified magnet schools as schools having a “distinctive 
program of study” that attracts a voluntary cross section of students from a variety of 
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racial groups.142 Federal regulations classify magnet schools as schools with a special 
curriculum capable of attracting substantial numbers of students of different racial 
backgrounds.143 Educators have defined magnet schools as schools offering a variety of 
educational offerings that result in the voluntary integration of the students enrolled.144 
Within all of these definitions four criteria stand out: 
 
1. Magnet schools must offer an educational program that is different, 
special, distinctive, or otherwise distinguishable from the regular 
curriculum in non magnet schools. 
2. The special curriculum must be attractive to students of all races, not 
just whites or blacks or Hispanics, or other minority groups. 
3. Magnet schools must be racially mixed and must have the effect of 
eliminating segregation of the races among the students. 
4. Magnet schools should be open to students of all races on a voluntary 
basis, and any admission criteria that are imposed must not have the 
effect of discriminating on the basis of race.145 
 
The first magnet school, Boston Latin, was founded in the 17th Century in 1635 
and was designated to meet the needs of intellectual elite.146 The magnet schools were 
founded for the primary purpose of solving a pressing political problem. They were 
designed to thwart active, dramatic, and possibly violent resistance by some whites to the 
development of desegregated schools required by the court.147 Magnet schools now serve 
                                                 
142Charles B. McMillan, Magnet Schools: An Approach to Voluntary Desegregation 
(Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1980), 8. 
 
143Ibid. 
 
144Ibid. 
 
145Ibid., 9. 
 
146Nolan Estes, Magnet Schools Recent Developments and Perspectives (Austin, TX: Nolan Estes, 
Daniel Levine, and Donald R. Waldrip, 1990), 3. 
 
147Mary Haywood Metz, Different by Design: The Context and Character of Three Magnet 
Schools (New York and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), 329-332. 
  
168
with a two pronged focus: the improvement of educational quality and the increase racial 
integration.148 While the concept of the magnet school is not a new one, the application of 
that concept has gone through expansions and modifications over the years as societal 
needs have changed.149 Magnet schools appeal to many educational constituencies by 
simultaneously creating desegregation without mandatory busing.150 
After 1975, federal courts began accepting magnet schools as a method of 
desegregation, consequently causing their numbers to dramatically increase.151 Magnets 
were first developed in large urban school districts that were seeking a voluntary 
desegregation strategy that allowed them to shun the idea of forced busing.152 The 1976 
amendment to the Emergency School Aid Act, which authorized grants supporting the 
development and implementation of magnet schools in desegregating districts, 
accelerated urban interest in the magnet school concept and strengthened their reputation 
as a viable desegregation strategy.153  
As the number of urban school districts using magnet schools as a tool for 
desegregation and expanded public choice increased, the debates around issues of equity 
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and excellence became more significant.154 In Smreker and Goldring’s book, School 
Choice in Urban America: Magnet Schools and the Pursuit of Equity, the authors give an 
account of both sides of the argument. 
Advocates of magnet schools argue that magnets:  
 
1.) attract students of different racial and socioeconomic backgrounds 
with similar educational interests;  
2.) provide unique sets of learning opportunities; and  
3.) encourage innovation. In other words, magnets are viewed as an 
effective way to enhance diversity and equity among schools, increase 
educational quality in school district, and stabilize enrollments.155 
 
 Critics of magnet school programs believe the concept enhances a class system 
between the affluent and those who are economically disadvantaged, specifically when 
magnet schools are selective in their enrollment and are few in number.156 They assert 
that middle-class parents have more of a vested interest as it relates to the availability of 
educational options, while lower-income parents are left with conventional attendance 
area schools that lack specialized offerings and have limited resources.157 Consequently, 
it is then claimed that magnets tend to absorb more academically motivated and capable 
students, as well as more effective and innovative teachers, resulting in diminished 
educational opportunities for those who are not afforded the opportunity to attend 
them.158 
                                                 
154Smreker and Goldring, School Choice in Urban America, 56. 
 
155Ibid. 
 
156Ibid. 
 
157Ibid. 
 
158Ibid. 
 
  
170
 Chicago, just as many other urban school districts, saw the implementation of 
magnet schools as a viable option to help desegregate its schools. It was thought that if 
special schools were an option, children from all over the city would be attracted to 
them.159 As a result, schools would have a multiracial student body in a system that had 
too many racially isolated schools.160 In the original Consent Decree, section 1.1.2 
established that the Board may utilize magnet schools to enhance desegregation. In 
section 602.2 of the Chicago Public Schools Policy Manual, there are several goals listed 
for magnet schools and programs including: 
1. To provide and maintain desegregation in student assignments 
consistent with the District’s desegregation obligation in U.S. v. Board 
of Education of the City of Chicago  
2. To promote diversity within schools included but not limited to the 
prevention, reduction and elimination of minority group isolation 
3. To provide a unique or specialized curriculum or approach 
4. To improve achievement for all students participating in a magnet 
school or program161 
 
The following types of magnet schools and programs exist in the Chicago Public 
Schools and are collectively referred to as magnet schools and programs: 
1. Elementary Magnet Schools- Generally, magnet schools do not have a 
neighborhood attendance boundary. Magnet schools offer a curriculum 
focused on specific programmatic theme. Every student in the school 
is involved in the magnet theme or focus offered at the school. The 
Chicago Public Schools uses non-testing admissions procedures for its 
magnet schools. 
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2. Elementary Magnet Cluster Schools- A magnet cluster school is a 
neighborhood school with a defined attendance area and accepts 
students who live within that boundary. Students who live outside of 
the attendance boundary must submit an application in order to be 
considered for acceptance. Magnet cluster schools are located in 
groups of no less than four schools clustered nearby in a manner that 
provides the benefits of magnet programs to as many students 
possible. Magnet cluster schools offer a curriculum focused on a 
specific programmatic theme. Each school in a cluster offers a 
programmatic theme in collaboration with its companion schools in 
the neighborhood cluster. The Chicago Public Schools uses non-
testing admissions procedures for its magnet cluster schools.162 
 
The Chicago Public Schools developed this strategy for those schools that may 
remain racially isolated. Their strategy was to put quality academic programming within 
neighborhood schools. These schools would be available to students who lived within the 
school’s attendance boundary. 
Magnet cluster schools are open to students who live in the attendance 
boundary for a particular magnet cluster school…Where possible, the 
Chicago Public Schools shall identify schools to be part of a magnet 
cluster that are in close geographical proximity and that may contribute to 
desegregation of the schools in the cluster.163  
 
Each school within a magnet cluster implements one of six academic areas 
of focus: Fine and Performing Arts; the International Baccalaureate 
Middle Years; the International the Chicago Public Schools Scholars 
Program; Literature and Writing; Math and Science or World Language.164 
 
3. Elementary Gifted and Enriched Academic Programs (GEAP) – Gifted 
and Enriched Academic Programs constitute a continuum of programs 
and services that modify, supplement and support the standard 
education of students identified as gifted and talented who consistently 
excel in general intellectual ability or possess aptitude or talent in a 
specific area. The Gifted and Enriched Academic Programs consist of 
Regional Gifted Centers, Classical Schools, Academic Centers, and 
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International Baccalaureate Preparatory Programs as further described 
below. 
 
A. Regional Gifted Centers-A Regional Gifted Center is a school or a 
program within a school that offers a curriculum which is designed 
to meet the needs of gifted students and is faster in pace, broader in 
scope, and presents subject matter in greater depth than is possible 
in most programs. Some of these centers are designed to service 
the needs of high ability English Language Learners. 
 
B. Classical Schools-Classical Schools are designed to provide a 
challenging liberal arts course of instruction for students with high 
academic potential. The instructional program in these schools is 
accelerated and highly structured for strong academic achievement 
in literature, mathematics, language arts, world language and the 
humanities. 
 
C. Academic Centers-Academic Centers offer a program that allows 
academically advanced students in grades 7-8 the opportunity to 
move through the course material at their own pace. 
 
D. International Baccalaureate Preparatory Program-An 
International Baccalaureate Preparatory Program is designed for 
intellectually able 6th, 7th, and 8th grade students. The program 
includes intensive study in English, French, social studies, 
laboratory science, mathematics, technology, arts, physical 
education, library science and advanced research.165 
 
4. Selective Enrollment High Schools-Selective Enrollment High Schools 
are designed to meet the needs of the City’s most academically 
advanced students. A selective enrollment school does not have an 
attendance area.166 
 
5. High School Magnet Programs-High school magnet programs are 
located in neighborhood high schools in order to increase educational 
opportunities for students. The schools accept students who live within 
their attendance boundary. Students who live outside the neighborhood 
attendance boundary must submit an application in order to be 
considered accepted.167 
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The goals of magnet schools and programs were explicitly described within the 
Chicago Public Schools policy manual. It made clear that these goals were consistent 
with the Second Amended Consent Decree. It was important that the motive behind the 
implementation of magnet schools and programs correlated with what was being asked of 
the district in regards to desegregation.  
Desegregation Goals- Consistent with the Second Amended 
(Desegregation) Consent Decree in the matter of U.S. v. Board of 
Education of the City of Chicago, the District currently applies specified 
racial goals to the extent practicable, in selecting applicants for admission 
in magnet schools and programs. The goal of each magnet school and 
program is to have an enrollment between 65-85 percent minority (Black, 
Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, or American Indian/Alaskan Native) and 
15-35 percent non-minority (White).168 
 
 It was also important to establish a system that enabled students of all races the 
opportunity to attend a magnet school. The lottery system was developed to assure that 
students were chosen randomly. It is again established that this process is also compliant 
with the second Amended Consent Decree. 
Computerized Lotteries- Where there are more applicants to a magnet 
school, magnet cluster school or high school magnet program than there 
are spaces available, a computerized lottery will be conducted to randomly 
select students for the available spaces. All lotteries shall be conducted in 
compliance with the Second Amended Consent Decree and the guidelines 
set out in the District’s Option for Knowledge publication.169 
 
 The concept of magnet schools represents another strategy the Chicago Public 
Schools put into place in order to help desegregate its schools. These schools provided an 
alternative to the traditional neighborhood school, attracting students from all across the 
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city with varying racial backgrounds. Historically, these magnets have often represented 
some of Chicago’s highest performing and most diverse schools. Although these schools 
had populations that reflected what was set forth in the Consent Decree and seemed to be 
consistent with the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case, other schools in the city 
were quickly dealing with the prospect of all their work to promote integration being 
undone. Chicago Public Schools were facing the reality of resegregation.  
Resegregation 
Even with all of the efforts school districts made to desegregate their faculties and 
student bodies, the goal of fully desegregating schools still seemed elusive. As time 
passed, the commitment to the tenets of the Brown v. Board case became less of a 
priority. This created an environment that provided an opportunity for school systems to 
experience the concept of resegregation. 
In 1991, The Supreme Court ruled in the Oklahoma v. Dowell case that the 
desegregation orders set forth as a result of the Brown decision were temporary.170 The 
Oklahoma v. Dowell ruling allowed local school districts to return to a system of 
neighborhood schools even in areas where residential segregation would require school 
children to attend either predominantly white or predominantly black schools.171 In the 
Missouri v. Jenkins case in 1995, the Court determined that Kansas could end its 
desegregation plan if it could not be proven that its neighborhood school system 
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intentionally promoted racial discrimination.172 Supreme Court decisions such as these 
have made a strong contribution to the resegregation of many of our Nation’s public 
school systems.173 
The Civil Rights Project of Harvard University was responsible for some of the 
key research that discussed the concept of resegregation. According to a Harvard 
University Graduate School of Education press release, “The Civil Rights Project at 
Harvard University is an interdisciplinary initiative committed to mobilizing the 
resources of Harvard and the broader research community in support of the struggle for 
racial and ethnic justice. By building strong collaborations between researchers, 
community organizations, and policy makers, The Civil Rights Project hopes to raise the 
level of discourse on targeted issues and to reframe the tone and content of many of the 
current legal and political debates.”174 Gary Orfield, a professor at Harvard University as 
well as the co-director of the Civil Rights Act Project, was the catalyst of several studies 
related to resegregation. One of Orfield’s study’s entitled “Brown At 50: King’s Dream 
or Plessy’s Nightmare,” examines a decade of resegregation from the time of the 
Supreme Court’s 1991 Dowell decision.175 
Major findings of the study included: 
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• In many districts where court-ordered desegregation was ended in the 
past decade, there has been a major increase in segregation. The courts 
assumed that the forces that produced segregation and inequality had 
been cured. This report shows they have not been. 
 
• Among the four districts included in the original Brown decision, the 
trajectory of educational desegregation and resegregation varies 
widely, and it is intriguing that three of the four cases show 
considerable long-term success in realizing desegregated education. 
 
• Rural and small town school districts are, on average, the nation’s 
most integrated for both African Americans and Latinos. Central cities 
of large metropolitan areas are the epicenter of segregation; 
segregation is also severe in smaller central cities and in the suburban 
rings of large metros. 
 
• There has been a substantial slippage toward segregation in most of 
the states that were highly desegregated in 1991. The most integrated 
state for African Americans in 2001 is Kentucky. The most 
desegregated states for Latinos are in the Northwest. However, in 
some states with very low black populations, school segregation is 
soaring as desegregation efforts are abandoned. 
 
• American public schools are now only 60 percent white nationwide 
and nearly one fourth of U.S. students are in states with a majority of 
nonwhite students.  However, except in the South and Southwest, most 
white students have little contact with minority students. 
 
• Asians, in contrast, are the most integrated and by far the most likely 
to attend multiracial schools with a significant presence of three or 
more racial groups. Asian students are in schools with the smallest 
concentration of their own racial group. 
 
• The vast majority of intensely segregated minority schools face 
conditions of concentrated poverty, which are powerfully related to 
unequal educational opportunity. Students in segregated minority 
schools face conditions that students in segregated white schools 
seldom experience. 
 
• Latinos confront very serious levels of segregation by race and 
poverty, and non-English speaking Latinos tend to be segregated in 
schools with each other. The data show no substantial gains in 
segregated education for Latinos even during the civil rights era. The 
increase in Latino segregation is particularly notable in the West. 
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• There has been a massive demographic transformation of the West, 
which has become the nation’s first predominantly minority region in 
terms of total public school enrollment. This has produced a sharp 
increase in Latino segregation.176 
 
 The study entitled “Resegregation in American Schools” was also completed by 
Gary Orfield along with John T. Yung, a doctoral candidate in education at Harvard.177 
Orfield and Yung’s study focused primarily on the following four important trends.178 
1. American South is resegregating, after two and a half decades in which 
civil rights law broke the tradition of apartheid in the region's schools 
and made it the section of the country with the highest levels of 
integration in its schools.  
 
2. Data shows continuously increasing segregation for Latino students, 
who are rapidly becoming our largest minority group and have been 
more segregated than African Americans for several years.  
 
3. The report shows large and increasing numbers of African American 
and Latino students enrolled in suburban schools, but serious 
segregation within these communities, particularly in the nation’s large 
metropolitan areas. Since trends suggest that there will be a vast 
increase in suburban diversity, this raises challenges for thousands of 
communities.  
 
4. There is a rapid ongoing change in the racial composition of American 
schools and the emergence of many schools with three or more racial 
groups. The report shows that all racial groups except whites 
experience considerable diversity in their schools but whites are 
remaining in overwhelmingly white schools even in regions with very 
large non-white enrollments.179 
 
                                                 
176Ibid., 2-3. 
 
177Ethan Bronner, “Resegregation is Emerging in Schools, Study Finds,” New York Times, June 
14, 1999, 1. 
 
178Gary Orfield and John T. Yung, Resegregation in American Schools, The Civil Rights Project, 
Harvard University (June 1999), 46. 
  
179Ibid. 
 
  
178
As a result of the study, it was determined that the causes for resegregation 
stemmed from a number of social and political factors: court rulings beginning in the late 
1980s that reversed many of the desegregation orders, the isolation of whites students in 
suburban schools, the increasing segregation of blacks and Hispanics in suburban 
schools, and the refusal of the Clinton administration to initiate any programs to 
challenge this reactionary trend.180 
 Orfield and Yung believed that in order to stop the resegregation of schools, it 
would be necessary to develop an alternative to existing policies.181 The authors listed the 
following priorities as a means of avoiding mass resegregation and improving interracial 
schools. 
1) Active discussion and leadership on this issue by the President and 
Education and Justice Department leaders, who would explain trends 
and consequences and discuss constitutional issues. Initiatives of this 
sort by the Reagan Administration, together with a systematic re-
staffing of the courts, have produced the current legal changes that 
exacerbate segregation.  
2) Leadership by the Justice Department and the Office for Civil Rights 
in defining standards for "unitary status" which specify how the 
various legal requirements of desegregation should be factually 
examined. Also important is the use of educational expertise to help 
the courts, which are often making quick and superficial judgments of 
complex issues, related to schools.  
3) Aggressive defense of remaining court orders.  
4) Requirements that charter schools receiving federal funds are 
desegregated in conformity with local and state desegregation plans 
and policies.  
5) Incentives in Title I plans that facilitate and encourage the transfer of 
low income students from concentrated-poverty low-achieving schools 
to schools that are more diverse. This is logical, since Title I research 
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shows little success of Title I programs in concentrated poverty 
schools, which are usually segregated minority schools.  
6) A policy of strong support for diverse suburban communities by the 
Education, HUD, and Justice Departments. This would include 
research on successful local practices that create integrated 
communities and vigorous enforcement against housing markets and 
lending practices that spread segregation.  
7) Proposing a program of aid for human relations, staff training, and 
educational reform in the nation's thousands of multiracial schools. 
Such a program existed until the Reagan Administration eliminated it.  
8) Fill the vacant federal judgeships.182 
 
  The Chicago Public Schools have also had issues with the concept of 
resegregation. Despite their efforts, the Chicago Public Schools still manage to be 
segregated. A perfect example of this would be Chicago’s magnet schools that were 
intended to embrace student diversity. In the late eighties during the peak of Chicago’s 
magnet programs, twenty-five out of twenty-eight elementary magnet schools were 
racially mixed without a predominant racial group.183 Twenty-two of these schools 
ranked among the top one hundred elementary schools in the country.184 In 2008, only ten 
of the existing twenty-seven magnet schools were racially mixed, with the remaining 
seventeen being either predominantly Black or Latino.185  
 This trend was also evident in Chicago’s selective enrollment high-schools. While 
blacks make up half of the Chicago Public Schools student population, they only 
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represent 29% of the student body in selective enrollment high-schools.186 This 
represented an 8% drop from the African American student population that was enrolled 
in these schools twelve year ago, with the biggest drops being in Chicago’s highest 
performing schools: Young, Jones, Lane, Payton, and Northside Prep.187  
 As the make-up of Chicago’s population shifted, so did the students to which the 
city served. The less diverse the student population became, the more difficult it became 
to desegregate schools. This dilemma made it difficult for Chicago and its school system 
to meet the criteria set forth in the Consent Decree and to remain committed to the tenets 
set forth in the Brown v. Board case. While the effects of resegregation would be up for 
debate similarly to transportation and white flight, there would be one underlying issue 
that would make or break all desegregation efforts. This would be the assistance or lack 
thereof provided in terms of funding from the federal government. 
Government Funding 
 The prospect of federal funding has been utilized in two ways to help support the 
idea of school desegregation; as leverage to secure compliance with civil rights mandates, 
and as direct support of desegregation related activities.188 Local school systems have 
historically either illegally separated their students based on their race, or 
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misappropriated financial resources that could be utilized to correct racial imbalance.189 
In the 1960’s the concept of nondiscrimination was paramount to public policy, so as a 
consequence, federal aid to school districts was based on their commitment to 
nondiscriminatory practices.190 This became part of the Chicago Public Schools history 
with desegregation. 
 Superintendent Benjamin Willis dealt with the issue of government funding and 
the government’s philosophy with discrimination head on. Willis was charged with 
developing plans to utilize federal funding in areas that did not accommodate high 
populations of low-income underprivileged minorities, resulting in the launching of an 
investigation.191 The federal government made the determination that they would 
withhold their financial support provided to the city of Chicago pending the hearing on 
the complaints to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) on 
segregation in the Chicago Public Schools.192 Superintendent James Redmond dealt with 
a similar plight. The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
threatened to relinquish up to $100 million dollars in federal funding due to the school 
district’s failure to integrate their faculties.193 
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 Over the span of three decades, Chicago as well as other school districts across 
the nation would deal with several government policies established to help fully 
desegregate the nation’s public schools. The implementation of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 along with the issuance and enforcement of guidelines 
for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contributed to a significant change in the 
relationship between the federal government and local school systems.194 The focus of 
federal financial assistance for education no longer was to assist schools in doing better 
than they were currently doing; rather, it was to remedy their failure to provide equal 
educational opportunities to minorities, specifically black children.195 In 1970, President 
Nixon proposed the Emergency School Assistance Program, designed to help school 
districts with court ordered desegregation.196 Under this program, $171 million dollars 
was provided for school districts over a two year period.197 Unfortunately after the 
program’s implementation, it was determined that these funds often were awarded to 
segregated districts who did not use them to further desegregation.198 The Emergency 
School Aid Act of 1972 was enacted as part of the Education Amendments of 1972 and 
imposed strict non-discrimination standards for school districts’ to be eligible for 
government assistance.199 In order to be considered eligible, school districts had to be 
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implementing a plan requiring desegregation of children or faculty pursuant to either a 
final court order or an order of a state agency. Eligibility for government assistance was 
also provided to school districts that had either a desegregation plan approved under Title 
VI, or a voluntary plan for the elimination of minority group isolation.200From fiscal year 
1973 to fiscal year 1981, $2.2 billion dollars was provided in order to aid in the 
desegregation of the nation’s schools.201 These funds were utilized for staff training, 
additional staff, new curriculum development, community relations activities, and the 
financing of magnet schools.202 In the early eighties, the philosophy of federally aided 
desegregation changed direction once again. On February 18, 1981, the White House 
issued America’s New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery, designed to 
reduce federal expenditures and federal presence in domestic venues.203 As a result, forty-
five federal education programs would be consolidated in order to move control of 
educational policy away from the federal government and back to State and local 
authorities.204 
When the Chicago Public Schools entered into the Consent Decree in 1980, it not 
only provided a viable solution to student desegregation, but also to areas that hindered 
their eligibility for federal funding. These areas included classroom integration, bilingual 
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program staffing, and faculty assignment.205 Section 15 of the Original Consent Decree 
directly addresses the issue of funding as it relates to fulfilling the decree’s obligations. 
Section 15 states: 
 
15.1 Each party is obligated to make every good faith effort to find and 
provide every available form of financial resources adequate for the 
implementation of the desegregation plan. 
 
15.2 Each party reserves the right to seek to add additional parties who 
may be legally obligated to contribute to the cost of the desegregation 
plan. 
 
15.3 The parties recognize that financial cost of implementation does not 
excuse the failure to develop a desegregation plan consistent with the 
principals set forth in 55 2-14, and is not a basis for postponement, 
cancellation or curtailment of implementation of the plan after it has been 
finally adopted, but is one legitimate consideration of practicability in 
meeting the objective in 2.1.206 
 
 The Chicago Public Schools questioned whether the provisions set forth in the 
Consent Decree required financial assistance from the federal government.207 This debate 
was decided in the United States v. Board of Education case when federal district Judge 
Milton I. Shadur ruled that the United States was obligated to provide assistance.208 The 
Chicago Public School District sought payment from the federal government because 
they believed that the language in the Consent Decree entitled them to government 
funds.209 Judge Shadur’s ruling required that the federal government provide $103.8 
                                                 
205Consent Decree 1980, 48. 
 
206Ibid. 
 
207Devins and Stedman, Symposium Civil Rights and Federalism, 17. 
 
208Ibid. 
 
209AP, “School Aid to Chicago Backed,” The New York Times, June 9, 1984. 
 
  
185
million dollars to assist in Chicago’s desegregation efforts.210 The Board requested $114 
million for its schools, but Judge Shadur believed that some of the programs the board 
requested did not meet the legal requirements of materially aiding desegregation.211 
 The U.S. Justice Department was unhappy with Judge Shadur’s decision. 
President Reagan and his administration appealed the judge’s decision that would require 
the federal government to pay $14.6 million dollars for the 1983-84 school year and as 
much as $250 million dollars over the next five years.212 The government’s position was 
developed from the Reagan Administration’s policy decision to reduce the government 
funding made available to school districts.213 Reagan’s Administration was responsible 
for phasing out the Emergency School Aid Act, the primary resource of federal aid 
designed to help school districts undergoing desegregation.214  On July 13, 1983, the 
Justice Department filed papers with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
stating that the previous judgment constituted an unwarranted interference and intrusion 
upon the discretion vested in officials in the executive branch.215 The Justice 
Department’s disgust was articulated in its motion seeking an Order to Stay the 
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proceedings. In an article published in the Education Week journal, the Justice 
Department is quoted as saying: 
The court’s decision is a sweeping unprecedented judicial intrusion into 
the formulation of national policy…The order is an affront to the doctrine 
of separation of powers and a profound intrusion into the constitutionally 
protected domain of the executive branch.216 
 
 Part of the Department of Justice’s argument was that funding Chicago’s 
desegregation project would take funding from other school district’s trying to 
desegregate their schools. This made it an issue of equity, questioning whether it was an 
equitable decision to provide so much support to one single school district. 
It marks the first time that a court has directed an official of the executive 
branch to divert funds from hundreds of federal grantees across the nation 
in order to finance a desegregation plan for one school district. It marks 
the first time that a court has ordered the executive branch to seek 
legislation in derogation of Administrative policy if a specified sum of 
money cannot be produced by reallocating funds.217 
 
 The Department of Justice also challenged the amount that the Chicago Public 
School district was requiring to implement its desegregation plan. They believed that the 
amount was unwarranted, and would be used elsewhere rather than to desegregate their 
school system. 
The nature and scope of the school board’s desegregation plan are so 
broad that they are virtually indistinguishable from all other educational 
activities conducted by the board…It appears that the board is attempting 
to balance its overall budget by seeking to make the United States 
responsible for the shortfall.218 
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 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sided with the Department of 
Justice, finding that Judge Shakur misinterpreted the provisions set forth in the 1980 
Consent Decree.219 A three judge appellate panel found that the Consent Decree does not 
require the federal government to lobby the Congress for desegregation funds for 
Chicago but only requires that the Chicago Public School District receive “top of the line 
priority” for funds from Educational Department accounts that can be used for 
desegregation purposes.220 Chicago would be forced to cut some of its programs and 
staff, eliminating $20 million dollars from its desegregation budget during the 1983-84 
school year.221 
The funding debate that took place in Chicago provided another barrier in the 
district’s quest to desegregate its schools. The strategies the Chicago Public Schools 
utilized throughout its history with desegregation such as busing, teacher transfers, and 
magnet schools were all very costly. School districts across the country felt the pressure 
to desegregate their school systems, but the prospect of funding always created a 
hindrance. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
FINAL ANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the analysis of historical documents to 
respond to the research questions presented in this study.  Each research question was 
designed to support the purpose of this study, which is to provide the current and future 
educational leader an historical analysis of the Chicago Public School Consent Decree 
(Consent Decree), while illustrating its relationship with the Brown v. Board case of 
1954.  Analyzing the Consent Decree from an historical perspective will provide findings 
addressing the following: 
1. The discriminatory practices responsible for the Consent Decree’s origin. 
2.  The goals established within the Consent Decree. 
3.  The strategies used to implement the Consent Decree’s goals. 
4.  The challenges that effected the implementation of the Consent Decree. 
5.  The implications of the Consent Decree’s implementation on current and 
future leaders.  
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Research Question 1 
 
What discriminatory practices, in violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. 
Board decision, led to the creation of the Consent Decree?  
Findings 
Education in the Chicago Public Schools mirrored the same racial isolation that 
was going on in traditional society.1 The Chicago Public Schools have had a history of 
segregated public schools, continuing the cycle of racial isolation.2  Black students 
attended the Chicago Public Schools as early as 1837. They were not formally segregated 
from their white peers; however, they were not encouraged to attend school.3 Compulsory 
attendance laws were not put in place until 1919, requiring all children to attend school.4 
As other minorities began to migrate to the city, Chicago’s population became more 
diverse.5 Eventually, the neighborhoods within the city became segregated based on race, 
ethnic, and religious identity.6 The concept of the neighborhood school was embraced by 
the Chicago Public Schools, and as neighborhoods became more segregated so did their 
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school’s populations.7  Ninety-one percent of elementary schools along with 71% of 
high-schools were made up of a single race by 1956.8 
The racial isolation that plagued the Chicago Public School system was not only 
perpetuated by neighborhood demographics, but also by some of the practices of the 
Chicago Public Schools itself.9 “Official restrictive housing covenants, and neighborhood 
school policies established to be consistent with them, worked to contain blacks and other 
minorities in specified areas of the city.”10  Actions such as these put the Chicago Public 
School system in direct violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case. 
The Willis Era: The Fifties 
Benjamin C. Willis became the superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools in 
1953, and played a major role in the Chicago Public School’s discriminatory practices.11 
Willis was a strong advocate of the values and virtues associated with the concept of 
neighborhood schools.12 Blacks during Willis’ tenure demanded that the Chicago Public 
Schools be desegregated, but their wishes were met with little regard.13 Although Willis 
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was known for building academic structures, schools in Black neighborhoods weren’t the 
beneficiary of the new facilities.14  
When schools in black communities were overcrowded, Willis utilized various 
tactics to increase classrooms within these schools. He allowed schools to operate with a 
proportionately high number of mobile classrooms that became known as “Willis 
Wagons.” 15  He also implemented plans that made it necessary to accelerate building 
schedules, to require teachers to work double shifts, and to convert commercial facilities 
into schools. These strategies enabled Willis to circumvent integration.16 Blacks were 
enraged and grew impatient with Willis and his actions, which were perceived to 
perpetuate segregation.17 Civil rights activist, as well as many Black leaders saw the use 
of mobile classrooms as a way to make sure that Blacks were contained in a certain area 
of the city, preventing their migration to areas that were designated as all-White.  
Eventually, Willis’ discriminatory practices would be unveiled. The federal 
government charged Willis with developing plans to utilize federal funding in areas that 
did not accommodate high populations of low-income underprivileged minorities, 
resulting in the launching of an investigation.18 The federal government made the 
determination that it would withhold its financial support provided to the City of 
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Chicago, pending the hearing on the complaints to the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) on segregation in the Chicago Public Schools.19  
Based on the results of the federal government’s hearing, a suit was brought by 
the Coordinating Council of Community Organization (CCCO) in 1965 against the 
Chicago Public Schools.20 On October 4, 1963, Benjamin C. Willis resigned from the 
Chicago Public Schools Board of Education, (the Board), charging that the Board had 
invaded his administrative domain amidst the segregation controversy going on in the 
Chicago Public Schools.21    
The Redmond Era: The Sixties  
  On May 25, 1966, James F. Redmond was appointed as the superintendent of the 
Chicago Public Schools.22 When James Redmond took over as superintendent of the 
Chicago Public Schools, the district was still segregated. Only 28% of white students 
were served by schools that had more than a 5% population of black students.23 In 
contrast, only 4.7% of black students were served at schools that were considered to be 
predominately white.24 
In January 1967, the United States Office of Education for Civil Rights provided a 
statement of findings and recommendations as they related to the operation of the 
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Chicago Public Schools.25 This report was entitled Report on Office of Education 
Analysis of Certain Aspects of Chicago Public Schools under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.26 The report highlighted four areas of concern, which included: faculty 
assignment patterns, boundaries and student assignment policies, the apprenticeship 
training program and the open enrollment for vocational and trade schools.27  
In response to these findings, Redmond developed a proposal requesting a 
planning grant from the U.S. Office of Education under Section 405 (a) (2) of Title IV of 
Public Law 88-352 to fund specialist to assist in developing a plan to address concerns.28 
The grant was approved, and Redmond and his team began working to resolve some of 
the problems associated with the operation of the Chicago Public Schools. At a special 
session of the Board of Education, Redmond presented the plan entitled, Increasing 
Desegregation of Faculties, Students, and Vocational Education Programs.29 It was 
considered to be the first out-and out integration program in Chicago’s history, and would 
later be known as the Redmond Report.30 
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The Board endorsed the new plan that aggressively worked to integrate the 
Chicago Public Schools.31 However, as time passed implementation costs, lengthy 
traveling times, and the fear of bodily harm to students caused board members to reassess 
the plan and eventually reject the busing project.32  In 1975, James Redmond made the 
announcement to the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education that he would not seek 
another term as the general superintendent.33 
The Hannon Era: The Seventies 
On July 24, 1975, Dr. Joseph P. Hannon was appointed as General Superintendent 
of Schools for four years.34 With an effective date of September 14, 1975, Hannon took 
on the Chicago Public Schools at a time when: reading scores were low; there was an 
increase in minority student population yet a decrease in minority teachers; the United 
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare threatened to relinquish up to $100 
million dollars in federal funding due to the school district’s failure to integrate their 
faculties; integrating students appeared to be an elusive goal; and a teacher strike was 
currently in progress.35  
In the early part of 1976, Hannon submitted a plan to the Office for Civil Rights 
in response to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s request to remediate 
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segregation policies in order to comply with Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act by September, 1976.36 The plan was Hannon’s effort to put together, in 
one booklet, the facts and figures related to the Plan to Integrate Local School Facilities, 
Equalize Staff Services, and Provide Special Services to National Origin Minority 
Children.37 
The plan was rejected by the Office for Civil Rights, and Hannon was asked to 
provide additional information.38 The Office for Civil Rights informed Hannon that it 
reviewed data to determine the process for assigning faculty and staff to develop racially 
identifiable schools.39 They also wanted to know if teachers assigned to work with 
minority students had less experience and professional training than those assigned to 
work with their nonminority counterparts.40 Lastly, the office wanted to determine if 
minority children were being offered equally effective educational opportunities as 
others.41   
The Office for Civil Rights requested a plan be submitted within sixty days 
explaining how the Chicago Public Schools would develop a process to assign faculty so 
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that it would comply with the goals for desegregation.42 It also expected that the ratio of 
minority to nonminority personnel in individual schools be the same as the ratio across 
the entire district by September 1976.43 At the same time, it was expected that the 
proportion of teachers with extensive professional education and experience and those 
teachers with lesser education and experience be comparable in number in all of the 
district’s schools.44  
The Board of Education passed a resolution, prescribed by the Illinois Board of 
Education, to develop, adopt, and implement a comprehensive Equal Educational 
Opportunity Plan created to meet the criteria for conformance with the Rules Establishing 
Requirements and Procedures for the Elimination and Prevention of Racial Segregation 
in Schools.45 A draft of the plan was created and submitted to the Office for Civil Rights 
to ensure that it would meet the Illinois resolution and also comply with the guidelines set 
forth by the Office of Civil Rights.46 The plan explained how the Chicago Public Schools 
would integrate faculties by September 1977, eliminate any identifiable pattern of 
principal assignment and provide appropriate bilingual services.47 
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 In February of 1977, a federal judge made the determination that the Chicago 
Public Schools Board of Education was in violation on the federal faculty/staff racial 
factor and bilingual issue but was not in violation of the faculty experience factor.48 A 
special consultant was designated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to 
assist in the negotiations with the board in the settlement of the Title VI proceedings.49 
On May 25th, the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education adopted the Plan for the 
Implementation of Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Related To: 
Integration of Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals and Bilingual Education 
Programs.50 The plan, under Dr. Hannon’s leadership became known as Access to 
Excellence.51 
Access to Excellence was designed to increase the quality of educational 
opportunities for all students in a desegregated setting.52 The plan was designed to be 
implemented within a five year period and to be completed by the 1982-1983 school 
year.53  
In the spring of 1979, the federal government accused the board of continually 
supporting segregation in its schools, and stated that it would file a suit against the board 
                                                 
48Stringfellow, Desegregation Policies and Practices in Chicago, 56. 
 
49Plan for the Implementation of the Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights of 1964 related to: 
“Integration of Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals and Bilingual Education Programs,” Chicago 
Public Schools, Board of Education, Chicago, 12 October 1977. 
 
50Stringfellow, “Desegregation Policies and Practices in Chicago,” 57. 
 
51Hannon, Plight of the Chicago Schools. 
 
52Ibid. 
 
53Ibid. 
 
  
198
if the Chicago Public Schools did not develop a comprehensive desegregation plan by 
September.54  It was stated to Dr. Hannon in a letter from Joseph Califano that the 
Board’s Access to Excellence program did not correct the identified violations.55 David 
Tatel, Director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Office of Civil 
Rights, delivered a document to Hannon expressing concern for Chicago’s segregated 
schools.56 The document expressed the need for negotiations for a citywide desegregation 
plan to begin right away.57 Tatel stated that if Chicago refused to participate in 
negotiations, the case would be referred to the Justice Department for court action.58 
Tatel also believed that the school board could do more to increase desegregation beyond 
the Access to Excellence Plan. To make matters worse, the federal government rejected 
the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education’s application for desegregation funds 
under the Emergency School Aid Act with the hope that Chicago would develop a plan 
that would give them eligibility.59 Federal officials gave Hannon and the Chicago Public 
Schools the options of participating in a “show cause” hearing to prove the charges 
incorrect or asking for a waiver to receive funding.60  
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Hannon set out to challenge the government’s findings and prove to federal 
officials that Chicago and its commitment to the Access to Excellence plan had made 
substantial strides toward desegregating the district’s public schools.61 On May 4, 1979, 
Hannon met with the officials of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to 
prove why the Chicago Public Schools should still receive federal funding.62 During the 
proceedings, Hannon asked federal officials to revoke their findings that the Chicago 
Public School District was deliberately segregating its schools, and to reinstate the 
district’s eligibility for $36 million dollars in funds under the Emergency School Aid 
Act.63 Hannon’s efforts could not persuade the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare to change its mind. The department did not agree with the district’s definition of 
what constituted a school being desegregated. Chicago’s standard for desegregation was 
when a school operated with no more than 90% of its student population belonging to 
only one race.64 The definition as it related to federal criteria considered a school 
desegregated when the school’s full time student enrollment was 25 to 50% white and 50 
to 75% black.65 
Hannon returned to Chicago, and under the directive of his administration, the 
Chicago Public Schools Board of Education approved an expansion of the Access to 
Excellence plan. This would call for the addition of 13 sites administering preschool 
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programs, classical schools, and language academies beginning in September of 1979.66 
Hannon took a firm stance on the concept of a voluntary integration plan, shunning any 
strategies that would be mandatory, such as busing. Hannon believed that the 
implementation of voluntary access to quality education was Chicago’s best option 
despite the fact that the city was residentially segregated.67  Furthermore, mandatory 
integration would not be an effective strategy due to the low white student enrollment 
throughout the district.68 
On July 13, 1979, Mayor Jane Byrne announced that she participated in a meeting 
with Dr. Hannon to discuss the status of the desegregation negotiations between the 
district and the federal government. She stated that Hannon and his staff were preparing 
an expanded desegregation plan. This plan would include clustering, the combining of 
school populations of three or more schools within the same proximity. This concept 
along with the use of magnet schools would require little busing.69 Hannon and his team 
also had to consider an alternative to their voluntary plans. The federal government 
demanded that mandatory backup measures be instituted if voluntary efforts failed to 
meet the goal of achieving desegregation that was acceptable to the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare.70 
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While mandatory integration strategies were not looked at favorably by the 
Chicago Public Schools, the federal government still believed they were a viable option. 
David Tatel, Director of the Office for Civil Rights stated: “We have decided that further 
progress would be enhanced by developing some specific desegregation option; one of 
the options will be busing.”71 Tatel also stated that the plan would need to be developed 
and approved by September 15, 1979 with an implementation date to be determined 
through later investigations.72 On August 26, 1979, Patricia Harris would be newly 
appointed as the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.73 
Although she stated she would assist Chicago in mapping out an acceptable school 
desegregation plan, the September 15, 1979 deadline would not be extended.74 
On August 31, HEW developed a proposal for the Chicago Public Schools that 
required the mandatory busing of 114,000 elementary students.75  It would not be a 
requirement for Chicago to accept the proposal, but if they chose to do so, it would 
desegregate 60% of the district’s schools and involve 55% of the district’s student 
population.76 Hannon’s response to the proposal was that busing 114,000 school children 
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to achieve the government’s definition of integration would be costly and would not 
improve education nor aid the city’s stability.77 
In mid-September, Hannon submitted to Washington, D.C. the plan, Access to 
Excellence: Further Recommendations for Equalizing Educational Opportunities, 
designed to achieve greater racial balance throughout the district.78 On September 26, 
1979, the HEW informed the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education that their 
submission would not be accepted because it did not adequately remedy the alleged 
segregated conditions in the Chicago Public Schools.79 On October 17, 1979, HEW 
announced it would continue negotiations if the Chicago Public Schools Board of 
Education agreed to their definition of a desegregated school and submit an effective 
desegregation plan by November 17, 1979.80 The Board refused to proceed with 
negotiations under the terms set forth by HEW.81 The following day, Hannon informed 
the Board that he would be receiving a letter announcing that Chicago’s desegregation 
case would be received by the Department of Justice.82  On October 29, 1979, HEW 
presented the matter to the Department of Justice with the intention that it would initiate 
litigation.83 Hannon was encouraged by board members and his close advisors to take a 
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public stand and fight the desegregation issue in court.84 The Chicago Public Schools 
Board of Education rejected the idea of creating a citywide desegregation plan that 
coincided with the stipulations set forth by HEW.85 Hannon echoed their sentiments 
referring to HEW’s proposal as “unworkable and unreasonable.”86 
On November 14, 1979, the General Superintendent of Schools set out to meet 
with members of government to work out a solution on pupil assignment.87 Hannon was 
in opposition of the charges against his school district, but he agreed to cooperate with 
HEW to resolve the desegregation issue in hopes to reclaim federal funding.88 Later that 
year, the Board submitted an application to HEW requesting ESAA funds for the 1980-81 
school year only to be denied once again by the HEW due to alleged discrimination.89  
The Caruso and Love Era: The Eighties 
Hannon would announce that he would resign effective January 25, 1980.90 At a 
time when things appeared to be at their lowest point, Angeline P. Caruso, Associate 
Superintendent of Curriculum and Instruction Services was appointed superintendent.91  
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Caruso served in the superintendent’s capacity until Dr. Ruth Love, Chicago’s first black 
school superintendent was hired in April of 1980.92 
On April 21, 1980, the Department of Justice found the Chicago Public Schools 
Board of Education guilty of the unlawful segregation of students based on their race.93 
The Department of Justice was prepared to file a suit against the board unless it was 
assured that voluntary compliance could be put in place to remedy the alleged 
violations.94  
The United States has filed a Complaint alleging that the Board of 
Education of the City of Chicago (the “Board”) has engaged in acts of 
discrimination in the assignment of students and otherwise, in violation of 
federal law. The United States alleges further that such acts have had a 
continuing system-wide effect of segregating students on a racial and 
ethnic basis in the Chicago public school system.95 
 
The school district was accused of operating in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Titles IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.96 The Complaint alleged that the Chicago Public Schools engaged in actions 
regarding student/faculty assignment and other educational practices that promoted 
inequalities regarding how students were educated. Specifically, these practices included: 
drawing attendance zone boundaries, adjusting grade structures of schools in racially and 
ethnically segregative ways, allowing racially segregative intra-district transfers by White 
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students, maintaining severely overcrowded and thereby educationally inferior schools 
for African American students and less crowded schools for White students, and 
assigning teachers and staff to schools in racially segregative ways.97 
The Department of Justice provided the Chicago Public Schools Board of 
Education an opportunity to enter into negotiations in order to reach an agreement that 
would resolve the desegregation matter.98 On June 11, 1980, the Board developed a 
Committee on Desegregation to meet with the United States Department of Justice to try 
to resolve the district’s legal issues.99 The Committee recommended to the Board that it 
continue to promote racial integration in its schools, and that the programs they 
developed to achieve integration must be guided by legal requirements as well as 
educational objectives.100 
The Committee reached an agreement with the Department of Justice and 
Education that centered on a three-step process to eradicate segregation in the Chicago 
Public Schools.  First, the parties agreed to a preliminary commitment to develop and 
implement a plan, which included principles that would guide development of the plan. 
The next step was to develop a detailed plan, with participation by appropriate experts 
and by the community, and adoption of the plan by the Board no later than March 1981. 
Finally, the parties agreed to implement the plan beginning September 1981.101  The 
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initial commitment would be carried out by entering into a Consent Decree, agreed upon 
by the Board and the Department of Justice and submitted to the United States District 
Court for approval.102 
Conclusion 
 For numerous decades, Chicago Public Schools have been accused of 
discriminatory practices. Even through the tenure of several different superintendents 
each with their own desegregation plan, the Chicago Public Schools still could not satisfy 
the federal government. The Brown v. Board case established that individuals needed to 
have an equal opportunity for an education. This means that every student should be 
afforded the same opportunity without fear of being discriminated against because of 
their race. The Chicago Public Schools ultimately found itself signing the Consent 
Decree because they were found to be in violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. 
Board decision, a lesson that taught the nation that there is no such thing as “separate but 
equal.” 
Research Question 2 
 
What were the goals set forth in the Consent Decree aimed at remedying the 
discriminatory practices that were in violation of the tenets set forth in the Brown v. 
Board decision? 
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Findings 
The Consent Decree 1980 
 The original Consent Decree and Desegregation Plan had two major goals.103 The 
first goal was to establish “the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated 
schools, considering all the circumstances in Chicago.”104 These circumstances referred 
to the challenges associated with desegregating the Chicago Public Schools such as the 
diverse racial make of the city and its segregated neighborhoods. The second goal of the 
Consent Decree and Plan was to “provide educational and related programs for any Black 
or Hispanic schools remaining segregated.”105 
The original Consent Decree consisted of several basic objectives: 
1.1 Systemwide Remedy- The Chicago Public Schools Board of Education 
(the “Board”) will develop and implement a system-wide plan to remedy 
the present effects of past segregation of Black and Hispanic students.  
 
2.1 Desegregated Schools- The plan will provide for the establishment of 
the greatest practicable number of stably desegregated schools, 
considering all circumstances in Chicago. 
 
a. Compensatory Programs in Schools-remaining Segregated- In order to 
assure participation by all students in a system-wide remedy and to 
alleviate the effects of both past and ongoing segregation, the plan 
shall provide educational and related programs for any Black or 
Hispanic schools remaining segregated. 
 
2.3 Participation- To the greatest extent practicable, the plan will 
provide for desegregation of all racial and ethnic groups, and in all age 
and grade levels above kindergarten. 
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1.1 Fair Allocations of Burdens- The plan shall ensure that the burdens 
of desegregation are not imposed arbitrarily on any racial or ethnic 
group.106 
 
The Modified Consent Decree 
 
In 2001, the federal government and the Chicago Public Schools reviewed the 
school district’s implementation of and compliance with the original Consent Decree and 
the Desegregation Plan.107 It was determined by the district court that there were areas of 
the plan that had not reached full compliance.108 These areas related to magnet schools, 
transfers, school openings and closings, attendance zone changes, controlled enrollment, 
assignment of faculty and school based administrators, compensatory programs and 
services for English Language Learner students.109 The federal government and Board of 
Education of the City of Chicago entered into a Modified Consent Decree.110 The new 
Modified Consent Decree was designed with the intention that its full implementation 
would address the goals set forth in the original Consent Decree and Desegregation 
Plan.111 The new Consent Decree also established a timetable that would bring the case to 
a final resolution.112 
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The Second Amended Consent Decree 
In 2005, the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, asked the 
federal government and the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education to consider what 
provisions of the Modified Desegregation Consent Decree would continue.113 The court 
revisited the Modified Desegregation Consent Decree because of the significant changes 
in racial demographics in Chicago’s neighborhoods and schools.114 The student 
population of the Chicago Public Schools in no way resembled that of the school 
population that existed during the creation of both the original and modified versions of 
the Consent Decree.115  
As a result of the court’s inquiry, and further discovery by both parties, the federal 
government and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago jointly requested that they 
vacate the Modified Consent Decree and be allowed to enter a Second Amended Consent 
Decree.116 In the proposed Consent Decree, the two parties requested that the Consent 
Decree automatically expire in June.117 The court approved the request to enter a Second 
Amended Consent Decree; however, established that the Consent Decree could not 
automatically expire without the determination being through the court.118  
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Conclusion 
 The Consent Decree established goals that were consistent with the tenets set 
forth in the Brown v. Board case. The Chicago Public Schools would now have to focus 
on providing all students an opportunity to a quality education with the same access to its 
facilities and resources. The Consent Decree would give the Chicago Public School 
district an opportunity to right some of the wrongs that had been established through 
years of segregative practices within its schools. With the courts watching, the 
accountability to desegregate the school system would need to become a priority for 
Chicago. 
Research Question 3 
According to available documentation, what did educational leaders have to do to 
implement the guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree aimed at supporting the tenets 
set forth in the Brown v. Board decision? 
Findings 
 In order to meet the guidelines set forth in the Consent Decree, the Chicago 
Public Schools utilized several strategies. These strategies once matriculated down to the 
school level, required support from administration in order to be successful. 
The Consent Decree lists the following strategies to be implemented by the Chicago 
Public Schools: 
Voluntary Techniques 
4.1.5 Permissive transfers that enhance desegregation, with 
transportation at Board expense. 
4.1.6 Magnet schools that enhance desegregation. 
4.1.7 Voluntary pairing and clustering of schools. 
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4.1.8 If magnet schools or other voluntary techniques are used, each 
shall contain/ethnic goals and management controls (e.g., an 
alternative that would require mandatory re-assignments) to ensure 
that the goals are met. 
 
Mandatory Techniques Not Involving Transportation 
4.2.1 Redrawing attendance areas. 
4.2.2 Adjusting feeder patterns 
4.2.3 Reorganization of grade structures, including creation of middle  
                     schools. 
4.2.4 Pairing and clustering of schools. 
4.2.5 Selecting sites for new schools and selecting schools for schools  
         closing to enhance integration. 
 
4.2 Mandatory Reassignment and Transportation- Mandatory 
reassignment and transportation, at Board expense, will be 
included to ensure success of the plan to the extent that other 
techniques are insufficient to meet the objective stated in 2.1. The 
plan may limit the time or distance of mandatory transportation to 
ensure that no student shall be transported for a time or distance 
that would create a health risk or impinge on the educational 
process. These limitations may vary among different age and grade 
levels. 
 
4.4 Priority and Combination of Techniques- The plan may rely upon the  
      techniques listed above and any other remedial methods in any       
      combination that accomplishes objective stated in 2.1.119 
 
 Some of the voluntary methods utilized by the Chicago Public Schools Board of 
Education required a certain amount of flexibility on the part of the building 
administrator. The permissive transfer system allowed students to move from one school 
to another to support integration in the Chicago Public Schools. This process changed the 
racial make-up of a school’s student body which was received differently by those who 
were already stakeholders within the school’s culture. Principals needed to employ 
various strategies to establish first structural then attitudinal change amongst the diverse 
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interests of those being served at the school site.120 Principals would have to deal with the 
prejudices, fears and doubts of students, faculty, and staff.121 He/She would need to 
remain cognizant of individuals varying views on desegregation and put systems in place 
to support staff and students in the change process.  
Magnet schools, while designed to enhance desegregation, sometimes had an 
adverse effect on the neighborhood school. Principals who were battling to keep their 
enrollments up suffered from the prospect of losing students to magnet schools. This 
scenario became an even larger issue when underperforming and underutilized schools 
became the victim of closure due to the Renaissance 2010 initiative.  
Mandatory methods utilized by the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education 
also brought about changes to the way school buildings had to function. Altered 
attendance boundaries and adjusted feeder patterns required both elementary and high-
school principals to put systems in place to make new students, who often represented a 
different race, comfortable with their transition into the school population. Mandatory 
methods also required principals to deal with the community, which expressed varying 
views about the desegregation of its schools. 
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The Role of the Principal in the Desegregation Process 
  There is very little literature available examining the role of the principal in the 
desegregation process.122 This may be because the desegregation process, rather 
voluntary or through court mandates was viewed as a change in policy and the Board of 
Education and the Superintendent usually exercised policy planning and decision-
making.123 The principal represented the position the public most closely associated with 
the daily operation of the school system and was a critical element to the public 
understanding and support for schools.124  
Studies  reveal that the presence of certain key ingredients in the principal’s 
beliefs and actions ensure a greater opportunity for the development of a productive and 
healthy school environment that has been altered by the implementation of a school 
desegregation plan.125  These ingredients include: 
1. Commitment- Principal must believe that integrated education is 
better than segregated education. 
2. Risk Taking- Principal must be able to place the goals and ideals of 
desegregation, integration, and the special focus of his/her school of 
their own personal well-being. 
3. School Climate- Principal must be dedicated to developing a positive 
school climate. The climate of the school is extremely important to 
desegregation efforts. The pulse of a building can determine a 
desegregation plan’s success or failure. 
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4. Creating the Principal’s Presence- The Principal sets the tone for the 
school. A principal’s presence must be keenly felt for successful 
desegregation to take place.126 
 
Each of these characteristics is of vital importance to a leader during the desegregation 
process. The desegregation of schools brought with it a tremendous amount of change. A 
school principal was often responsible for helping people cope with the change process. 
Successful school desegregation is an ongoing set of adaptations, 
modifications, and situational responses to social change. It is a dynamic, 
in contrast to static, educational endeavor. Whether one views the 
desegregation process as a set of predictable developmental changes, or 
being so completely situational that transference from one setting to 
another is not possible, the fact is that change is constantly taking place. 
Being aware of this change and able to guide it distinguishes successful 
from unsuccessful school principals. Reacting positively to change is 
critical to successful desegregation; reacting negatively is likely to 
promote dissension, conflict, and the loss of learning opportunities.127 
 
School principals represented the catalyst of change as it related to moving from a 
segregated school model, to one that embraced integration. Teachers often based their 
feelings on desegregation based on the actions of the lead administrator. 
 Whether the desegregation efforts take place in Chicago, or any other city within 
the United States, the principal plays a large role in the success or failure of the school’s 
ability to be desegregated. The principal plays a critical role as a change agent in the 
desegregation process because of his/her exposure to the daily operational consequences 
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of desegregation as well as his/her position between the school and larger community 
forces.128  
In a national study looking at desegregation, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
found that when there was opposition from leadership in implementing a desegregation 
plan, there were serious disruptions in the education process. 129 When leaders are 
supportive, they tend to keep the community involved in the desegregation process, 
making them more accepting of desegregation.130 The principal’s immediate goal in the 
desegregation process is to comply with the law while peacefully implementing the plan 
developed for his/her school.131  Principals must find a way to translate Board of 
Education policy into educational programming.132 The Chicago Public School 
Desegregation Consent Decree was no different, as school principals needed to find a 
way to implement its policies while maintaining the integrity of their academic structure. 
 As it relates to the Chicago Public Schools and its principals’ experiences with 
desegregation, the majority of available documentation on the topic is related to the Plan 
for the Implementation of Provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Related 
To: Integration of Faculties, Assignment Patterns of Principals and Bilingual Education 
Programs established in1977, rather than the Consent Decree itself.  Many of the 
guidelines and stipulations set forth in the Consent Decree such as faculty integration 
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were consistent with what had been set forth in Chicago’s previous attempts at 
desegregation. 
 In the Fall of 1977, a research team from the University of Illinois at Chicago 
observed several school principals during the implementation of the faculty desegregation 
plan.133 Principals were the ones solely responsible for notifying teachers of transfers and 
accepting or rejecting teachers that were sent to them through the new transfer policy.134 
Principals also played a part in the appeals process in the aftermath of the mass transfer 
of teachers.135  
Principals were asked to carry out a number of tasks that were informal in nature. 
The principal often had to council teachers who he/she had inherited through the transfer 
process in order to make them comfortable with their new surroundings.136 The principal 
would also have to continually assess instruction, keeping a pulse of teachers’ strengths 
and weaknesses to determine the best fit for his/her school. 
 Before principals found themselves dealing with teachers who had to cope with a 
change in environment, they had to recover from their own experiences with change. The 
strategy to integrate Chicago’s teaching force came right behind the transformation of the 
process by which the district chose their school leaders. In the late 60’s, the Chicago 
Public Schools were forced to respond to the idea that white males dominated the make-
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up of its school principals.137 By 1970, the principal selection process was changed, 
providing local school councils the opportunity to select principals for schools that had 
vacancies.138 While this new process brought about more black administrators to 
Chicago’s schools, it also perpetuated the idea that administrators match the racial 
identity of their schools.139 From the list of available principal candidates in 1966, 1968, 
and 1970, not a single Black male and just two Black females had been assigned to non- 
Black school buildings.140 
The distribution of Chicago’s principals by race became an issue of contention 
with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.141 In 1977, the principal 
assignment policy was changed to move toward equalizing percentages of minority and 
majority principals throughout the city.142 In order to create this equalization, roughly 
eighty-two principals would be transferred to lead other schools.143 
This new system of transferring principals gave the instructional leaders a new set 
of circumstances about which to think. In a research study supported by the Spencer 
Foundation and the National Institute of Education, it was revealed that there were three 
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major areas of concern for principals involved in the transfer process: 1) faculty and staff 
relationships; 2) community responsiveness; and 3) resource adequacy.144 
 Principals found that when they took over schools, they often found themselves in 
a position where they had to prove that they were competent leaders. They also needed to 
establish relationships with their staff in order to create an environment of trust. There 
were many scenarios in which the incoming principal represented a different race and 
sometimes a different gender than their predecessor, adding another dimension to the 
teacher/principal relationship. 
The same elements of change that teaching staffs had to deal with also impacted 
members of the school’s local community. Some principals were met with great 
community resistance because of their gender or race. Some communities were content 
with the previous school leadership, and did not believe change was necessary.  
 While the community had to adjust to the principal, principals who found 
themselves in new school settings had some adjusting to do as well. Newly transferred 
principals needed support, either from the community, their staff, their colleagues, or 
central office. Oftentimes, none of the resources were available, leaving principals to 
fend for themselves. 
Conclusion 
The strategies involved in any desegregation effort require strategic maneuvers by 
educational leaders. The Chicago Public School Desegregation Consent Decree is no 
different, as school leaders had to be committed to making integration work. As the 
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Chicago Public School District had been working to desegregate its schools for decades, 
school leaders had been impacted by desegregation strategies long before the signing of 
the Consent Decree. As previously stated, a lot of these strategies found their way into 
the desegregation Consent Decree. Between dealing with teacher transfers, leading new 
schools, dealing with resistant communities, and integrating students, the educational 
leader in the Chicago Public Schools had quite a bit with which to deal. Without 
question, their leadership was instrumental in implementing the desegregation Consent 
Decree. Principals needed to be committed to integrating their schools and embrace the 
tenets set forth by the Brown v. Board case that established that every student should 
have access to same educational opportunities. 
Research Question 4 
 According to available documentation, what supports/obstacles did the Chicago 
Public Schools and educational leaders face while implementing the Consent Decree 
aimed at supporting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision?  
Findings 
In order to fulfill the goals established in the Consent Decree, the Chicago Public 
School District had to be willing to try many different organizational strategies such as 
student busing, faculty integration, and magnet schools. The Chicago Public Schools 
would experience many triumphs and defeats in its quest to desegregate its schools. Some 
of the strategies supported the cause, while others may have caused more harm than 
good.  
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As stated in the original Consent Decree, mandatory reassignment and 
transportation had to be included and funded by the Chicago Public Schools Board of 
Education to ensure success of the plan to the extent that other techniques were 
insufficient to create desegregated schools.145 Although the prospect of busing was an 
aggressive integration strategy, it did not come without its shortcomings. Chicago had 
dealt with transportation before in their quest to develop desegregated schools. 
Superintendent Benjamin Willis was highly criticized for his voluntary transfer plan 
which permitted the transfer of elementary students, most of them Negro, from some of 
Chicago’s most overcrowded schools.146 Part of the controversy developed because the 
burden of paying for the students’ transportation rested on the parents whom oftentimes 
were financially incapable of covering the cost.147  Superintendent James Redmond also 
took on the issue of busing when part of his proposed desegregation plan included the 
busing of over a thousand Black children to schools outside of their neighborhood.148  
Effective desegregation did not happen for a number of reasons including 
disinterest amongst parents, lack of private transportation, and extensive traveling time 
experienced by the students.149 Superintendent Joseph Hannon’s plan attempted to avoid 
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mandatory busing.150 Instead, the plan relied on a voluntary system allowing students 
who were chosen through a lottery system the opportunity to attend a magnet school. 
Even with the prospect of voluntary busing, the plan still had its detractors. In an article 
in Illinois Issues, Doris Galik, a parent from the Gage Park neighborhood stated: “The 
only thing Access to Excellence will teach us is how to ride a bus at the taxpayers’ 
expense.”151  
The Consent Decree gave Chicago the opportunity to provide busing for those 
students who were accepted into one of the city’s magnet schools. Transportation is what 
allowed magnet schools to service students across the city. This in turn provided an 
opportunity for magnet schools to embrace a more diverse school population, and remain 
consistent with the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case. 
Chicago’s population changed just as those of many other urban cities that 
developed some form of integration plan for its public schools. Those schools that once 
attempted to integrate their populations were now being depleted of their White students. 
This plight, known as ‘White Flight”, was also evident in Chicago and its public school 
system. Even though the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education thwarted all 
demands for segregation in the early 1900’s, white constituents of the city and its public 
schools continued to migrate outside of its boundaries.152 Before 1920, Chicago only had 
one elementary school that had a student enrollment that was over 90% black, but in 
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1930, twenty-three elementary schools, two junior high schools, and one high school 
were over the 90% mark.153 White enrollment in the Chicago Public Schools continued to 
drop totaling 34.6% of the school district in 1970, 19% in 1980, and declined an 
additional 8% by 1990.154    
Although the cause for white migration out of Chicago and its public schools can 
be up for debate, the aftermath of it taking place made it challenging for Chicago to fully 
desegregate its schools, and consequently difficult to meet the goals of the Consent 
Decree. Without an equitable ratio of blacks and whites in the district, it became 
increasingly difficult to support integration and furthermore carry out the goals of the 
Consent Decree. 
Chicago also utilized the tactic of integrating their teacher force as a means of 
battling years of racial isolation in its public schools. The focus became not only to 
integrate a school’s student body, but also to assure that the teaching staff was held to the 
same commitment. The original Consent Decree included the following provisions with 
regard to teacher assignment: 
The Board will promptly implement a plan to assure that the assignment of 
full-time classroom teachers to schools will be made in such a manner that 
no school is identified as intended for students of a particular race, color, 
or national origin.155 
 
3.1 No later than November 1, 1981, with respect to the full-time 
classroom teachers in each faculty, the racial/ethnic composition and the 
proportion of experienced teachers will be between plus and minus 15 
percent of the system wide proportion of such teachers with respect to 
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such characteristics, and the range of educational training will be 
substantially the same as exists in the system as a whole. 
 
3.2 The Board will make every good faith effort to follow professional 
staff assignment and transfer practices which, when taken together as a 
whole on a frequently reviewed periodic basis, will assure that the racial 
composition, the experience and the educational background of individual 
school faculties and administrative staff more nearly approach the city-
wide proportions of minority, experienced, and more extensively trained 
professional staff; provided, however, that nothing that nothing in this plan 
shall require the assignment or transfer of any person to a position for 
which he or  she is not professionally qualified. The Board will not adopt 
or follow assignment and transfer practices which will foreseeably result 
in the racial identifiability of school based on faculty or administrative 
staff composition or in unequal distribution of experienced and more 
extensively trained staff. 
 
5.3The failure of a particular school or schools to meet the guidelines will 
not constitute noncompliance with the above guidelines if the district 
provides a detailed satisfactory explanation justifying such failure to meet 
guidelines.156 
 
 Despite Chicago’s efforts to integrate its teaching faculty, school leaders still 
found it to be an unlikely task for various reasons. Beverly Tunney, president of the 
Chicago Principals Association stated, “Principals have had difficulty integrating schools 
and filling positions because of distance and safety concerns.” “…in Chicago, we have a 
teacher shortage. “We are finding it very difficult to get qualified teachers in the 
classrooms due to the integration guidelines.”157 
 Chicago Public Schools still operated in racial isolation with over half of its 
schools being out of compliance with faculty guidelines on race.158 In September 1980, 
                                                 
156Ibid. 
 
157Rossi, “Racial Guidelines for Faculties Change,” 1. 
 
158Ibid. 
 
  
224
29% of schools were out of compliance compared to 59% twenty years later.159 There 
were proposed changes to these guidelines on Wednesday, November 15, 2000 when 
school board members voted unanimously to loosen guidelines for racial composition of 
faculty at individual schools.160 Former guidelines required schools to have faculties that 
required plus or minus 15% with the new plan expanding that number to 25%.161  
Faculty integration of Chicago Public School’s teaching force appeared to be an 
elusive goal. Whether it was teachers’ negative experiences with the process, the lack of 
available teachers or principal’s hiring practices, achieving the faculty integration portion 
of the Consent Decree remained a feat. Just as student integration proved to be a difficult 
task for the Chicago Public Schools, developing teaching faculties that would be more 
racially balanced also brought about some complications. The Chicago Public Schools 
needed to have other strategies in place. One of them would be the development of 
Magnet Schools. 
Chicago, just as many other urban school districts, saw the implementation of 
magnet schools as a viable option to help desegregate its schools. It was thought that if 
special schools were an option, children from all over the city would be attracted to 
                                                 
159Olseki, “City Falls Short on Teacher Diversity,” 2. 
 
160Ibid. 
 
161Ibid. 
 
  
225
them.162 As a result, schools would have a multiracial student body in a system that had 
too many racially isolated schools.163  
The concept of magnet schools represents another strategy the Chicago Public 
Schools put into place in order to help desegregate its schools. These schools provided an 
alternative to the traditional neighborhood school, attracting students from all across the 
city with varying racial backgrounds. Historically, these magnets have often represented 
some of Chicago’s highest performing and most diverse schools. Although these schools 
had populations that reflected what was set forth in the Consent Decree and seemed to be 
consistent with the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case, other schools in the city 
were quickly dealing with the prospect of all their work to promote integration being 
undone. Chicago Public Schools were facing the concept of resegregation.  
Even with all of the efforts school districts made to desegregate their faculties and 
student bodies, the goal of fully desegregating schools still seemed elusive. As time 
passed the commitment to the tenets of the Brown v. Board case became less of a priority. 
This created an environment that provided an opportunity for schools systems to 
experience the concept of resegregation. 
The Supreme Court ruled in the Oklahoma v. Dowell of 1991, that the 
desegregation orders set forth as a result of the Brown decision were temporary.164 The 
Oklahoma v. Dowell ruling allowed local school districts to return to a system of 
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neighborhood schools even in areas where residential segregation would require school 
children to attend either predominantly white or predominantly black schools.165 In the 
Missouri v. Jenkins case in 1995, the Court determined that Kansas could end its 
desegregation plan if it could not be proven that its neighborhood school system 
intentionally promoted racial discrimination.166 Supreme Court decisions such as these 
made a strong contribution to the resegregation of many of our Nation’s public school 
systems.167 
The Chicago Public Schools also had issues with the concept of resegregation. 
Despite their efforts, the Chicago Public Schools still managed to be segregated. A 
perfect example of this was Chicago’s magnet schools, schools designed to bring about 
diversity. In the late eighties, during the peak of Chicago’s magnet programs, twenty-five 
out of twenty-eight elementary magnet schools were racially mixed without a 
predominant racial group.168 Twenty-two of these schools ranked among the top one 
hundred elementary schools.169 In 2008, only ten of the existing twenty-seven magnet 
schools were racially mixed, with the remaining seventeen being either predominantly 
Black or Latino.170  
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 This trend was also evident in Chicago’s selective enrollment high-schools. While 
African Americans made up half of the Chicago Public School’s student population, they 
only represented 29% of the student body in selective enrollment high-schools.171 This 
represented an 8% drop from the African American student population that was enrolled 
in these schools twelve year ago, with the biggest drops being in Chicago’s highest 
performing schools: Young, Jones, Lane, Payton, and Northside Prep.172  
As the make-up of Chicago’s population shifted, so did the students to which the 
City of Chicago served. The less diverse the student population became, the more 
difficult it became to desegregate schools. This dilemma made it difficult for Chicago and 
its school system to meet the criteria set forth in the Consent Decree and to remain 
committed to the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case. 
The financing of past desegregation projects had proven to be costly, and in 
Chicago’s case it would be no different. Funding would serve as an obstacle for the 
Chicago Public Schools and its educational leaders while implementing the Consent 
Decree.  
In 1980, the Chicago Public Schools would enter into the Consent Decree which 
we would keep them away from any litigation.173 The Consent Decree was approved, 
providing the Chicago Public Schools Board of Education not only a viable solution to 
student desegregation, but also to areas that hindered their eligibility for federal funding 
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such as classroom integration, bilingual program staffing, and faculty assignment.174 
Section 15 of the Original Consent Decree directly addresses the issue of funding as it 
relates to fulfilling the Consent Decree’s obligations. 
Section 15 states: 
 
15.1 Each party is obligated to make every good faith effort to find and 
provide every available form of financial resources adequate for the 
implementation of the desegregation plan. 
 
15.2 Each party reserves the right to seek to add additional parties who 
may be legally obligated to contribute to the cost of the desegregation 
plan. 
 
15.3 The parties recognize that financial cost of implementation does not 
excuse the failure to develop a desegregation plan consistent with the 
principals set forth in 55 2-14, and is not a basis for postponement, 
cancellation or curtailment of implementation of the plan after it has been 
finally adopted, but is one legitimate consideration of practicability in 
meeting the objective in 2.1.175 
 
The question became if these provisions set forth in the Consent Decree required 
financial assistance from the federal government.176 This debate would be decided in the 
United States v. Board of Education case when federal district Judge Milton I. Shadur 
ruled that the United States was obligated to provide assistance.177 The Chicago Public 
Schools sought payment from the federal government because they believed that the 
language in the Consent Decree entitled them to government funds.178 Judge Shadur’s 
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ruling required that the federal government provide $103.8 million dollars to assist in 
Chicago’s desegregation efforts.179 The school board requested $114 million for its 
schools, but Judge Shadur believed that some of the programs the board requested did not 
meet the legal requirements of materially aiding desegregation.180 
 The U.S. Justice Department was unhappy with Judge Shadur’s decision. 
President Reagan and his administration appealed the judge’s decision that would require 
the federal government to pay $14.6 million dollars for the 1983-84 school year and as 
much as $250 million dollars over the next five years.181 The government’s position was 
developed from the Reagan Administration’s policy decision to reduce the government 
funding made available to school districts.182 Reagan’s Administration was responsible 
for phasing out the Emergency School Aid Act, the primary resource of federal aid 
designed to help school districts undergoing desegregation.183  On July 13, 1983 the 
Justice Department filed papers with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
stating that the previous judgment constituted an unwarranted interference and intrusion 
upon the discretion vested in officials in the executive branch.184 The Justice 
Department’s disgust was articulated in its seeking an Order to Stay the proceedings. 
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 Part of the Department of Justice’s argument was that funding Chicago’s 
desegregation project would take funding from other school districts trying to 
desegregate their schools. This made it an issue of equity, questioning whether it was an 
equitable decision to provide so much support to one single school district. The 
Department of Justice also challenged the amount that the Chicago Public Schools was 
requiring to implement its desegregation plan. They believed that the amount was 
unwarranted, and would be used elsewhere rather than to desegregate their school system. 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sided with the Department of 
Justice, finding that Judge Shakur misinterpreted the provisions set forth in the 1980 
Consent Decree.185 A three judge appellate panel found that the Consent Decree does not 
require the federal government to lobby the Congress for desegregation funds for 
Chicago but only requires that the Chicago Public School system receive “top of the line 
priority” for funds from Educational Department accounts that can be used for 
desegregation purposes.186 Chicago would be forced to cut some of its programs and 
staff, eliminating $20 million dollars from its desegregation budget.187 
Conclusion 
The Chicago Public School’s quest to desegregate its schools was not easy. Some 
of the strategies that were implemented would not prove to be successful. The prospect of 
faculty integration became difficult tasks due to a lack of qualified teaching staff. This 
would often put a strain on school principals, hindering their ability to hire certain staff 
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members because of their race. School funding also became an issue. Since the 
desegregation process is an expensive one, cuts in government support made it difficult to 
continue some of the supports that were in place to help with the desegregation efforts. 
 Some of the barriers that got in the way of Chicago’s desegregation efforts were 
beyond its control. A high percentage of White students leaving the school district made 
it difficult to integrate the student body of many of the Chicago Public Schools. There 
have been many theories to why large amounts of White students leave school districts 
after desegregation efforts, but regardless of what the reasoning may be, the reality is that 
the non-presence of White students made it difficult to create an integrated educational 
setting. 
 Not all of Chicago’s efforts proved unsuccessful in the desegregation process. The 
implementation of magnet schools created an opportunity for students to be educated in a 
diverse environment while receiving a high quality education. The magnet school concept 
utilized busing to assure that students from across the city had an opportunity to attend. 
 Chicago’s efforts to fulfill the goals of the Consent Decree brought the school 
district closer to embracing the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case. Although 
some of the strategies would be problematic, the focus would remain the same. The 
Chicago Public Schools would need to continue to assure that all of its students had the 
same opportunity to achieve a quality education. 
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Research Question 5 
What implications does the implementation of the Consent Decree aimed at 
meeting the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board decision have on current and future 
educational leadership? 
Findings 
Twenty-nine years after the proposal of the Consent Decree, U.S. Judge Charles 
Kocoras has ended the federal mandate requiring the district to integrate its schools.188 
Experts now wonder whether with all of Chicago’s efforts, if integration had ever been 
really achieved.189 District officials state that they will start from scratch developing an 
equitable system, possibly using socio-economic factors as a determinant rather than 
race.190 
When determining how the implementation of the Consent Decree will affect both 
current and future leaders, the researcher categorized the Consent Decree’s history into 
three facets: 1) prelude to the Consent Decree, 2) the Implementation of the Consent 
Decree, and 3) beyond the Consent Decree. The section entitled, “The Prelude to the 
Consent Decree”, examines how the Consent Decree occurred. It will recount how 
Chicago operated its schools in violation of the Brown case and illustrate what current 
and future educational leaders can learn from these mistakes. The section entitled, “The 
Implementation of the Consent Decree” looks at how the Consent Decree was 
implemented, recounting some of the strategies used to meet the goals set forth by the 
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Consent Decree, and providing the opportunity for current and future educational leaders 
to learn from these strategies. The final section entitled, “Beyond the Consent Decree”, 
looks at how current and future leaders will be affected now that the Consent Decree has 
ended. 
Conclusion 
The Prelude to the Consent Decree 
The Consent Decree took place because Chicago’s school district supported the 
segregation of its schools. This was far removed from what was established in the Brown 
v. Board case. Brown v. Board established that separate facilities could not be considered 
as equal. More specifically, the Brown case referred to educational facilities that were 
separated by race that did not offer the same set of resources and opportunities for 
students.  
The first lesson current and future educational leaders must learn is that the 
creation of the Consent Decree was rooted out of Chicago’s inability to embrace what 
had been established in the Brown v. Board decision. They must then make a 
commitment to incorporate the tenets set forth in the Brown v. Board case within their 
own leadership practices, staying true to the idea of educating all children equally. 
Thomas Sergiovanni, author of the book, Moral Leadership discusses the concept 
of the heart, head, and hand of leadership. In short, the heart represents what a person 
believes in, the head represents what a person learns over time, and the hand represents 
the decision a person makes based on the knowledge a person has from the heart and the 
  
234
head. This concept can be effectively applied to educational leaders and their experience 
with external forces such as the Consent Decree. 
Most school leaders came in with what they felt in their heart as it relates to the 
Consent Decree. They did not like it due to the fact they did not comprehend its 
importance. They then relied on their head, which told them that the Consent Decree 
affected their hiring practices and allowed students to transfer from their schools. When it 
came to using their hand to drive their decisions, it would be done with resentment due to 
the experiences of the heart and the head. The reality is that the information available to 
the head does not tell the whole story. Leaders are influenced to make decisions without a 
full scope of information. By understanding the importance of the Brown decision, and 
the fact the Consent Decree is in place because its tenets were violated, the current and 
future educational leader will have accurate information to help him/her better inform 
his/her decisions. It is with this new found information that school leaders can strive for 
equality amongst all students. 
Chicago went through several initiatives in an attempt to desegregate its schools, 
all to no avail. Some established moderate success, but none to the level that satisfied the 
federal government. Each effort was spearheaded by an educational leader that brought 
with him/her their own sense of commitment to the desegregation efforts. Some believed 
it to be a more worthy cause than others. Lesson two for current and future leaders is to 
be aware of their own biases and understand the importance of a school environment that 
provides equal opportunities. Gareth Morgan, in his book, Images of an Organization, 
refers to an organization becoming a “psychic prison.” In this case, it would refer to a 
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leader becoming a slave to his/her own vision. Benjamin Willis was so committed to the 
neighborhood school concept, that he was oblivious to how it affected Blacks and 
minorities who were forced to be educated in substandard conditions.  Joseph Hannon 
provides a similar example, remaining steadfast on the idea that mandatory desegregation 
efforts were bad. In his case his commitment to solely voluntary methods of 
desegregation consequently became the demise of his desegregation plan. 
By looking at how the Consent Decree came into existence, the current and future 
educational leader can see how education can lose its focus. As we are committed to 
educating all students, we should do so on an equal basis providing students the same 
opportunities to achieve academic success. Current and future leaders cannot allow their 
own biases to get in the way of educating children. It is the responsibility of school 
leaders to embrace every student that walks through their doors, ensuring them the best 
educational experience possible. 
The Implementation of the Consent Decree 
The Consent Decree put specific goals in place to attempt to rid the Chicago 
Public Schools of its history with segregated schools. The goals set forth were consistent 
with the tenets that came out of the Brown v. Board case. In order for these goals to be 
achieved, the school district would have to implement several different strategies. Some 
of these strategies were not received well by either the community or school staff. 
Principals often found that they were attempting to carry out Board driven initiatives that 
they believed had an adverse effect on their schools. Those that handled these situations 
positively often weathered the storm and were able to achieve some success in the 
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desegregation process. Those who were negative often found that their educational 
programs suffered. Lesson three for current and future leaders is that they must 
understand that the effectiveness of an educational initiative often rests in their hands. If a 
staff member perceives his/her leader as disliking something, he/she too will look at it 
with disgust. If an educational leader looks at an initiative positively, his/her staff will be 
more apt to put in the effort to make it successful. Current and future leaders need to 
understand the importance of students being provided equal opportunities in education, 
and assure that those who they supervise understand this concept as well. In order to 
accomplish this, leaders must be aware that the change process can be difficult. Often 
people are afraid to move away from what they are comfortable with. Leaders must 
attempt to show empathy and create an environment that embraces change as a means of 
getting better. 
The Consent Decree offered an alternative for schools that would remain racially 
isolated. These particular schools would benefit from additional programming that would 
be implemented to assure the same quality education as those schools that were able to 
operate with a more diverse student body.  
The fact that schools still operate in racial isolation requires current and future 
leaders to reanalyze the tenets set forth by the Brown v. Board case. The popular 
sentiment is that the Brown v. Board case established that separate facilities could not be 
equal. This worked under the premise that minority students were denied education 
alongside their white counterparts because of their race. It also considered that when 
facilities were separated, they were done so in an unjust way with minorities suffering the 
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most. The provision established in the Consent Decree worked behind the premise that a 
school cannot be integrated because of the segregated neighborhood to which it resides. It 
is not to say that these particular school buildings are not open to all races. With a high 
proportion of minority students compared to the district’s white population of students, it 
became increasingly difficult to integrate all of the Chicago Public Schools. In these 
instances the district would provide additional programming to benefit its minority 
students.  
Current and future leaders must remember that the Brown v. Board case 
established that all students should have an equal opportunity to be educated with the 
access to the same facilities and resources. When students cannot share the same 
facilities, it is important to first assure that it is not due to discriminatory practices. It is 
the responsibility of school leaders to embrace every student that walks through their 
doors, ensuring each of them the best educational experience possible. 
Beyond the Consent Decree 
After decades of struggling with the prospect of desegregating its schools, the 
Chicago Public School District has finally been removed from government supervision. 
The Consent Decree has come to an end with the future of desegregating Chicago’s 
schools still up in the air. Many question what was the point, and if any good came out of 
it. Schools in the Chicago Public Schools are still often recognized by race with racially 
isolated schools representing the majority of the Chicago Public Schools.  
Now more than ever, current and future educational leaders need to be committed 
to educating our students. Leaders must remind themselves of the injustices that went on 
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before the signing of the Consent Decree, and make certain that it is not allowed to 
happen again. Lesson four for current and future educational leaders is that they must 
take it upon themselves to create an educational environment that embraces all students 
regardless of race, color, or religion. When in an isolated setting, current and future 
leaders must be committed to providing their students the same opportunities as those 
who are educated in more diverse settings. 
What has changed is now current and future leaders must build off the foundation 
created by tenets of Brown v. Board, and enforced with events such as the Consent 
Decree. Current and future leaders must move to provide equitable environments for 
students rather than just equal accommodations. At this point, equality is not the answer. 
In order to achieve equity, current and future educational leaders must continually 
advocate for the needs of children. 
It will be the responsibility of current and future educational leaders to guarantee 
that all students are given access to the resources needed to be successful. These leaders 
may represent the only advocates these students have. It is important that current and 
future educational leaders take this responsibility seriously; making it an obligation rather 
than something they were told to do. No longer are the days where the Chicago Public 
School District will need to work in fear of court sanctions due to non-compliance as it 
relates to issue of segregation. Will the Chicago Public Schools still do the right thing? 
The reality is it won’t be up to them; rather it is in the hands of our current and future 
educational leaders. 
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Recommendations for Further Research 
This study was limited to using available documentation to provide an historical 
analysis documenting the discriminatory practices responsible for the Consent Decree’s 
origin, the goals established within the Consent Decree itself, the strategies used to 
implement the decree’s goals, the supports and obstacles that effected the decree’s 
implementation, and the effect of the decree’s implementation on current and future 
leaders. Additional research could be done in a variety of ways.  A researcher could 
study:  
1.) principals’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the Consent Decree; 
2.) the effect of the Consent Decree on the academic achievement of minority 
students; and 
3.) a comparison of the effect of desegregation efforts on urban school districts. 
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